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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Massively multiuser virtual environments (MMVEs) have become an increasingly
popular Internet application in the last years. They allow a large number of users to
join a simulated virtual online world. There, every user is represented by an avatar.
The user controls his avatar to move through the virtual world and interact with
his surrounding and the avatars of other users.
The most successful MMVEs are massively multiplayer online role-playing games
(MMORPGs). In MMORPGs, users can play a role in a fantasy game world, fighting
monsters together with other players, solving epic quests, advancing their characters
to higher levels, and acquiring virtual wealth. World of Warcraft [16] by Blizzard
Entertainment is the most prominent example, having more than ten million players
worldwide as of March 2012 [92]. To play the game, users have to pay a monthly
fee, allowing Blizzard Entertainment to make huge profits from operating World of
Warcraft. The MMORPG market currently amounts to $12 billion in 2012 and is
expected to grow to $17.5 billion per year by 2015 [115]. This market size makes
creating MMORPGs interesting for game developing companies. Consequently, a
lot of new MMORPGs have been announced or already entered the market.
However, there are considerable economic risks involved in developing and operating
an MMORPG. After the initial development, there are significant costs to operate
the game. Current MMORPGs are based on client/server technology. A central
server contains the whole virtual world, receiving player actions from all the clients
and supplying them with updates of the world state. This server has to be powerful
and it needs a high bandwidth and low latency Internet connection to support just
a few thousand players. If a company wants to support more players, it has to use
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more servers with each server running an identical copy of the game world, called
shard. Operating these servers creates considerable costs.
As long as player numbers are stable and servers are working to capacity, revenues
should always cover operating costs. However, player numbers may vary greatly over
time and for new games it is pretty had to predict their success. If companies over-
estimate player numbers, they will provide too many servers with over-provisioned
bandwidth resulting in higher costs and less profit or losses for the company. Un-
derestimating the player numbers also causes problems. When World of Warcraft
started, its operator was very much surprised by its success. Servers were overloaded,
spoiling the game experience for players with high latency (lag) till the game reacts
to player input, overcrowding of areas in game, and even regular server failure. It
took the operator quite some time to keep up with the enormous success and open
up new shards. At that time, competition in the market was not very intense. How-
ever, there are many more competitive games today. Bad playing experience at the
start and the resulting bad reputation might ruin the success of a game forever.
Users will quit and play one of the competing games.
The need for high player numbers to cover costs of operation and the upfront un-
certainty in player numbers form barriers for smaller companies. Without these
problems, some niche games appealing to a smaller audience might become econom-
ically more successful creating a more diverse market.
Peer-to-peer technology might help to solve these problems. In a peer-to-peer appli-
cation, there is no central server all clients communicate with. Instead, all peers can
communicate with each other, supplying services to other peers and using services
other peers offer. Peer-to-peer file sharing applications have been very successful
in distributing files, with peers exchanging data directly between each other. No
expensive central server with large storage space to store files and high bandwidth
to deliver files is necessary. The software creates the network out of participating
computers, with each computer supplying storage space and bandwidth to other
computers. In an ideal peer-to-peer application, every node would supply as many
resources as it consumes.
Thus, a peer-to-peer-based MMVE could possibly support any number of players
in one single world, without the operator of the game having to pay for servers or
bandwidth. However, to apply peer-to-peer technology in MMVEs, a decentralized
simulation of the virtual has to be developed. Instead of using a central server,
peers exchange messages directly between each other to perform that distributed
simulation. Despite changing network conditions and message latencies, players
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expect the simulation to advance as fast as the real wall-clock time, with reactions
to player input occurring as fast as they would occur in the real world. Furthermore,
the MMVE should work reliably despite nodes joining or even failing unexpectedly.
Although several approaches have been discussed, so far no working peer-to-peer-
based MMVE exists.
One reason for this is a serious issue threatening MMORPGs: Cheating. MMORPGs
are highly competitive environments. Typically, a player advances his avatar to
higher levels by fighting monsters and solving quests. He collects better equipment,
which in turn enables him to fight even harder monsters and advance further. Virtual
currency can be used to buy better equipment, too. Certain achievements can only
be reached by investing enough time and having the necessary equipment and player
skills. Thus, a player’s avatar is perfectly suited to demonstrate the player’s status
to other players. For a lot of players, gaining achievements and advancing his avatar
plays the major role in MMORPGs [128].
How the game is meant to be played is guarded by rules. They govern how players
interact with the virtual world and other players and what the effects of interaction
will be. These rules have to be the same for all players and they have to be obeyed
by all players for the game to be considered fair.
Players playing by the rules have to invest a lot of time and effort to make progress.
Consequently, there will always be some players trying to break the rules to get an
unfair advantage: to cheat. Since avatars, equipment, and virtual currency are even
traded for real money nowadays, there will be motivation and criminal energy for
cheating. Cheating poses a serious threat to all MMORPGs. For honest players,
fairness is a critical requirement. If honest players think they are competing with
cheaters, they will simply quit the game and look for a better one.
1.2 Contribution
In current client/server-based games, enforcing rules is straight-forward. The whole
game world and player interaction are centrally managed by a server able to check
whether player actions conform to the rules. This server has full authority over the
virtual world state and it can be trusted to stick to the rules since it is under control
of the operator. In a peer-to-peer-based MMVE, the world state and its evolution
is distributed between all peers. These peers cannot be trusted. An attacker could
have made any kind of modification to the game program. The best one can hope
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for is only a certain number of nodes being cheaters and the majority being honest.
Under this assumption, a system using replication and redundant checking might
become a viable remedy for cheating.
Our main contribution is the design and evaluation of such a system: a decentralized
distributed storage able to ensure the virtual world only evolves to the rules even in
the presence of a certain number of malicious nodes. This storage is based on our
second contribution: the design of a self-stabilizing peer-to-peer overlay resilient to
routing attacks malicious nodes could use to increase their influence on the operation
of the storage.
1.3 Organization
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter two contains the foundations this thesis
is based on. It illustrates how current MMVEs look like, explains their current
technical infrastructure, and shows what has been done to realize peer-to-peer-based
MMVEs. It also discusses the problem of cheating, introduces different types of
cheating, and shows the state-of-the-art to counter cheating. Chapter three presents
the basic architectural design of our approach. In chapter four, we present a self-
stabilizing overlay we developed to serve as the basis of a reliable virtual world
storage shown in chapter five. Extensive evaluation follows in chapter six, while
chapter seven concludes, summarizing the contributions of this thesis and showing
open topics.
Chapter 2
Massively Multiuser Virtual
Environments
2.1 Characterization
A massively multiuser virtual environment is a virtual world able to host a massive
number of users simultaneously. Richard Bartle gave the following definition of a
virtual world in his seminal book [9]:
Virtual worlds are implemented by a computer (or network of computers)
that simulates an environment. Some – but not all – the entities in this
environment act under the direct control of individual people. Because
several such people can affect the same environment simultaneously, the
world is said to be shared or multi-user. The environment continues to
exist and develop internally (at least to some degree) even when there
are no people interacting with it; this means it is persistent.
Multi-user dungeons (MUDs) were the first successful applications to fulfil this vir-
tual world definition. The first MUD was developed in 1978 by Roy Trubshaw and
Richard Bartle. MUDs were completely text-based. A user could connect to a MUD
server using a Telnet client. He created a player character: an entity representing
the user in the virtual world. The state of the virtual world as seen by the player
character was presented to the user with text descriptions. It was up to the user’s
imagination to create an image of the world in his mind. He could issue text com-
mands to control the actions of his player character. He could move to different
neighbouring areas, inspect the local area, or interact with other entities in the local
area. These commands were sent to the MUD server. It simulated the result of the
action, updated the state of the virtual world, and sent the result of the action back
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to the user. When entering an area with another player character in it, users could
interact by talking to each other or exchanging virtual items. Player characters could
also interact with characters controlled by the server, so-called non-player charac-
ters (NPCs). Some of them were friendly characters players could talk to and obtain
tasks to solve. Others are enemy characters players could fight. Some of these enemy
characters continually moved through the virtual world to look for player characters
to attack so the world kept changing even when no player characters were present.
Thus, MUDs fulfil Bartle’s definition of a virtual world.
Bartle pointed out, that the fact that most MUDs were games allowing users to play
a role in a fantasy game world heavily influenced the terminology to describe virtual
worlds today. Users are players. When interacting with the virtual world they play
the game controlling their player character. Although it might be possible to use
virtual worlds as e-learning environment or collaborative work environment, most
virtual worlds today are games.
While MUDs still exist, modern virtual worlds feature a graphical representation on
the client. A user can actually see an image of the virtual world and interaction takes
place via a graphical user interface. The first virtual world featuring graphics was
Neverwinter Nights published in 1991. It could be played over the AOL online service
and existed until 1997. Meridian 59 published in 1996 was the first 3D graphical
virtual world. It was also the first to be playable over the Internet. Thus, it can
be regarded as the ancestor of modern 3D virtual worlds. Ultima Online published
in 1997 and Everquest from 1999 closely followed and were the first to become a
commercial success. They still exist today. The most successful virtual world today
is World of Warcraft [16] published in 2004, attracting millions of players.
According to Richard Bartle, most virtual worlds can be identified by five charac-
teristics ensuring that a virtual world resembles the real world.
Rules: "The world has underlying, automated rules that enable players
to effect changes to it (although not to the rules that grant them this
ability). This is the world’s physics." Players can execute actions in
the world that will change the world. For example, they can move
their player character around changing the position of the player
character in the world. The result of an action will be computed
automatically according to the rules of the virtual world. These
rules have been defined by the creator of the virtual world, they
cannot be changed by players.
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Avatars: "Players represent individuals ’in’ the world. They may wield
partial or total influence over an army, crew or party, but there is
only one game entity that represents them in the world and with
which they strongly identify. This is their character. All interaction
with the world and other players is channeled through characters."
This means a player is represented in the virtual world by his avatar
or player character. Actions triggered by the player are executed
by his player character. There might be additional characters influ-
enced by the player, but his player character is the most important
one. Thus, a multiplayer strategy game is not a virtual world be-
cause there is no single character representing the player giving out
all the orders.
Real time interaction: "Interaction with the world ta-kes place in real
time. When you do something in the world, you can expect feedback
almost immediately." Time in the virtual world passes like wall time
in the real world. Similar to the real world, actions of characters
have almost immediate effect. Furthermore, the world continues to
change, even if a player character does not perform any actions.
Thus, round-based games would not be a virtual world.
Shared world "The world is shared." Multiple players can join the vir-
tual world at the same time. They can interact with each other
directly or indirectly via the environment. A single-player role-
playing game would not be a virtual world, as it can only be played
by a single player although the first three characteristics might be
fulfilled by the game.
Persistence "The world is (at least to some degree) persistent." This
means the world maintains its state including the effects of player
actions. When a player leaves the virtual world, the changes he
affected to the world will remain. When he comes back, his player
character will be located at the position he left and the world will
have evolved according to its rules and the actions of the remaining
players.
While the first graphical virtual worlds were called graphical MUDs, today the
term massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) is typically used
for these games. The term "massively multiplayer" suggests that a high number
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Figure 2.1: Representation of the virtual world in World of Warcraft as seen by the player
of players can simultaneously share the virtual world. With current client/server-
based MMORPGs up to a few thousand players can join a virtual world at the same
time.
2.1.1 The User Perspective
Similar to offline computer games, a player has to obtain the game software and
install it on his computer before entering the virtual world. He also has to register
at the game operator to create an account. After starting the software and entering
account name and password, the user can create a new player character or select one
of his existing player characters to enter the virtual world. Typical for role-playing
games, a player can choose class and race of his created character and customize
its appearance. Most MMORPGs feature a fantasy world and race choices include
dwarves, elves, and gnomes. Typical classes are warriors, mages, and priests. A class
determines the play style of a character, the available equipment, and the actions
that can be performed. Warriors usually wear heavy armour. When fighting, they
will try to get close to their target and their actions include various kinds of attacks
performed with weapons like swords or axes. Mages wear only thin armour. They
will try to keep their distance to the enemy and attack him with magical spells
like fireballs. Priests can cast spells to heal characters and are often included when
players play in groups to heal injured members. A player can have multiple player
characters so when joining he can choose which role he wants to play at that time.
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After joining the world, the player will see a 3D graphical representation of the
virtual world. Figure 2.1 shows how this representation looks like for the currently
most popular MMORPG World of Warcraft [16]. It features a third person per-
spective with a camera centred on the player character, zoom- and rotatable using
the mouse. Player characters can move forward, backward, sideways, and rotate by
pressing the associated movement keys. For example, pressing the arrow up key will
cause the character to move forward and upon releasing the key the character will
stop moving. Similarly, pressing the right arrow key will start rotating right and
releasing it will stop the rotation. Holding up and right arrow at the same time will
cause the player character to run clockwise in circles.
A graphical user interface is laid over the world view providing additional elements
like a map, a chat frame, frames for showing the status of the player character or
of the currently targeted character, and buttons giving access to player inventory
or player equipment. The map shows a top-down view of the area surrounding
the player character. Using the chat frame, players can talk to other players. The
character status frames shows the amount of health a character has left and the
available resources for performing actions.
Player Actions
Action bars contain the actions that can be triggered by the player by clicking on
them or by pressing the shortcut key associated with the slot in the action bar.
Actions include attacks or magical spells causing a certain amount of damage to
the target character reducing the health of the target. When the health reaches
zero, the target dies. Player characters that died will be resurrected. Non-player
characters controlled by artificial intelligence (AI) will disappear and spawn again
after some time has passed. Healing classes can also cast healing spells to add life
points to their own health or to the health of allied characters.
To execute an action, certain preconditions have to be satisfied. Many actions need
a target the action is performed on. The player has to select a target from the
world using the mouse. It will appear in the target frame and all actions requiring
a target will be performed on that target. When the player tries to attack the
target, his player character must face the target and it must be within range of
the attack. Maximum action ranges differ between actions. Melee attacks typically
require being very close to the target while magical spells can be cast from longer
ranges. Actions often cost some kind of resource such as mages needing mana to
cast a spell. Only when enough of the resource is currently available, the action can
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be performed subtracting the cost of the action from the available resource. Often
resources regenerate over time. If the player triggers an action and the preconditions
are not fulfilled, he will receive an error message.
Otherwise, the action will be executed by applying effects to the world. A typical
effect is causing damage to a character reducing the amount of health the character
has left. The damage caused depends on attributes like strength, stamina, and
intelligence of the player character as well as attributes of the receiving character
like armour or damage resistances. These attributes depend on the level of the
player character and its equipment. Player characters with higher level and better
equipment are stronger, able to defeat stronger opponents.
Actions like magical spells often have an associated cast time that must pass before
the effect is applied. For example, casting a fireball may require the player character
to stand still and wait for two seconds before the fireball is actually launched and
flies towards the enemy causing damage on impact. Any movement of the player
character while casting will interrupt the action. Enemies getting in melee range
of the caster might also perform a special action interrupting the casting. Upon
execution of the action, the action must typically cool down for a certain time until
it may be used again. Cooldown times are different for different actions with more
powerful action having longer cooldowns so they can be used less often during a
fight. There is also often a global cooldown that prevents any action from being
executed after a former action has been triggered. In World of Warcraft, this global
cooldown lasts 1.5 seconds but can be reduced by a certain attribute of the player
character. This mechanism fosters a tactical use of abilities activating the right
ability at the right time instead of letting the player hitting keys fastest win. The
global cooldown further decreases action frequency to limit the amount of actions
the server has to process in a given time.
Considering the large variety of actions of different classes that also includes healing,
temporary strengthening effects for allies or weakening effects for enemies, and effects
hindering or fastening movement of characters, fights feature interesting dynamic
interactions. The interaction is usually not as fast-paced as in first-person shooters
(FPS), but more tactical due to cooldowns and the wide variety of actions. The
winner in player versus player fights (PVP) is determined by player skill as well as
strength of player characters. NPCs can also perform certain actions but their AI
is more predictable then a human enemies’ actions making defeating NPCs mostly
a matter of player character level and equipment.
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How and how fast characters move, the set of available actions, their preconditions,
effects, and how these effects are calculated make up a major part of the game
mechanics or game rules. It is absolutely crucial these game rules cannot be broken
as we will argue in the next section.
Motivations of Play
Fighting NPCs or other players makes up a large part of player activities but is
just a means to an end. The world in role-playing games has a story players can
experience. NPCs will send players on quests, asking them to defeat certain monsters
in the world, to protect NPCs from enemies, or to collect certain items that are
hidden and protected by monsters in a distant location. Sometimes multiple quests
are chained together to tell a bigger story. By solving quests and defeating NPCs,
player characters receive experience points. Upon receiving enough experience points
the player character will advance to the next level, raising its attributes making it
stronger. Quest rewards also include improved equipment also increasing player
character’s strength. After becoming stronger, the player character can go to other
areas of the world with stronger NPCs and solve quests and experience the story
there.
In contrast to offline role-playing games, MMORPGs allow to play together in a
group to solve quests and fight monsters together. This group play is often en-
couraged as defeating the strongest NPCs requires coordinated play by a group of
players fulfilling special roles like "tanks" absorbing damage, healers healing wounded
players, and damage dealers bringing the enemy monsters down.
Virtual worlds also have an in-game economy where goods can be crafted from
reagents in the world and items can be traded between players using an in-game
currency. The primary purpose of obtaining these items is again to become stronger.
However, some players also enjoy getting rich by crafting, buying, and selling items.
Richard Bartle developed a typology of players classifying them according to their
motivation for playing an MMORPG [9]. According to him, there are achievers, ex-
plorers, socializers, and killers. Achievers primarily focus on advancing their player
characters, becoming more powerful, richer, or obtaining the best equipment. Ex-
plorers concentrate on exploring the world, experiencing the quests and the entire
content that is available. Socializers primarily enjoy playing together with friends
and the social interaction among players. Finally, killers enjoy playing the role of a
bad guy killing other players and disrupting their game experience.
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Yee [128] argues this taxonomy of types is too strict as there could be multiple over-
lapping motivating factors. He conducted a survey among 3000 players asking them
for their motivation. Afterwards he classified the motivation into the three main
factors achievement, social, and immersion. They were divided into several sub-
factors. For example, the achievement factor is divided further into advancement,
mechanics, and competition. Players focusing on advancement again enjoy increas-
ing level and strength of their player characters to show off their status to others.
Players focusing on mechanics have fun analysing the game rules to maximize their
strength becoming the most skilful players. Finally, players who like competition
especially enjoy defeating other players in fights or dominating the economy of the
world.
Advancement and competition were among the most important factors mentioned
by players. If competition and showing off the obtained status is that important
to many players, it is absolutely crucial the competition is fair. The rules should
be the same for all players. If some players are able to cheat and break the rules,
honest players enjoying the competition will simply quit playing the game as they
cannot win an unfair competition. This endangers the success of the virtual world.
Thus, operators have to make sure cheating is not possible.
2.1.2 The Operator Perspective
Developing and running a virtual world causes considerable costs for the opera-
tor. As of 2003, the average costs for development were estimated to be $7 million
with $10 to $12 million being common [95]. Lately, the development cost of the
MMORPG Star Wars: The Old Republic [39] were estimated to be the highest ever
totalling $150-$200 million [96]. The main reasons for these high costs compared to
developing traditional offline games are twofold.
First, a huge amount of content has to be created for the virtual world. For offline
games, it is appropriate to offer 20 hours of entertainment until the game is played
through. MMORPGs are designed to be played continuously. Every time a player
enters the world, he needs something to accomplish. With many players in the
world, the world has to be big to accommodate all the players and provide a variety
of activities to choose from. Creating content like quests and 3D models for world
objects requires considerably bigger effort compared to offline games.
Second, designing and implementing the technical architecture for an MMORPGs
is much more challenging. Currently, it consists of servers running the virtual world
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simulation and clients visualizing the world and allowing player interaction. Even
with this centralized architecture, an MMORPG is a distributed system and devel-
opers have to face all the additional difficulties like partial failure and message loss.
Still, the virtual world should always be available, run reliably, and it should be
scalable so game interaction runs smooth even with a massive number of players. If
player progress is lost, the world is not available, or interaction suffers from message
delay or inconsistencies, players will be disappointed and quit eventually.
In addition to the initial development costs, launching the games requires invest-
ments into server infrastructure and marketing. Afterwards, there are costs for
running the virtual world, estimated to be as high as $3-$5 million per year [95]
These include further developing and maintaining the world and adding new con-
tent but also staff costs for player support and community management. Finally, the
energy and bandwidth consumed by servers and any additional maintenance costs
have to be paid as well.
A commercial operator of a virtual world expects revenues to make up for the
running costs, to pay off the initial investments, and to generate a profit. The
classical subscription-based model requires the player to first buy the game for a
price comparable to offline games, covering a considerable part of the development
costs but not generating a profit on its own [95]. Typically, 30 days of play time is
already included. Afterwards, players have to subscribe by paying a fee to continue
playing. This fee usually ranges from $10 to $15 per month, depending on the game
and the subscription interval. World of Warcraft employs this subscription model
generating a large stream of revenues with its 10 million subscribers as of 2012.
Lately, the so-called free-to-play model has been applied successfully by MMORPGs
like Lord of the Rings Online [116]. With this model, downloading the game client,
creating an account, and playing the game is free of charge. However, after the
player started playing and advanced its character some levels, the game will begin
to charge the player for making additional content available. For example, higher-
level regions of the world will not contain any quest givers and unlocking them has
to be paid for first.
There is an in-game shop where players can buy these quest packs or a wide variety of
items to increase the advancement speed or make playing the game more convenient.
More character slots to create more player characters than the initially allowed
number can also be bought. The operator assumes once a player started playing
the game and got attracted to it, he will pay to continue playing. Even if he does
not, he is still available to play in groups or build social connections with others
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who in turn pay to play. Considering the fact that Lord of the Rings Online runs
on this model for quite some time and a lot of other MMORPGs have changed to
this model lately, it seems to be quite successful.
The third model called pay-to-play is a hybrid between the two former models,
requiring the player to pay for the game initially but no subscription is necessary.
Guild Wars [3] and Guild Wars 2 [4] are examples for this kind of model. Guild
Wars 2 also features an in-game shop generating running revenues.
No matter what model is used, having more players will generate more revenues.
The major part of the costs is fixed like the development costs or staff costs for
game maintenance and support. It does not make difference in cost whether a
development team enhances the world to keep it interesting for 100.000 or 1 million
players as they create the same content for every player. Some staff costs like support
or community management might vary with player numbers. Bandwidth costs are
probably the only costs that directly scale with the number of players. Therefore,
a commercial game operator will always try to attract as many players as possible.
When fixed costs are covered, every additional player generates a profit margin.
Thus, operators are naturally interested in keeping the virtual world cheat-free so
players stay attracted to it.
2.1.3 Terminology
A lot of terms have been used to describe what is essentially a virtual world: dis-
tributed virtual environment (DVE), networked virtual environment (NVE), mas-
sively multiuser virtual environment (MMVE), massively multiuser online game
(MMOG), or massively multiuser online role-playing game (MMORPG). Each of
these terms stress different aspects, for example DVEs and NVEs are used do de-
scribe systems with smaller user numbers while all M*-terms include these massive
user numbers. The term MMVE we use is more neutral towards potential uses of vir-
tual worlds, also allowing systems like collaborative workspaces. In fact, MMORPGs
like World of Warcraft with their 3D representation and their fast-paced fighting in-
teraction in a fantasy game world are the main motivating and as of today only
existing applications. Therefore, a user is a player and we will use the terms MMVE
and MMORPG quite interchangeably.
There is a clear distinction between the terms player, player character, and node or
peer of a player. A player is the user in front of the computer controlling the actions
of his player character in the virtual world. A node or peer is the process on the
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player’s computer part of our peer-to-peer network. However, to improve readability
we will often use the term player instead of player character when the true meaning
is clear from the context. We will also talk about the current position of a player
or even the current position of a node when we are really referring to the current
position of the player character of the player running the node. Where necessary
and terms could be mixed up we will draw distinctions and use the original terms.
Finally, when we say a player performs an action we really mean a player makes its
player character perform an action. In a strict sense, this action is an action allowed
by the game rules but not including movements. However, sometimes we will use
the term action including both movement and actions in the strict sense to denote
everything causing a change of world state triggered by a player.
2.2 The Anatomy of a Virtual World
Internally, a virtual world consists of a set of logical objects, also called entities.
Each of these objects has attributes describing its state. The state of all objects
in the world determines the state of the world. This state evolves over time as the
world is simulated according to the world rules. Multiple physical copies or replicas
might exist for each logical object on different hosts. In fact, every host rendering a
view of the world needs a replica of the objects it renders or at least a partial copy
of the object state to create a visual representation.
2.2.1 World State
The primary attribute associated with every object is its position. It decides where
in the virtual world the object is located. Positions are defined using a three-
dimensional coordinate system based on floating point numbers. Most virtual worlds
are similar to the real world in that there is a ground plane with x- and z- coordinate
defining the position on the plane. The y-coordinate specifies the height. The world
is bounded with maximum and minimum values for x-, y-, and z-coordinate defining
a cuboid space for the world. It mainly extends into the x-z-plane. Like the real
world, virtual worlds are mostly flat. While it would be possible to use a spherical
or toroidal shape for the world, it is very uncommon because it is more intrusive
when new areas are added to the world. Thus, worlds have borders and new areas
can be added behind these borders.
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Typically, every object has got an associated ID uniquely identifying the object
among all others in the world. Furthermore, each object has got an associated
graphical 3D representation realized using a textured 3D model to be rendered by
the game client. The orientation attribute determines which direction in the world
coordinate system the 3D model is currently facing.
Depending on its type, an object may have various additional attributes. Some of
these may change dynamically over time, like the position and the orientation of
an object if it is mobile. Others may be static like the ID of an object. Objects
that have only static attributes are called static objects. The vast majority of the
world is made up of static objects. The complete exterior of the world, the ground,
mountains, buildings, and trees down to beds and chairs within houses are all static
objects. They will never change so it is not possible to dig a hole in the ground, to
chop a tree, or to move a chair.
Dynamic objects with variable attributes includes things like doors that can be
opened and closed or chests that can be found in caves revealing valuable items when
opened. These objects are typically immobile but player characters can interact with
them changing their state. Mobile objects have additional attributes describing their
current movement: a 3D vector describing direction and the speed of movement and
another vector to describe the rotation of an object.
Most mobile objects are characters, moving through the world. This includes AI-
controlled non-player characters like animals and monsters players can fight with
or human characters players can talk to and obtain quests. These characters have
attributes describing the powers they have, their current health, and the current
state of the AI containing its plan or the goal it wants to accomplish. A player
character has a lot more attributes, also describing its equipment, the items in its
inventory, current action cooldowns, or the progress on different quests.
Objects like chairs might actually be dynamic and moveable in single-player offline
games. In a shared world, the opportunities for players to change the world are
purposefully limited. If chairs could be moved in an MMORPG, there would def-
initely be players who would take them to inappropriate places like the dragon’s
lair disrupting the game experience of others. Therefore, changes to the world are
mostly limited to fighting and killing monsters in MMORPGs. The monsters will
reappear after a while. This way the world always returns to the same state so all
players can have the same experience.
The limitation of player influence on the world is also the reason why the inventory
and the equipment of player characters are modelled as attributes of player charac-
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ters instead of objects in the world. If items can be placed anywhere in the world,
players could easily disrupt other players’ game experience.
2.2.2 State Evolution
A virtual world resembles the real world. Time advances like wall time in the real
world and the state of the world changes continuously. Upon triggering an action,
players expect an immediate response. This continuous real-time behaviour has to
be simulated by a discrete step computation device. Therefore, discrete updates
of the world state are calculated at a very fast rate, typically 60 Hz. This rate is
high enough for humans to only perceive a continuous change, creating the desired
impression.
Internally, two functions are used to realize this: Update() and Draw(). Update()
calculates the new state of the virtual world and afterwards Draw() renders the part
of the world visible to the player. At a frequency of 60 Hz, both functions will be
called every 16.66 ms. Typically, the operating system is not a real-time system
so invoking these functions at precisely the intended time cannot be guaranteed.
However, on typical powerful systems 60 Hz should be reached on average. To
prevent jitter in the update frequency from causing stuttering in the world, the time
that has actually passed since the last update is also given as a parameter to the
update function.
Update() inspects all dynamic objects in the world and calculates their updated state
based on the old state and the amount of time passed since the last invocation of
the update function. If Δt is the time since the last update, then the new positions
pnew of mobile object can be calculated using the formula pnew = pold +v ∗Δt where
v is the current movement vector of the object and pold is its old position. Similarly,
the orientation of the object can be updated using its rotation vector and the passed
time.
To be more realistic, the position updates are usually done using more sophisticated
physics calculations. For example, while moving on the ground, the height of the
objects is always set to the ground. If a character has an upward moving vector
because it is jumping, gravity will change its movement vector over several updates
so it will return to the ground. Friction can be simulated causing characters to slide
down inclined planes so characters cannot walk up steep mountains. Movement of
characters is also stopped if their 3D model starts to overlap with other objects like
buildings or other characters so a player cannot just walk through walls.
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During the update, the AI state of NPCs is also updated, e.g. inspecting the sur-
roundings of the NPCs and looking for close player characters to chase and attack.
The update function also processes player input by sampling the state of player in-
put devices. If the forward key is detected as being pressed when it was not pressed
on the last update, the movement vector of the player character is changed to mov-
ing forward. Similarly, if it was pressed but is detected as released, the movement
vector component of the forward direction will be changed to zero. If the player
presses a shortcut key to trigger an action, the update function will check whether
all preconditions are met and start executing the action. It will add the action to
the set of running actions. On further invocations, it will advance the state of any
action in this set. It will subtract the elapsed time from the remaining cast time
and apply its effects by modifying the state of the corresponding objects. When the
action is finished, it will be removed from the set.
Movement of characters and most actions also have associated animations so players
can actually see what is being done. Starting and updating the state of animations
and blending different animations into another also happen inside the update func-
tion. When the update is finished, the draw function renders the current world
state. The 3D rendering is usually computationally much more expensive than up-
dating and will take much more time than the update. When drawing has finished,
any remaining time is skipped until the update-draw-cycle starts again. This basic
principle is also used in distributed multi-user virtual worlds, as we will show in the
following sections.
2.3 Client/Server-based MMVEs
Today’s MMORPGs like World of Warcraft [16] are all based on client/server tech-
nology. The game provider operates powerful servers in a data centre simulating the
virtual world or parts of it. With millions of subscribers, no server would be able to
run a virtual world with that many players. Therefore, MMORPGs use a concept
called sharding. Instead of one single virtual world, there are multiple shards each
representing another copy of the virtual world. When creating a player character
and joining a world, the player has to decide which shard he wants to play on. Each
shard is run by its own servers. The player connects to the game server of its shard
using his game client. The server sends the avatars of the player and the player
selects one to join the world. Then the server sends the current state of objects to
the client that will render the scenery around the player character.
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2.3.1 Locality of Interest
Sending all objects in the world to all players would not be scalable. Therefore, the
amount of transferred data is reduced by sending only the state of dynamic objects
to the client. Static objects which make up the majority of objects are already
hard-coded into the client. Second, only the objects close enough to the player
character for him to see and interact with are actually sent. This limited visibility
and interaction range creates a circular so-called area of interest (AOI). Its radius
is commonly smaller than the real-world visibility with typical values around 50
meters.
This locality of interest is the reason why distributed virtual environments can ac-
tually scale to massive user numbers. If all clients were always interested in the
whole world state, the amount of data sent to each of the clients would increase
with every additional player quickly overloading the server. As long as players are
evenly distributed all over the world, this locality limits the amount of data the
server has to transfer. However, if there are hotspots in the world where a lot of
players aggregate so they are all in each others’ AOIs, the server might still become
overloaded. In the worst case, all player characters are in the same location and the
system would not scale again.
2.3.2 Replicated Simulations
The server continuously updates the state of the virtual world as described in sec-
tion 2.2.2. Since the server knows the positions of all player characters, it can send
every client only the updated state within its AOI. Sending every player the state
of its AOI 60 times per second would overload any server. Therefore, the client
performs its own simulation of the local area. As long as no new objects enter its
AOI or other player characters in its AOI perform actions, the simulation on the
client will update the state on its own trying to make it consistent with the state
on the server. However, standard consistency models like linear, serial, or causal
consistency [60] cannot be readily applied as they do not fit well with the continuous
changes of state, causing high response times [55]. Therefore, objects will only be
loosely consistent as shown in the following.
When a player starts to move, its client will send a message to the server and it
will include its movement into the local simulation beginning to move the player
character. Upon reception of the message, the server will also begin to include the
movement of the player character and it will calculate the set of clients whose player
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characters are in visibility range to the now-moving player character. It will send
each of these clients a message so they can also include the movement of the player
character in their simulation.
However, transferring messages takes a certain amount of time. When a player
character starts to move, it will start moving immediately on its client. When the
message arrives at the server it will start moving there, and when the messages
from the server reaches the clients whose AOI the player character is in, it will
start moving at these clients. Since the messages for the different clients can arrive
at different times, the movement will not necessarily start at the same time on all
clients. All clients and the server will see a different state with the moving player
character being at a slightly different position depending on when the movement was
started. These inconsistencies can easily be observed when two players are physically
next to each other and start running forward at the same time as every player will
see himself being in front. These small inconsistencies can grow fast considering
that starting and stopping to move in conjunction with turning at slightly different
times can lead to positions finally diverging a lot.
Therefore, the server is the only authority on the current state of the world and it
can overwrite the states created by the simulations on the clients with its own. This
way it prevents inconsistencies on the clients from becoming too big so the resulting
inconsistency is a short-term inconsistency [89]. However, simply overwriting the
state at the client could be very disruptive as positions of objects suddenly change
when the client receives the updated state. Therefore, clients usually interpolate
between their own state and the received state to create a smooth transition to the
new state. This overwriting of the state mostly happens indirectly on the fly, as all
player or NPC actions sent to the clients also contain the current position of the
acting characters. This way the state never diverges too much.
Often there are additional dynamic objects in the world that are not relevant to
any actions performed in the world but they make the world appear livelier. This
includes birds flying in the sky or grass on the ground swaying in the wind. The
dynamic states of these objects are never synchronized between clients and server
as they do not exist on the server in the first place.
2.3.3 Player Movement and Actions
As player characters and their AOI move, the server will continuously send them
the current state of objects entering their AOI. Similarly, if objects move into the
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AOI of a stationary player characters the client will be informed about their state
by the server so it can include the objects into the local simulation.
When a player triggers an action, the client will locally check whether the precon-
ditions for executing this action are met. If they are met, it will start executing the
action and send a message to the server. The server will perform the same check and
either start the action or respond with an error message. This can always happen
as the state of client and server is not necessarily consistent. An enemy player could
be just within range of a certain attack while the server already noticed that player
started moving and is already out of range. The client will stop any animation it
started for the action and display the server’s error message saying the target is out
of range instead. The higher the latency to the server, the more likely inconsistencies
and disruptive overruling by the server occur.
The effects of any actions are also calculated by the server. While the client may
already start an animation for an attack, the final damage caused, often involving
some randomness, is only decided by the server. The same is true for actions per-
formed by NPCs. The client might simulate and perform all actions but the final
effects on object states can always be overridden by the server. Animations played
for actions are not synchronized with the server as the server does not include an-
imations in its simulation. Animations serve the same purpose as the nonrelevant
objects to make the virtual world appear more realistic but they do not play a role
in any state update calculations. Therefore, the times an attack animation hits an
enemy character is not necessarily the time the server subtracts the damage from
the health of the target.
2.3.4 State Consistency
In effect, the world state on clients and server is only loosely consistent [56]. How-
ever, players could only see this if they did a side-by-side comparison of the views
presented by multiple clients. Besides that, players might only notice this indirectly
when positions of objects suddenly change or actions that should have been possible
from the client’s view are denied because the client state was corrected by the server.
These inconsistencies can still be disruptive or even lead to players taking wrong
decisions based on the wrong state.
As long as players take actions and messages are in transit, the state of the world will
be different on server and clients. The world state will be eventually consistent [120]
so all clients and server will have a consistent state if they are not moving and
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not performing any actions. However, it is hard to define consistency for systems
with continuous state changes. Traditionally, replicas of an object are said to be
consistent at time t if they have the same state. This definition has been adapted
by Mauve [89] for use in continuous systems defining the state to be consistent if
all hosts that received all messages necessary to calculate the correct state at time t
have the same state at that time. Even this adapted definition fails to really capture
the nature of continuous systems.
The times at which different hosts calculate their updates are never perfectly syn-
chronized. When an object is moving and multiple hosts update its position, they
would have to do this at exactly the same time to calculate exactly the same posi-
tion. Even if all of them update the state of the objects within one millisecond, they
will still generate slightly different position and the replicas of the object would not
be consistent according to the former definition. On the other hand, if all the devi-
ations are only caused because of the small differences in update time, this would
still be sufficiently consistent.
Therefore, our definition of consistency at time t defines world states to be consistent
if updating the state from the last updated state to time t on all hosts that received
all messages necessary to calculate the correct state at t yields the same state. Hosts
with clocks running ahead of the true time will already have updated their local state
to time t + x. Their state is considered to be consistent with the state of others if
it is reachable from the other’s state at time t.
2.4 Peer-to-Peer-based MMVEs
First proposals to implement distributed virtual environments on decentralized ar-
chitectures reach back to the 1990’s targeting multiple users and distributed archi-
tectures e.g. SimNet [20] or MiMaze [49]. These architectures could only support
small user numbers since they used a decentralized architecture broadcasting all
state updates to all nodes. This was shortly followed by rising popularity of the first
successful MMORPG Ultima Online [38].
Later, peer-to-peer file sharing networks like Napster and Gnutella [57] became
extremely popular allowing a large number of users to share files without needing
expensive central servers and having to pay for file transfer traffic. Therefore, interest
was rising to implement MMVEs based on peer-to-peer technology, freeing operators
from the costs of running expensive servers and paying for their bandwidth. Instead,
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the bandwidth of clients/peers players already paid for is used. Furthermore, if
designed right, peer-to-peer networks can scale very well. Applied to MMVEs, much
larger virtual worlds could be realized and sharding would not be necessary.
2.4.1 Challenges
In a peer-to-peer based MMVE, there is no central server holding all objects in the
world, updating them based on the actions received from clients, and distributing the
updated state to interested clients. The objects in the world have to be distributed
among the peers as no single peer is able to receive actions of all players and update
the world state.
Consequently, events like the actions and movement of players have to be forwarded
to peers responsible for the area the players are in. They are the authority for the
state in that area. Players moving into this area will receive the state from these
nodes. Furthermore, nodes in an area need to see the actions and movements of
other player characters in that area so they can update their local simulation. The
mechanism to get updates and actions to peers interested in these events is typically
called interest management.
The peers have to form a structured overlay network on top of the underlying
TCP/IP layer, to find peers based on their locations and exchange messages ef-
ficiently. Furthermore, redundancy has to be employed to compensate for the un-
reliability of peers so the world is simulated correctly despite nodes joining and
leaving unexpectedly. In the following, we will analyse how existing approaches try
to realize peer-to-peer based MMVEs focusing on their state distribution and their
interest management mechanism.
2.4.2 State Distribution
After unstructured peer-to-peer networks became very popular, structured peer-
to-peer networks realizing a distributed hash table (DHT) like Chord [113] and
Pastry [103] to store and look up data in a purely decentralized fashion have been
developed. In DHTs, the connection graph is a special structure, e.g. a ring. Nodes
in the ring have identifiers from a one-dimensional numeric key space and they are
responsible for storing all data from a certain part of this key space, e.g. all keys
closest to their own identifier. When storing or looking up data, a node can always
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decide whether it is responsible for a key or whether any of its neighbours in the
structure is closer, forwarding the query to the closer neighbour.
In [70], DHTs were used as a backup persistent storage. Since DHTs generate keys
for data using hash functions, they destroy any locality of data as they map data
uniformly to the key space. Objects close in the world will have keys far apart so
they will not be stored on the same node in the network. This makes executing
range queries to retrieve state in an area very expensive.
Therefore, Mercury [15] used the basic ideas of distributed hash tables to form a
structured overlay without using hash functions. It directly used the attributes of
stored objects to map objects to the nodes responsible for storing it arranged in
a ring structure. Thus, objects close in the attribute space were also close in the
ring and range queries can be executed more efficiently. Mercury used multiple ring
structures to support multiple attributes. In Colyseus [14], Mercury was used to
store objects from a virtual world with 2-dimensional positions by using x- and z-
coordinate of the positions as object attributes. However, having to route queries
on multiple hops before data can be retrieved proved to be too slow considering
the real-time interaction necessary for virtual worlds so Colyseus was only used for
smaller multi-player games. Similarly, [37] proposed to use a spatial index on top
of a generic DHT to store objects based on their locations. Again, maintaining the
index and multi-hop routing in the DHT will be too slow for real-time interaction.
Therefore, other approaches combined ideas of peer-to-peer-based and client/server-
based MMVEs. Typical for these approaches is the splitting of the world area into
zones and using coordinators responsible for data in their zone. As the world is
mostly flat and objects are mainly distributed in the x-z-plane, the splitting typically
happens using these two dimensions. This is common to all approaches distributing
world state, including ours.
In [70], the world is split into disjoint fixed size zones. In each zone, there is one
node responsible for updating the state in that zone essentially acting exactly like a
central server for that zone with nodes forming a zoned federation. An underlying
DHT is used to assign responsibilities for zones and serve as a backup storage.
However, seamless change of zones was not possible because each zone was like a
small virtual world with its own central server.
Therefore, [6] split the world into fixed size rectangular zones with one coordinator
per zone, allowing players seamless changing of zones. Whenever a player gets
close to a zone border and his actions may affect multiple zones, coordinators use
locking mechanisms to synchronize state changes. However, distributed locking
2.4 Peer-to-Peer-based MMVEs 25
only works if nodes holding locks are reliable. This system is targeted more at using
multiple reliable servers than unreliable peers. Hydra [24] follows a similar approach,
sacrificing seamless zone changes but implementing failover mechanisms for servers
using replicated backup zones on different servers.
Mopar [129] partitioned the world into small hexagonal cells also allowing seamless
transition between cells. Each cell has an associated home node which is determined
using a Pastry DHT to map cell identifiers to the responsible nodes. This home node
always knows which node currently located in a cell is the master node of that cell
acting as its coordinator. All other nodes in a cell are slave nodes connected to
the coordinator using it to exchange events and update their world states. Master
nodes form an overlay connecting to all neighbouring master nodes, each updating
the state in its own cell and synchronizing object transitions with its neighbours.
Furthermore, they exchange information on player movement changing master node
responsibilities and recording changes in master nodes at the home nodes so other
nodes can always discover the master node of a cell using the DHT.
SimMud [80] uses a combination of a Pastry DHT and coordinators to simulate the
virtual world. Similar to [70], the world is split into disjoint fixed size zones with
no seamless transition. For each zone, there is a multicast group using Scribe [22]
on top of Pastry to realize application-level multicast. Every node periodically
reports its player character’s position and any state updates to all other nodes in
the group. The other nodes use interpolation and dead-reckoning [110] to smoothen
the visual representation of player character movement. Furthermore, each group
has a coordinator responsible for updating the state of all non-player characters
based on the actions of player characters and sending state updates of NPCs to
its group. However, using Pastry’s multihop-routing to realize a scalable multicast
with Scribe incurs a considerable delay for propagating updates and was too slow
for real-time interaction.
All of the coordinator-based approaches so far use fixed size regions. The load on
each coordinator depends on the number of players in a region correlated with its
size. However, some areas might be more popular than other areas creating a higher
load on coordinators responsible for these areas. Even approaches supporting differ-
ent region sizes [24, 70, 80] require the developer to estimate popularity of regions
beforehand and they cannot adapt to changing popularity over time. Therefore,
coordinator-based approaches have been proposed using a dynamic partitioning of
the world into zones.
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In [101], peer-to-peer technology is used to manage the server infrastructure simu-
lating the world partitions. Similar to former approaches, the servers act as coor-
dinators for their respective zone. Zones are dynamically generated similar to the
2-dimensional DHT CAN [98]. In CAN, every node is responsible for a rectangular
zone and nodes in neighbouring rectangular zones are connected. Messages can be
sent using the location as address, arriving at the node responsible for the zone the
location is in. With one peer in the network, its zone would be the whole world.
When another peer joins, it will send a message to its position arriving at the node
responsible for the respective zone. That node will split its zone in two equally-
sized zones and each of two nodes will become responsible for one of the split zones.
In [101], servers form a CAN overlay and peers connect to the servers based on the
zones they are currently in. These servers simulate the world state in their zone.
They are connected to the servers of neighbouring zones so they can handle object
transition and synchronize state. If a server experiences high load because too many
players are in its zone, a new server will be added to that zone halving its size and
reducing the load on that server. Similarly, servers with low load can be removed
joining zones that have been split. This allows better load balancing than possible
with fixed size zones. The hybrid architecture HYMS [28] also uses the CAN-based
recursive splitting approach to control responsibility of servers for zones.
GROUP [19] uses a CAN-based overlay to store the world state in a completely
distributed fashion. In GROUP, the peers themselves are assigned fixed random po-
sitions in the world and are responsible for storing and updating all objects within
their CAN-zone. These zones change dynamically as node join and leave the net-
work and the objects have to be passed around. This dynamics was taken one
step further with approaches using the current positions of player characters in the
world to determine the responsibility for objects in the world. When every node is
responsible for storing all objects it is closest to, a Voronoi tessellation [7] is cre-
ated where each peer is responsible for all objects within its Voronoi cell, see also
figure 4.1. Distributing state based on Voronoi tessellations is used in several ap-
proaches like [13, 18, 67, 99]. They all have the advantage of a more fine-grained
load balancing as nodes join the network or player characters aggregate in an area
automatically shrinking zones. However, they also suffer from the increased over-
head associated with transferring objects between nodes whenever player characters
move. Therefore, using dynamic Voronoi tessellations might be more suitable to
disseminating events as shown in the next section.
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2.4.3 Interest Management
Interest management mechanisms create an overlay structure allowing efficient dis-
semination of events to all nodes interested in these events. These nodes can update
their player character’s state if affected by an event and they can update their cur-
rent world view. The interest management also has to adapt the structure of the
overlay as players move. Maintaining an authoritative state for other objects in the
world is the task of the state distribution mechanism.
A straight-forward approach to ensure all nodes receive all relevant actions of players
is broadcasting all actions. Broadcasting was used in MiMaze [49] and also in [89] but
it is inherently not scalable. SimMud [80] adapted this approach to use multicast
groups to broadcast messages only within a fixed size area. This approach only
provides limited scalability as the number of players per zone may not be too big.
To exchange events more efficiently, later approaches focused on disseminating events
only to players close enough to perceive the event. Only the players whose AOIs
contains the player generating the event will receive it. Since AOIs typically have
identical sizes, the relationship of being contained in another player’s AOI is sym-
metric. Therefore, every player has to forward its events to all players within its
AOI. To exchange messages efficiently, the overlay structure should reflect the lo-
cality in the virtual world by connecting nodes close to each other so messages
can be transferred within a few routing steps. While there are approaches to use
only weakly-structured overlays and gossiping for event dissemination [108], most
approaches rely on specific overlay structures for event dissemination.
In Solipsis [78], nodes are connected to all other nodes within their AOI. Thus, events
can be forwarded directly to other nodes. Since players are moving constantly, con-
nections have to be adapted accordingly. The network has to stay globally connected
and a node has to notice when a new node enters its AOI and connects to it. To
ensure that also in cases when all nodes in the AOI lie in one direction or the AOI
is empty, a node a maintains a second set of nodes outside its AOI. This set con-
tains the closest nodes whose convex hull contains a. This ensures a node is always
connected to outside nodes in every direction that can tell the node when a player
enters its AOI. If connected nodes fail causing the node to lie outside the convex
hull, it can issue a special query running in a circle around its position to discover
nodes to repair the convex hull set. Nodes periodically exchange position updates
to adapt the structure of the overlay.
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In [77], a similar approach is used connecting to all nodes within the AOI and
using an unstructured second set to discover nodes entering the AOI but without
guaranteeing all nodes in the AOI will always be detected. pSense [105] works
similar but global connectivity is insured by splitting the area around a node into
eight sectors and connecting to the closest node outside the AOI in each sector.
These nodes function as sensor nodes notifying nodes about players entering their
AOI. Approaches like COVER [94] use an additional global quad tree of super-nodes
responsible for maintaining player positions and detecting nodes entering AOIs. In
QuON [8], locally constructed quad trees are used at each node to maintain the
second set of nodes guaranteeing global connectivity.
Multiple approaches like VAST [69], VoN [68], Nomad [100], and others [19, 50] use
Voronoi tessellations to create a Delaunay graph overlay structure by connecting
neighbouring Voronoi cells. In these approaches, nodes are again connected to all
nodes within their AOI and disseminate events directly. They connect to the nodes
outside their AOI whose Voronoi cell overlaps their AOI. This structure automat-
ically ensures a node is connected to other nodes in every direction to maintain
global connectivity and detect nodes entering the AOI. These approaches mainly
differ in how they adapt their structure to player movement, additionally predicting
movement or using a red-black Delaunay structure that can be adapted faster [50].
In [74], an approach is presented to use the Delaunay graph to build a dissemination
tree using other nodes in the AOI to forward an event to all nodes if the number of
nodes is too high for the generating node to forward an event directly to all other
nodes.
2.5 Cheating in MMVEs
Whenever written or unwritten rules govern human actions, there will be people
trying to break these rules to get an advantage – reaching from just jumping the
queue to committing crimes. Cheating in games is probably as old as gaming,
especially when money can be won or lost, for example in poker. Even when nothing
serious is really at stake, there will be people trying to cheat just to win. Adopting
the definition of [127], we define cheating as:
Any behaviour that a player uses to gain an advantage over his peer
players or achieve a target in an online game is cheating if, according to
the game rules or at the discretion of the game operator (i.e. the game
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service provider, who is not necessarily the developer of the game), the
advantage or the target is one that he is not supposed to have achieved.
This definition has an important implication: whether some behaviour is considered
to be cheating can be very different from game to game. It is up to the operator
to define it as cheating or as valid behaviour. Nevertheless, there is a set of very
similar rules that has emerged in MMORPGs. Thus, there are also some common
types of cheating that have been analysed in [124, 126, 127]. We will present these
types in the following section.
Considering the importance of competition and advancement as a motivating factor
for playing MMORPGs [128], players will only play the game if it is fair: the rules
are the same for everyone and nobody can break the rules. Having cheaters in the
game will have severe consequences for the success of a virtual world [54]. Therefore,
operators have to make sure cheating is not possible. We will show cheating coun-
termeasures that have been proposed after discussing cheating types in the following
section.
2.5.1 Cheating Types
There are two general types of rules a cheater can try to break. First, there are cod-
ified rules implemented as part of the game code defining what actions are possible
and how the game world evolves according to these actions. They are usually not
specified externally but the executable code running the virtual world defines these
rules. Thus, breaking codified rules generally involves modifying either the code
itself or changing the intended effects of the code by modifying its execution infras-
tructure. The cheats to break codified rules are specific for each virtual world and
the way it is implemented. However, since current client/server-implementations
work quite similarly, certain types of cheats have emerged.
In addition to codified rules, there are uncodified rules used by the game operator
to specify how the game is supposed to be played. The game software itself is left
intact but used in a way forbidden by the operator.
Collusion
A very common uncodified rule found in all competitive games is the prohibition of
collusion. If multiple players are supposed to compete against each other but some
of them collude, they might gain an advantage against non-colluding players. For
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example, in World of Warcraft there is a ranking system for team-based player vs.
player fights. Since each player can have multiple player characters, each team of
players might form two teams: the first team consisting of characters supposed to
be pushed up to higher ranks and the second team only serves as the victim for the
other player’s first team. This allows the winning teams to climb up the ladder very
fast as matches also end very fast. This so-called win-trading is explicitly forbidden
by the operator of World of Warcraft.
Automation
Stating the game has to be played manually by the player himself is another typical
uncodified rule. Computers are in several ways superior to humans. Modern chess
software beats most humans even on middle-class personal computers. In games
like first-person shooters involving fast reactions and precision of player actions,
players can use an aimbot – an additional piece of software generating mouse input
for the game doing the aiming and shooting. In MMORPGs, there is also bot
software completely automating the process of fighting NPCs by generating the
necessary input for the game client. Thus, players can have the bot control his
player character collecting in-game money and experience points to raise the level of
the player character. It might sound strange for a player to use a piece of software
to actually play the game rather than playing the game himself. However, some
players consider the levelling or the farming of in-game money or crafting reagents
as boring and try to automate this, giving them an advancement advantage over
players playing manually.
Real-Money Trading
Using bots often appears in conjunction with another uncodified rule: the prohibi-
tion of real-money trading for in-game goods. There are companies offering players
to sell them in-game money, items, or even high-level characters for real money.
These companies either employ people mostly in low-salary countries to play the
game and collect the items to be sold. However, some of them also use bots to auto-
mate the collection process. The time and the investment required to farm a certain
amount of gold and the demand of players buying gold have led to the creation of
real market market prices for in-game money. This price allows determining the real
value created in virtual economies – which can be substantial. In [23] the players
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of the MMORPG Everquest [119] were shown to create a greater gross domestic
product per capita than the people in Russia as of 1999.
Typically, the operator is not interested in letting other companies earn money with
his game. Furthermore, the farming of in-game money leads to price inflation de-
stroying the in-game economy as players not using bots or not buying in-game money
from money-selling companies are not able to afford the prices of items, reducing
their fun in playing the game. By allowing real money trading an operator would
also indirectly admit that there is real value contained in virtual objects, establish-
ing a notion of virtual property. This would have a lot of legal implications [10].
For example, if players were owners of a virtual item, the freedom of the operator
to change or extend the game would be limited. Any adjustments to the power of
the items or adding more powerful weapons to the game world would reduce the
value of any existing now-weaker weapon. Owners of these weapons might demand
compensation for the damage caused. Therefore, any trades involving real money
are typically forbidden.
Abusing the Game Procedure
It is also forbidden to abuse the game procedure, for example when players about
to lose a duel log out immediately to prevent their defeat. However, current games
usually prevent this type of abuse because upon triggering a logout or disconnecting
the player character usually stays in the world for a certain time. In effect, any kind
of rule is possible: if the operator declares the game to be played with the left hand
only, this would also be a valid uncodified rule – albeit a rule that does not make
much sense and would be hard to enforce anyway.
State Tampering
The first way to break codified rules is to directly modify the state of the world,
allowing to increase levels, power, and inventory of player characters or to weaken
enemies. In [63] it was shown how a weakness of the client/server implementation
in World of Warcraft could be exploited to modify the position of one’s player
character. In World of Warcraft, the complete player character state is stored at the
central server and directly modifying this state is not possible because the server
updates the state according to player actions only. It can check these actions and
calculate their effects. There is one exception: the server trusts the client regarding
the position of the player character. Its position is included in every action sent
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to the server and the server updates the player character position to the reported
value. Using a debugger, the memory at the address of the current position can be
modified to reduce travel times or to always stay directly behind an opponent even
when he is turning so he has no way to defend himself. While World of Warcraft
uses techniques to make it harder to identify critical memory locations containing
trusted state, e.g. dynamically changing memory locations, it does not perform any
checks on the validity of reported position. Fundamentally, there is only one way to
prevent the tampering with the world state in a client/server architecture: "Never
trust the client!". The server should be the only one updating the world state and
only according to actions of players that have been checked by the server.
State Exposure
Another attack on codified rules is the information or state exposure cheat [85].
Typically, a virtual world only allows a player to gain a limited amount of infor-
mation about the world determined by the visual perception range. Having more
knowledge might give a cheating player an unfair advantage over honest players. An
example for this type of cheat is the so-called wallhack in first-person shooters. By
changing settings in the graphics driver, the rendering of textures can be disabled for
the walls in the game allowing cheating players to look through walls and see honest
enemy players trying to hide. For this cheat, only the infrastructure of the game
had to be modified, not the game itself. Similarly, so called maphack allow a player
to read out the entire dynamically created map so he knows the whereabouts of all
interesting objects. This is even possible without actually reading into the process
memory by using network sniffers and constructing the map from the sniffed data
instead. The underlying problem is again misplaced trust in the client. Once state
is exposed to the client, the client cannot be trusted to keep it a secret.
Timing Cheats
Timing cheats are possible when players can get an unfair advantage by sending
messages not at the time they are supposed to. The most important example is
players getting an advantage by delaying sending their actions. This is only possible
if the architecture actually allows such an advantage. In a simple client/server
implementation, the server decides on the execution times of player actions based
on the reception time of the action message and delaying a message would actually
put a player at a disadvantage.
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However, some implementations try to compensate the disadvantage of players with
a high-latency Internet connection that always see the current state later than other
players and have their actions always executed with a considerable delay. The
architecture might synchronize clocks and put timestamps into the action messages
of clients. Upon reception of such a message with an old timestamp, the server
might conclude a player action happened earlier and recalculate the current state.
Using timestamps is also mandatory in any peer-to-peer-based MMVEs as states
will only be consistent if actions are executed at the same time which is impossible
with variable message latency (see section 3.1.2).
Using timestamps opens up the possibility to delay an action or to replace the true
time with an earlier timestamp. This lookahead cheat allows a cheating player to
see the actions of other players and answer with an action put back in time so it
will be executed first. To other people, this would appear as if the player actually
performed this action first but it arrived later due to high message latency.
Inconsistency Cheats
In peer-to-peer-based MMVEs relying on exchanging player actions or state up-
dates to calculate world state in a decentralized fashion, a cheating player can gain
an advantage by tampering with this exchange. This is generally not possible in
client/server architectures as nodes do not interact with each other but all messages
go to and are processed by the central server.
A cheater could try to give invalid commands [124] by executing actions that are
not allowed at a certain time because its precondition are not met. By disabling
the local check of preconditions, a cheating player can send out the action anyway,
hoping other nodes will execute it.
By creating inconsistencies in the world view of other players, a cheater might cause
them to take wrong actions. He can send different actions to different other nodes
causing their state to diverge. He can also completely blind specific players by
suppressing the sending of any updates or actions to him.
A cheater might also cause other players to take certain actions by spoofing their
identity directly creating actions in their name. If that is not possible, a cheater can
still replay old recorded actions of other players.
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Exploiting Bugs
A typical uncodified rule is the prohibition of exploiting bugs to get an advantage.
Sometimes there are loopholes in the code, allowing players to use an uncommon
combination of actions to create effects not intended by the developers. Examples
for loopholes are sending negative amounts of in-game money to other players using
the in-game money transfer, exploiting AI-errors causing NPCs a player could not
defeat normally to become defenceless, or somehow being able to fly in areas where
it is not possible.
However, a bug is also a codified rule. Since there is not external specification
saying negative amounts of money may not be transferred or flying is supposed
to be impossible, a player who exploits the bugs does not break a codified rule.
Operators typically argue that players should have an idea about what is intended
and what is not based on similarities to the real world or to other parts of the virtual
world. Since transferring negative amounts of money is impossible in the real world,
it should not be possible in the virtual world and players know that. Sometimes
the distinction between bug exploitation and clever use of game mechanics is not
that clear. For example in World of Warcraft, powerful guards prevent fighting in
cities by attacking anyone who is attacking a player. A clever player could start a
fight against an NPC outside the city and run into the city for guards to help him
defeat the NPC. It is not immediately clear whether this is an exploit or a clever
use of game mechanics. In the end, it is the operator’s decision and his obligation to
develop a consistent ruling on these border cases so players know what to expect.
2.5.2 Cheating Countermeasures
There are two fundamental ways to counter cheating: prevention and detection.
Cheating prevention means cheating is essentially impossible. Either the system is
just not vulnerable to a certain kind of cheat – like timing and inconsistency cheats
that do not work in client/server-based MMVEs not using timestamps – or addi-
tional measures have been implemented making an architecture invulnerable against
certain cheats that would have been possible otherwise. Countering cheaters by de-
tection includes having a mechanism that can detect cheaters and, upon detection,
punish them for cheating, for example by temporary or permanent exclusion from
the game. If the detection works reliably, the number of cheaters will be reduced
over time. Making the punishment visible to other players discourages cheating
when they see there is actually a mechanism in place to catch cheaters [17].
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Detecting and punishing cheaters can be used to counter all kinds of cheats. Break-
ing uncodified rules cannot be prevented but only detected and punished. The
operator simply cannot prevent players from transferring real money outside the
game exchanging it for in-game items or placing a robot in front of the computer to
play the game. Breaking codified rules like state exposure can be prevented by lim-
iting the amount of state given to clients [85] or can be detected, e.g. by tracing the
view directions of players diverging for players using wallhacks as they tend to look
at enemy players more often although these should not be visible for them [83].
A detection procedure faces the typical challenges of classification: working reliably,
i.e. not generating false negatives while at the same time not classifying honest play-
ers as cheaters, i.e. not generating false positives. Internally, there is some kind of
threshold to distinguish cheating from non-cheating behaviour. If detecting cheaters
was a clear-cut case and performing a certain action under specific circumstances
was cheating, that action could be denied in the first place preventing the cheating.
Since falsely accusing honest players of cheating and punishing them will probably
cause more harm to the success of the game than some cheaters going undetected,
the operator will pick a more conservative threshold preferring false negatives over
false positives. Cheaters will probably reverse-engineer these thresholds so a limited
amount of cheating will always be possible with any detection procedure. Therefore,
if prevention is possible it should always be used instead of detection.
The distributed storing and updating of peer-to-peer-based MMVEs introduces ad-
ditional ways of breaking codified game rules like state tampering, state exposure,
timing cheats, and inconsistency cheats compared to client/server-based MMVEs.
In the following, we will show existing proposals to prevent these types of cheating.
Event Exchange
In the beginning, most proposals focused on preventing players from delaying mes-
sages or tampering with timestamps to see other player’s moves before revealing
their own moves. The lockstep algorithm [11] divided the game time into rounds.
In each round, every player can perform one action he has to send to every other
player. The round ends when the last player has sent his action. To prevent players
from making their move for the round based on the other players’ moves in the
same round, each player first commits his move by sending out a secure hash of his
move and reveals his move afterwards by sending out the original move only after
receiving commitments from all other players. However, the highest latency between
any pair of players dictates the round length determining the delay between a player
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action and its execution. This will be too slow for fast-paced real-time games. Fur-
thermore, any cheater can stop the progression of the protocol by not revealing his
move.
Therefore, [31] proposed a pipelined lockstep protocol, allowing to interleave the
committing and revealing of multiple actions. The rate at which actions can be
generated can be increased. Still, the latency between triggering an action and exe-
cuting it stays the same. This latency was reduced in NEO [48] explicitly bounding
the length of a round. In NEO, each node must be able to send his move before the
round end to at least half of the other nodes. After the round ends, all nodes send
out their votes telling all other nodes which actions they received in time. After-
wards, all nodes will agree on which actions to perform. NEO still had some flaws
allowing spoofing and replaying of actions as well as sending out conflicting actions
to create state inconsistencies. SEA [30] extended NEO implementing the neces-
sary cryptographic means to prevent these kinds of cheats. A different approach
to prevent timing cheats is a hybrid architecture [27] using a central server. If first
gives out encryption keys to encrypt all actions while decryption keys are given out
synchronized to game rounds so no cheater can see a move earlier than the others
and react to it. A decentralized approach based on the same idea was presented
in [112]. In [25], one-time signatures were used for the same purpose.
There are also proposals to detect players modifying the timing behaviour of their
messages by using trusted nodes to purposefully delay messages to nodes under test,
trying to find out whether they are waiting for other players’ moves [41, 42, 43].
However, these approaches failed to acknowledge that cheaters will react differently
when noticing they are being tested. The underlying problem is that cheaters can
always adapt their behaviour to any detection procedure in place.
Ensuring players send out their actions with the correct timing and do not send out
conflicting actions is only one step to realize a fair game. It is still necessary to
check whether the created actions are actually valid and to ensure the game state is
only updated according to these actions and not tampered with.
Secure State Maintenance
The most common approach to check actions and ensure the game state evolves
according to actions only is assuming the existence of trusted nodes known to work
correctly. For example, RACS [123] uses a central server acting as a referee. It
receives all actions of all players like the central server of client/server-based MMVEs
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but does not send out updates to all nodes. They instead exchange actions and
updates in a decentralized fashion and use the referee to resolve any conflicts that
might occur. The referee is still the authority for the game state and stores it
reliably.
Similar approaches distribute the game state among region controllers acting as a
trusted authority for the state in a certain area [58, 75]. A hybrid architecture using
untrusted region controllers is proposed in [72]. A central server checks whether the
region controllers are working correctly, similar to RACS.
In [76], mutual checking was identified as an approach not relying on trusted nodes
but only using the assumption that only a fraction of all nodes is malicious and most
players do not cheat. Based on this assumption, [53] used a scheme of peer auditing
to check the executed actions and the state distributed among untrusted nodes
for correctness. However, it still relied on trusted nodes to resolve any conflicts
appearing when audits failed. Therefore, the authority to decide and store the
correct state are still trusted nodes.
An approach to store the world state in a distributed fashion while not assuming
trusted nodes is Phitos [52]. It only used redundancy and replication to make sure
the world state is not tampered with. However, it only ensures that state that has
been stored is not modified afterwards. It does not show how to actually decide
whether a state update was correct in the first place. As such, it can only be used
as a kind of persistence layer as assumed by approaches like [75] using strategies to
create state snapshots as proposed in [130].
Trusted Computing
A fundamentally different way to prevent cheating analysed in [76] is trying to make
sure clients can actually be trusted and will not cheat. Approaches like Punk-
buster [40] used in client/server-based online games monitor the game at the client
trying to detect modification to the game software or additionally running software
used for cheating. However, the underlying fundamental problem is the physical
control of a user over his client computer. He can modify any software or modify
its execution environment like system calls or other called libraries to change its
behaviour in any desired way. All the server can do to check whether the client has
been tampered with is send it a message and check whether the response message is
the expected one. Given enough time, a cheater will be able to modify the program
so it answers with the correct response.
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However, using techniques of trusted computing like special hardware chips at the
clients to create a trusted execution environment will make successful modification a
much more costly endeavour [76]. Similarly, [26] proposed to use the isolated trusted
execution processor of Intel’s Active Management Technology platform to monitor
the execution of the game software and detect cheaters.
In [93] using mobile guards with continuously changed protection algorithms is pro-
posed to detect modifications. A mobile guard uses self-modifying code creating
randomized checksums of the game code on the client while not leaving enough time
for a cheater to analyse the behaviour of the guard and the currently calculated
checksum.
Chapter 3
A Cheat-Resistant MMVE
Architecture
So far, approaches to realize peer-to-peer based MMVEs have either not considered
cheating at all or they relied on the existence of nodes trusted to be honest to deal
with cheaters. We are interested in finding out whether it is possible to realize a
peer-to-peer based MMVE based only on the assumption that a certain share of node
tries to cheat while the majority of nodes is honest and follows the given algorithms.
Our system should simulate one large virtual world with seamless movement instead
of a world consisting of multiple disjoint areas.
Our goal is to obtain the same level of cheat-resistance that current client/server-
based MMVEs offer. We do not consider breaking uncodified rules like automation
or exploiting bugs. Our primary concern is to prevent cheaters from being able to
tamper with the world state and to make sure the world state evolves only according
to the rules of the world. Tampering is not possible in a client/server-based MMVE
where the central server is the only authority for storing and updating the world
state while the distributed storing in peer-to-peer-based MMVEs opens up that
possibility. Furthermore, causing other nodes to perceive an incorrect world state
by causing inconsistencies should be prevented like in a client/server-based MMVE
where the central server is the only source for clients to perceive the world state.
Modifying the timing behaviour or the timestamps of messages should also not
yield an advantage for a malicious player. Finally, exposure of information about
the world state should only be possible according to the limited perception range of
players.
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3.1 Basic Idea
State tampering is an inherent problem in all approaches based on loose consistency.
All of them in some way update the world state on one node based on the world
state reported by other nodes to resynchronize the world views. A node updating
its state has to trust the reported state to be correctly calculated according to the
rules only or it will update its own state based on tampered data.
The basic idea to solve this problem is to never update the state of a node based on
the states of other nodes but have each node update its state only according to its
own old state and the actions of players. If all nodes have the same state and receive
the same set of player actions, they will all take the same decisions on which actions
are allowed based on the current state and they will all calculate the same updated
state. However, since a virtual world is a real-time simulation with continuously
running updates, all the updates have to run synchronized among all nodes. This
level of time synchronization cannot be achieved in practice. Furthermore, all nodes
have to receive and process the player actions at the same time. This is also impos-
sible due to varying message latencies in the Internet. However, using an optimistic
event-based simulation instead of the standard update loop solves both problems.
3.1.1 Event-Based Simulation
Normally, a real-time virtual world is implemented using an update loop where the
operating system triggers the world state update several times per second without
giving any guarantees about the exact times. When the update is started, the
current real-world wall time is read and the virtual world state is updated to that
time.
A discrete event or event-based simulation models a system to perform state changes
only at discrete points in time whenever an event occurs. Internally, an event-based
simulator maintains an event queue containing all future events to be processed.
It performs a loop dequeuing the first event from the queue, updating the state of
the system, and adding any events generated during the update to the event queue.
Since the simulated system is a physical system using wall time, each event has an
associated timestamp signalling the time it will be executed to change the state in
the system. The simulator always maintains a current virtual time [73] which is
always equal to the timestamp of the event executed last.
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If multiple nodes have the same system state and the same events, they will perform
the same simulation creating the same result state. Therefore, implementing a
real-time virtual world simulation using an event-based simulation can be used to
synchronize the state on different nodes without exchanging the state itself.
However, the impression of real-time interaction is normally created using the fast-
running continuous update loop. Therefore, we have implemented a hybrid virtual
world simulation using a continuous update loop to internally perform an event-
based simulation as proposed in [46]. On every update triggered by the continuous
update loop, the simulator processes all events that have occurred since the last
update applying their change to the world state timed to their respective execution
times. However, there are also continuous changes in the world state as objects
move. Therefore, before executing the event, the simulator first updates the state
of all objects to the execution time of the event before applying the state change
by executing the event. Finally, a throw-away copy of the world is updated to
the current wall time and rendered on screen so the user always sees the current
world state even when no events have occurred. Although performing multiple
state updates in one invocation of the world update functions makes it much more
expensive depending on the number of events to be processed since the last update,
the effort is still negligible compared to the rendering of the world.
Using this hybrid model, actions of players are processed as events. A player starting
to move would be realized by creating an event with the current time as timestamp
and adding it to the event queue. Upon executing the event, the simulator will
first update all objects including their current positions to the event’s execution
time and then change the movement vector of the player character. Upon execution
of the next event, the player character position will be updated according to the
movement vector and the time passed since the last updating of the player character.
Its movement will continue with its position being updated until another event of
the same player changes the movement vector again.
All other state changes have to be implemented using events, too. The collision
detection has to be triggered by an event to stop moving objects colliding with
other objects. Depending on the maximum movement speed, the detection events
have to be executed several times per second to detect collisions reliably. The AI
controlling NPCs has to inspect the virtual world and take decisions as a result of
executing an AI event. If a player executes an action that has a certain cast time,
the beginning of the cast will be an event. When the event is executed, it creates
another event signalling the completion of the cast. Upon executing the completion
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event, its effect will be applied. It could also create more events each applying their
own effect or creating even further events. This way an action can cause multiple
effects at certain times during its execution.
In our hybrid approach, the continuous update loop performs a kind of sampling of
the event-based simulation. No matter how often or at which times the continuous
update function is called, the updated state at all event times will always be the
same. By exchanging events only and receiving them in time, all nodes in a network
would be able to calculate the same state of the world. Luckily, events like the AI
event, collision detection events, or events created as a result of executing another
event do not have to be exchanged between nodes. Collision detection and AI events
can just be scheduled at fixed intervals while events created by other events do not
have to be exchanged as long as the root cause event is exchanged. In general, it is
sufficient to only exchange events signalling the execution of an action by a player
to realize a consistent distributed simulation.
3.1.2 Optimistic Distributed Simulation
For simulations on multiple nodes to stay consistent, the nodes must have added all
events to the event queue before advancing the virtual simulation time and process-
ing later events. Since transferring events over a network takes time, the execution
time of an event should always be slightly in the future to leave room for all nodes
to receive the event before its execution time. If a player presses the key to move
forward, its character will not start moving immediately but an event will be sched-
uled with a future timestamp. This local lag can typically be in the range of 150 ms
without harming the perception of players to interact with a real-time world [89].
However, these 150 ms might not be enough to always transfer the events in time
since some messages might experience higher latency and clocks are not perfectly
synchronized as well. Under these circumstances, a node will receive a late event
which means the state it calculated is incorrect as it is missing the late event. There
are two fundamental ways to handle late events: conservative lock-step synchroniza-
tion [91] and optimistic techniques like Time Warp [45, 73].
In a conservative algorithm, all nodes first form an agreement to advance the current
virtual time by explicitly committing themselves to not generate an event before the
time in question, effectively preventing late events. Since reaching this agreement
takes a considerable amount of time, conservative algorithms are usually unsuitable
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to implement a real-time simulation as time in the world could not advance while
the agreement is in progress.
In Time Warp, every node advances its virtual time with the current real time
without waiting for an agreement with other nodes. In case an event is late, it repairs
its incorrect state. Every node creates a copy of its current state at checkpoint times.
Furthermore, it does not remove processed events in the event queue. Upon receiving
a late event, the node performs a rollback to the latest checkpoint before the event
and re-executes all events including the late event after the checkpoint. This way
Time Warp allows rewinding and replaying the world simulation at any point in time.
The rollback and the reprocessing of events will all happen within the same update
so the user will not notice the replaying. Instead, he will see a sudden change in
world state as for example a standing player is suddenly teleported forwards when
a node notices it started moving a second ago. Therefore, rollbacks may cause
temporary inconsistencies with instant world state changes not covered by the rules.
However, in combination with local lag late events should be the exception and the
world state will be eventually consistent when all late messages have arrived.
3.1.3 Limitations
Combining Time Warp and local lag to realize a decentralized MMVE has been
proposed in [89] and similarly in [32] using it to implement mirrored game servers.
Exchanging only player actions resulting in a consistent simulation of the world
state automatically ensures the world state only evolves according to the rules of
the world as we have shown in [107]. Therefore, it is generally more suitable to
prevent cheating in a peer-to-peer-based MMVEs as discussed in [29]. Since all
nodes store the complete state of the world, a joining node will also be able to
retrieve the correct state of the world. It asks all nodes for their state and performs
a voting on the results. Since the current state of a node can always be rolled back,
sparse vector clocks [125] can be used to identify which nodes have included which
player actions to identify a consistent state. As long as the majority of nodes are
honest, it will start the simulation based on the correct state.
However, there are two major limitation of using this approach. First, it is very prone
to timing cheats with cheaters delaying their actions purposefully causing rollbacks
at honest players’ nodes. This causes honest players to take actions based on a
state that will be corrected later on. It is also vulnerable to inconsistency cheats by
malicious players sending different actions to different nodes or not sending actions
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to some nodes. This will cause the world state do diverge. To fix this, all honest
players would have to send out any actions they received from other players a second
time to make sure all honest players receive all actions sent out by malicious nodes.
The second and much more severe limitation is the lack of scalability. All nodes per-
form replicated simulations of the whole world and all actions performed by players
have to be sent out to all other nodes. If inconsistency cheats should be prevented
each action actually creates n2 messages. Using this fully-replicated simulation
would only be possible if the virtual world consists of many disjoint areas with a
tight limit on the number of players per area. A single large virtual world with a
massive number of players cannot be realized this way. The key to scalability is to
distribute the world state among multiple nodes and have each node simulate only a
part of the world. However, this means taking over the world state from other nodes
will be necessary in any scalable solution as nodes move around and simulate the
state in different areas. This fact inspired our cheat-resistant architecture described
in the next section.
3.2 Architecture
In a scalable architecture, nodes can only simulate a part of the virtual world. To
present the world view to the user, they will have to simulate the area surrounding
the player. If the player moves to a different area, its node will have to simulate
the world in that area. Therefore, it has to take over state from nodes currently
maintaining that area. If these nodes are malicious, they can report a tampered
state. Even assuming an honest majority and using voting would not help, as a
cheater could have multiple player characters under his control and move them to
the area to get a local majority. A node needs a way to ensure state it has received
from other nodes was correctly created according to the rules.
Therefore, we propose to use a hybrid architecture consisting of two disjoint parts.
First, there is the decentralized simulation of the virtual world. It may be based on
approaches like Solipsis [78], pSense [105], or VoN [68] using a peer-to-peer overlay
adapting its network structure to the current player positions allowing to exchange
events and state updates locally. These approaches do not consider cheating so
cheaters might report tampered state. Therefore, there is a second overlay structure
to realize a reliable distributed storage. This storage fulfils two tasks. As we have
shown in [64], it acts as a reliable persistent storage to ensure world and player
character state is not lost when nodes join and leave. It also maintains the current
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state of the world ensuring it only evolves according to the game rules to protect it
from tampering by malicious nodes.
The tools to achieve this reliability and resilience are replication of data, redundancy
of simulation, and use of voting to establish the correct state with a high probability.
While the first part of our architecture, the decentralized simulation of the virtual
world, has to react fast to player input and continuously update the state, the
storage can take its time to perform votings and focus on state correctness to prevent
tampering. However, due to the voting the storage will only be able to provide a
probabilistic protection against tampering and data loss. With increasing churn or
increasing number of malicious nodes, the probability for data being lost or getting
tampered will increase. This probability can be reduced by increasing the amount of
redundancy in storing and updating the world state. On the other hand, increasing
redundancy increases costs in terms of bandwidth consumption or computational
power. Our goal is to find out what level of reliability and protection can be realized
at what costs.
There are already approaches like PAST [104] and OceanStore [82] to realize a
reliable distributed storage based on a peer-to-peer overlay, using replication to
provide reliability and different techniques to keep replicas consistent. They are,
however, unsuitable to be used as a reliable data store for an MMVE. First, they
use hashing to distribute data on nodes destroying any locality of data. Objects
close to each other in the virtual world will not end up on the same or close nodes
but they will be distributed all over the network. To update the state in an area, all
objects in that area must be requested. Retrieving them from all over the network
will be much more expensive then retrieving them from a few close nodes. Second,
these distributed storages just store data and make sure it is not lost. There are no
means to make sure the stored data is actually correct.
Therefore, we have designed a reliable distributed storage to persistently store data
in a virtual world. It is based on a structured peer-to-peer overlay mapping the
locality in the virtual world to locality in the network to allow efficient retrieving
of close data. Furthermore, the storage executes an update procedure calculating
the correct state with a high probability despite node churn and the existence of
malicious nodes.
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3.3 System Model
Our system consists of Internet-connected PCs to become the nodes of our peer-to-
peer overlay. The PCs have sufficient amounts of storage and computation power
to store data and perform simulations. We expect the available bandwidth to be
the limiting factor. We assume all nodes are able to connect to each other using
a link layer implementation like the one described in [65]. It allows establishing
connections even in the presence of NAT (Network Address Translation) routers
normally not allowing incoming connections. The established connection is reliable
and message order will be preserved as realized by TCP. However, message latency
might vary and be high in case of message loss on the underlying layer.
Nodes form an overlay so every node is only connected to a subset of all nodes on
the link layer. However, on the overlay layer all nodes can still exchange overlay
message using multi-hop routing. Nodes are considered to be unreliable. They
might fail unexpectedly at any time. Churn is high so nodes are joining and leaving
the overlay constantly. The system is not an open system. There is an operator of
the virtual world who also designs and implements the virtual world and lays out
its rules. He also operates a trusted central certification authority as we proposed
in [121, 122]. Players have to acquire a certificate from that certification authority
to join the overlay. Using this certificate, integrity of messages and non-repudiation
can be realized. Furthermore, players identified as cheaters can be punished by
revoking their certificate. To make sure they do not just come back with a new
identity, acquiring a certificate must be expensive, e.g. by costing money or by
being bound to real-world identities.
At any time, only a subset of all players is in the network. The majority of these
players is honest and their nodes follow the protocol specified and implemented
by the operator. However, players have full physical control over their computer.
Therefore, an attacker can tamper with his node to not follow the protocol in any
way. He can modify the code, modify the state of memory, or send out any kind of
message at any time. While the world is running, there are no nodes in the network
that can be trusted to follow the correct protocol.
We use physical clocks to control the timing behaviour of the update algorithm and
to put timestamps into messages signalling the execution times of player actions.
We assume clocks among honest nodes to be synchronized down to ten milliseconds,
a value than can be achieved over the Internet by using the Network Time Protocol
(NTP) [90]. Furthermore, we assume drift of clocks and timers to be bounded.
Chapter 4
A Self-Stabilizing Delaunay Overlay
This chapter presents the overlay we developed as base for the reliable storage.
First, we analyse the requirements of the overlay. Then we show how we designed
the overlay to fulfil these requirements. We evaluate how the overlay performs with
respect to our requirements in chapter 6.
4.1 Requirements
The purpose of the storage is to reliably store location-dependent data. In our case,
this is data with coordinates from a 2D Euclidean space as key. To allow storing
and retrieving of data, the overlay has to support communication between nodes
based on locations. Two functions for message exchange have to be supported:
Unicast Communication The overlay must route unicast messages from one node
to one destination location until it is received by the node responsible for that
location. This type of message will be used by the storage to store data at
other nodes. It will also be used to retrieve data for a given location and
return it to the requesting node.
Multicast Communication Multicast messages must be routed from one node to
a given area. All nodes responsible for data in that area will receive this
message. This type of message will be used by the storage to retrieve all data
in an area.
To realize our goal of a reliable, resilient, and scalable storage, the overlay has to
fulfil the following non-functional requirements:
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Scalability The overlay has to be scalable. Ideally, the traffic at each node should
not depend on the number of nodes in the network. This means nodes can
be added to the overlay without incurring significant additional load on other
nodes and the system could run with an arbitrary number of nodes. To realize
this, the overlay needs a structure allowing efficient routing of messages and a
scalable mechanism to maintain that structure.
Reliability The overlay must work reliably despite the unreliability of individual
nodes. If a node fails, the maintenance mechanism has to repair the network
structure so the overlay can continue to exchange messages on behalf of the
storage.
Resilience The overlay must be resilient to malicious nodes not following the pro-
tocol of the overlay e.g. by dropping or tampering with messages. Specifically,
the overlay must prevent malicious nodes from gaining more influence than
proportional to the share of malicious nodes in the network.
4.2 Overlay Structure
Nodes can use the overlay to send messages to other nodes using their 2D overlay
addresses. The overlay will route these messages via intermediate nodes if necessary.
However, the overlay also allows finding nodes responsible for keys from the given
key space. It performs a distributed computation of a mapping from a key space to
the set of nodes in the network.
4.2.1 Key Space and Node Responsibility
Overlays like Chord [113] and Pastry [103] use this ability to realize a distributed
hash table (DHT). A DHT allows to store data under arbitrary given keys by hashing
these keys to a numeric key space K = {0, ..., kmax} with kmax = 2l − 1 and l being
the length of keys in binary representation. The typical way of mapping keys to
nodes is by assigning node IDs from the same key space K. Then, a distance
function d : K ×K → R≥0 is used to compute distances from node IDs to data keys.
The node with the smallest distance to the data key is the responsible node for this
key. Pastry uses the metric distance function dp(a, b) = |a − b|. Therefore, a node b
with a being the node with the next smaller ID (predecessor) and c being the node
with the next bigger ID (successor) is responsible for the interval [a+b2 ,
b+c
2 ). With
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Figure 4.1: Voronoi tessellation
Chord’s distance function dc(a, b) =
⎧⎨
⎩
a − b, if a > b
kmax − b + a, else
a node is responsible
for all keys between itself and its predecessor if a is used as node key and b is used
as data key.
The fact that nodes are responsible for their closest keys allows a greedy routing pro-
cedure if the network is structured appropriately. When a node receives a message
with a key as destination, it is either the closest node and receiver of the message or
it knows another node that is closer to the destination and can forward the message
to that node.
In contrast to DHTs, our system uses two-dimensional keys k = (kx, ky) ∈ K ⊂
R × R to represent the location of objects in the virtual world as points in a plane.
Following the DHT approach, we assign node IDs from the same space. We use the
Euclidean metric d(a, b) =
√
(ax − bx)2 + (ay − by)2 as distance function. If N ⊂ K
is the set of node IDs, the Euclidean metric creates a Voronoi tessellation [7] of the
plane K, see figure 4.1. For each n ∈ N its Voronoi cell contains all points k where
k is closer to n than any other element of N . Two adjacent Voronoi cells with a
common border are called Voronoi neighbours. For points on the border with equal
distance to multiple Voronoi neighbours, we defined the leftmost neighbour and for
nodes with equal x-coordinate the topmost neighbour to be responsible for these
points. The tessellation of the key space of Pastry into disjoint intervals is actually
the one-dimensional case of a Voronoi tessellation.
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Mapping keys to closest nodes also allows efficient area query processing. If a node
is responsible for one key of a given requested area, it is probably also responsible
for other close keys of this area and so these keys can be returned in one message.
4.2.2 Node ID Assignment
The two-dimensional ID of a node determines which data the node is responsible for.
Therefore, a node must not be allowed to choose its own ID. Otherwise a cheater
could easily place nodes under his control in locations allowing him to tamper with
stored data. Instead, node IDs are assigned by a certification authority (CA). Nodes
exchange their certificates upon connection establishment and verify their node IDs
using the public key of the CA. Furthermore, a price has to be associated with
obtaining an ID as shown in [44] using game theory to prove the negative effects of
free identities. Otherwise an attacker could just obtain a large number of identities
to launch a Sybil attack [36] and dominate the overlay. The price makes obtaining
IDs expensive and limits the number of IDs a cheater can have. This is also necessary
to punish cheaters by excluding them through certificate revocation. Otherwise he
could just return with a free new ID once his malicious behaviour was detected.
This price might be a usage fee. It could also be binding a certificate to a credit
card number or a verified real person identifier.
4.2.3 Primary Structure
The primary structure of a network is a graph with nodes as vertices of the graph
and edges representing connections between nodes. If a node a and b are connected
then a is a neighbour of b and vice versa. The network should be structured in
a way allowing a simple greedy routing procedure: a message for a destination is
forwarded from one node to a node closer to the destination until the closest node
is reached. A node only needs local information – its neighbours – to decide who
to forward the message to. This only works when the structure does not contain
different nodes with local distance minima to a destination. If a node calculates its
distance to a destination and compares it with the distances of its neighbours and
concludes it is the closest node there may not be a different node drawing the same
conclusion for this destination. Otherwise messages for a destination will end up on
different nodes, depending on where they came from.
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Figure 4.2: Delaunay graph
Chord and Pastry both use a simple ring structure without different local distance
minima. In Chord, a node’s successor is its only neighbour. In Pastry, successor and
predecessor are neighbours of a node. Since their key space K is a ring of congruence
classes Z/kmax both form a ring structure closing the ring by connecting the node
with the highest ID with the node with the lowest ID. In Chord, the ring is a directed
graph. When performing the greedy routing, every node can only decide if it or its
successor is closer to a destination. For a ring of n nodes, a routed message is passed
around the ring. Since nodes are essentially ordered, it is guaranteed that a message
arrives at the responsible node. Pastry’s ring is undirected and messages can be
routed in both directions around the ring. Again the ordering of nodes guarantees
the responsible node is reached eventually.
In our overlay, we chose the Voronoi neighbours of a node to become its overlay
neighbours. Connecting the Voronoi cell centres to their Voronoi neighbours creates
a Delaunay graph [7], see figure 4.2. A Delaunay graph is a triangulation of the
Euclidean plane and the dual graph to a Voronoi tessellation.
Unicast Message Routing
When a node routes a message, it will compare its distance to the message desti-
nation to the distances of its neighbours. If it is closest, the destination lies within
its Voronoi cell and it is responsible. If not, the node will forward the message
to the closest neighbour which will perform the same greedy routing procedure.
As the Voronoi tessellation covers the whole plane and all Voronoi neighbours are
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Figure 4.3: Neighbourhood routing in the Delaunay structure
connected, each routing step brings the message closer to its destination until the
responsible Voronoi cell is reached. Figure 4.3 shows the route of a message sent
from a node a to destination x lying in the Voronoi cell of b. This is a worst-case
scenario as source and destination have the maximum possible distance along the
diagonal of the key space. With even distribution of nodes in the key space, the
worst-case routing performance in the Delaunay structure is O(
√
n) due to the two
dimensions of the key space. Compared to the O(n) performance of Pastry with its
one-dimensional ring, the Delaunay structure allows getting closer to a destination
in two dimensions simultaneously on each hop.
4.2.4 Routing Table
In a one-dimensional overlay structure like a ring, routing needs O(n) hops on av-
erage. This linear routing performance does not scale in general. Assuming every
node sends one message in a given time frame, each of which will be forwarded O(n)
times by other nodes then O(n2) messages will be transferred on the link layer. On
average, every node will have to transfer O(n) messages. This means the traffic on
one node increases linearly with the number of nodes.
Therefore, peer-to-peer overlays usually feature an additional structure connecting
nodes far away from each other in the key space. This allows a node to bridge a
much larger key space distance in one hop when routing a message. Thus, routing
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Figure 4.4: Pastry routing table, b=4, l=6
paths become shorter and the traffic per node is reduced. For example, Chord and
Pastry both feature a routing path length of O(log(n)).
Each node stores the set of nodes providing these additional long distance connec-
tions in a routing table. Our routing table is heavily inspired by the routing table
of Pastry adapting it for two dimensions. Pastry features a two-dimensional routing
table with b columns and l rows where b is the radix used in the key space and l is
the length of keys in digits. The size of the key space is N = bl. A routing table
entry ei,j is defined by its column i, 0 ≤ i < b and its row j, 0 ≤ j < l. For a node
c with ID c0c1...cl−1 and a node d showing up in entry ei,j, d’s ID d0...dl−1 has to
fulfil a certain constraint. It must match c’s ID in the first j digits c0...cj−1. Then,
digit j must equal i. The remaining digits are not constrained. Therefore, d’s ID
must be of the form d = c0...cj−1i∗. In the first row with j = 0, the constraint
effectively means that a node in column i starts with i. All nodes in the second row
start with c0 and have the column number i as the second digit. All nodes in the
third row start with c0c1 with the column number i as the third digit. The entry
ecj ,j is left blank for all j = 0...l−1. So in every row j the column number equalling
the node ID in digit j is not occupied. This entry would contain a node with ID
c0...cj−1i. Since i = cj, it would be c0...cj−1cj. However, nodes matching c’s ID in
the first j+1 digits are found in the next lower row j+1. Therefore, the entries ecj ,j
are not needed. Entries can also be empty if no node with a matching constraint
exists. This is highly likely for lower rows as the key space is usually only sparsely
populated with nodes. Figure 4.4 shows an example of a Pastry routing table.
This kind of routing table allows a prefix routing scheme to be used yielding O(log(n))
routing performance. For a message destination t = t0...tl−1, even in the worst case c
will have a routing table entry matching t in the first digit because c has nodes in its
first row with all possible digits. Assuming d is that entry, d’s ID will be t0d1...dl−1.
Now d will also have an entry in its second row matching t in the first two digits
because d has all possible digits in its second row. This means even in the worst
case, this routing procedure allows a message to get closer to its destination with
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Figure 4.5: Three layers of a routing table with bx = 4 and by = 4
each hop matching the destination in one more digit. The maximum number of hops
is l. With l = logbN , the worst case routing performance depends logarithmically
on the size of the key space. If the n nodes are evenly distributed in the key space,
routing will take O(logbn) steps.
Applying this scheme to two dimensions, we use a three-dimensional routing table
with bx columns, by rows, and l layers. Figure 4.5 shows how the first three layers
contain nodes from different areas of the key space. For our key space K = Kx×Ky,
bx is the base of the numbers used for the integer part of the x-coordinate and by is
the base of the numbers used for the integer part of the y-coordinate. The length
of the x- and y-coordinate integer parts is l. Therefore, an ID d ∈ K has the
form d = (d0,0...d0,l−1.∗; d1,0..d1,l−1.∗) with d0,0...d0,l−1.∗ being the x-coordinate and
d1,0..d1,l−1.∗ being the y-coordinate of d. We denote the fractional part of the IDs as
.∗. However, in the following, we will only consider the integer part of coordinates as
the fractional part is only used when switching to the neighbourhood-based routing.
Also, we assume keys already differ in the integer part so no keys have equal integer
parts. This can easily be ensured by the central certification authority generating
the keys. Consequently, the size of the key space using only the integer part is
|K| = |Kx| ∗ |Ky| with |Kx| = blx and |Ky| = bly.
The node ID d in an entry ei,j,k of node c with ID c = (c0,0...c0,l−1; c1,0...c1,l−1) must
fulfil a constraint similar to Pastry. The x-coordinate d0,0...d0,l−1 must match c’s x-
coordinate in the first k digits. The value of digit d0,k must equal i. The y-coordinate
d1,0...d1,l−1 must also match c’s y-coordinate in the first k digits. The value of digit
d1,k must equal j. Thus, d must be of the form d = (c0,0...c0,k−1i∗, c1,0...c1,k−1j∗) for
k > 0 and d = (i∗, j∗) for k = 0.
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Unicast Message Routing
This routing table enables prefix routing with logarithmic routing performance. Fig-
ure 4.6 shows a node a sending a message to destination x. In this example, both
bases are identical with bx = 2 and by = 2. The ID of node a starts with 0 in the
x-coordinate and 0 in the y-coordinate. Node a lies in the zone Z0,0. A zone Zi,j is a
rectangular sub-area of the key space where all keys start with i in the x-coordinate
and j in the y-coordinate. Zones can be divided into sub-zones. Zone Zik,jl is a
sub-zone of zone Zi,j with all keys in Zik,jl starting with ik in the x-coordinate and
jl in the y-coordinate.
The way the routing table is built, a has stored one node from each of the zones
Z0,1, Z1,0, and Z1,1 in the top layer of its routing table. The destination x is not in
a’s zone Z0,0 but in zone Z1,1. Therefore, a will forward the message to the node b
in Z1,1 stored in its top routing table layer. Node b shares a common prefix with the
message destination x. Both start with 1 in the x- and y-coordinate which means
both are in zone Z1,1. However, they are not in the same sub-zone. Node b’s ID
starts with 10 in the x-coordinate and 11 in the y-coordinate. Thus, b is in sub-zone
Z10,11 while the destination x is in sub-zone Z11,11. In the second layer of its routing
table, b has stored nodes from each of the other sub-zones Z10,10, Z11,10, and Z11,11.
Since x is in Z11,11, b will forward the message to c taken from the second layer
of its routing table. Node c is situated in sub-zone Z110,110 while x is in Z111,110.
Again, c has one node from each of the zones Z110,111, Z111,110, and Z111,111 in the
third layer of its routing table. Therefore, it will forward the message to node d in
zone Z111,110. Assuming the integer parts of IDs has three digits (the routing table
has three layers), this routing process will finish here and d will continue with the
neighbourhood-based routing in the Delaunay structure. It will compare its distance
to x with the distances of its neighbours and find out it is the final receiver of the
message.
In each routing step, the next node matches the message destination in at least one
more digit in the x- and y-coordinate. Even in the above worst case, when sending
node and destination share no common prefix, only l routing steps will be necessary.
From l being the length of the integral part of keys and N = blx ∗ bly being the size
of the integral part of the key space follows l = logbx∗byN . With even distribution
of n nodes in the integral part of the key space, the worst-case routing performance
is O(logbx∗byn).
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Figure 4.6: Message routing using routing tables
4.2.5 Shortcuts
In addition to the neighbourhood sets and the routing table, we also maintain a
third set of nodes called shortcuts. It serves as a cache containing additional nodes
a node often communicates with. This is especially useful for answering queries
in the storage. When a node receives a request routed over intermediate nodes, it
will send a reply back. By putting the original requester into the shortcuts set and
establishing a direct connection to him, we can send the reply back directly and
do not need to route it. The route back would probably be different from the first
route, giving an attacker more chances to tamper with the query processing.
Furthermore, when more queries from the same source arrive, the already estab-
lished shortcut connection can be used to answer it. To do this, shortcuts are also
included in the routing procedure. Whenever a shortcut is closer to a message des-
tination than any neighbour or routing table entry, the message is forwarded to the
shortcut instead. Getting closer to a destination than normally possible is always
an improvement. It creates shorter paths. Shorter paths mean smaller latency and
fewer chances for a malicious node to tamper with the routing. Since a query reply
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message is addressed directly at the requesting nodes position, the shortcut will
always be responsible and the reply will be transferred back directly.
4.3 Delaunay Structure Maintenance
The maintenance algorithm must maintain the overlay structure as nodes join and
leave the network. Furthermore, it must contain the influence attackers have in the
network. To tamper or drop more messages, attackers will try to have more messages
routed via malicious nodes. This means malicious nodes appear more often in the
routing tables and neighbourhoods of other nodes than expected considering their
share in the network. The maintenance algorithm must prevent this and keep the
share of malicious nodes in routing tables and neighbourhoods proportional to their
total share in the network.
4.3.1 Self-Stabilization
Typically, proposals for peer-to-peer overlays describe their maintenance algorithm
using procedures for joining and leaving of nodes. Given an existing overlay, they
show how one node joins the overlay e.g. by routing messages to its new neighbours
and exchanging messages with them to be integrated into the structure as their new
neighbour. Often the routing table is also filled while executing the join procedure.
There might also be a mechanism to adapt the structure for graceful leave or when
neighbours detect the ungraceful leave of a node.
When we started developing our overlay, we discovered two flaws in these approaches.
First, the procedures given usually assume an existing overlay but they do not work
when the overlay is started for the first time. In that case a lot of special conditions
can arise that have to be treated differently. For example, a protocol specifying left
and right neighbour in a ring have to be informed does not work as expected if left
and right neighbour are identical because only one node is already there. Pastry uses
a set of multiple neighbours in both directions on the ring for robustness reasons,
making it hard to deal with these special cases arising when the overlay is not already
sufficiently large.
Second, these procedures usually assume only one local change in the network at
a time. Two join procedures can be executed concurrently when they happen in
different locations. In the same neighbourhood two concurrent joins lead to the two
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independent join procedures interfering and in result the overlay structure might
become inconsistent. To solve this, Chord specifies the case of concurrent join of two
neighbours. However, there might be even more concurrent joins or joins interfering
with leaves. Although concurrent joins are unlikely to happen when the overlay is
large, they are common in the early phases of starting up the overlay when it is still
small.
Self-stabilization [35] is a principle guaranteeing a system to reach a legitimate
state in a finite number of steps from any starting state using "distributed control".
Every component only acts on state it sees locally and the system as a whole finally
reaches the desired global state. Applying this principle to maintain an overlay
structure, nodes only need to exchange local information about their state with
their neighbourhood. A self-stabilizing overlay is automatically able to deal with
nodes joining and leaving as it will reach the desired state from any state. A joining
node just connects to any node of the network and it will automatically be integrated
at the correct position after a finite amount of steps. A leaving node just closes all
connections and the overlay structure will adapt. The algorithm only requires the
network graph to be connected. Otherwise, it will create partitioned overlays each
with its own structure.
Decentralized self-stabilizing algorithms have been used to create trees [47] or a
variant of Chord using a self-stabilizing ring [79]. In [71] a self-stabilizing algorithm
is proposed to create a Delaunay graph. It is a synchronous algorithm proceeding in
rounds. In every round, nodes exchange information about their neighbourhoods and
use this information to form new connections adapting their neighbourhood. This
algorithm features a guaranteed worst-case number of rounds of O(n3) to create a
Delaunay graph from any connected starting graph.
However, in practice this algorithm has two drawbacks. First, the round length
would have to be picked conservatively to allow information exchange and connection
establishments in an Internet setting. This might lead to long stabilization times
in the worst case considering the O(n3) bound on the number of rounds. Second,
the algorithm needs regular information exchange even if no changes occur in the
network. This is not efficient when only few local changes happen in the network.
Therefore, we have developed an asynchronous self-stabilizing algorithm to create
a Delaunay overlay. Its basic idea is to exchange neighbourhood information with
other nodes whenever the neighbourhood changes. Nodes use a message called
NetworkView containing the source of the message and its neighbours to exchange
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Figure 4.7: Sending a NetworkView before disconnecting an ex-neighbour
this information. Listing 4.1 shows a simplified version of the procedure executed
when a NetworkView is received.
4.3.2 Adding and Removing Neighbours
Each node maintains a set of nodes called Neighbours containing all of a node’s
neighbours. When first connecting to a node in the network, this set is empty on
a new node. Therefore, the new node sends out an empty NetworkView containing
only its own address. Upon receiving a NetworkView, a node calculates its local
Delaunay graph including the nodes in the NetworkView. Then it notices whether
it is missing a neighbour it needs to add. Every new neighbour it is already connected
to is added as a neighbour directly. This might be the case if nodes are connected
after bootstrapping or because one is in the routing table of the other.
If a node adds a neighbour, it has to inform its neighbours about its new neighbour-
hood by sending them a NetworkView. Furthermore, adding a neighbour means an
existing neighbour might be removed from the neighbourhood and become an ex-
neighbour. All ex-neighbours will also receive a NetworkView before disconnecting
them so they know the reason for the disconnection. For example if the new node
c lies in the middle between two neighbours a, b and c sends a NetworkView to a,
a will add c as neighbour and remove b. By sending a NetworkView including c to
b before disconnecting, b knows that c is there and needs to become its neighbour,
see figure 4.7.
NetworkViews are never routed over multiple hops but only exchanged directly be-
tween connected nodes. Since the channel uses FIFO order, it is guaranteed a
receiving node always acts on the most current state reported by other nodes. It
will also always receive that state. Once a NetworkView is sent is will be trans-
ferred reliably. Only node fail can prevent this. However, when a node fails new
NetworkViews with updated information will be exchanged anyway.
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OnNetworkView(NetworkView nv)
{
nodes = {LocalNode} ∪ Neighbours ∪ PendingNeighbours
DelaunayGraph dg = CalculateDelaunayGraph(nodes ∪ nv)
//add or connect new neighbours
foreach(Node neighbour in dg.GetNeighbours(LocalNode)\Neighbours)
if(IsConnected(neighbour ))
AddNeighbour(neighbour)
else
ConnectNeighbour(neighbour)
// remove pending neighbours that are no longer our neighbours
exPendingNeighbours = PendingNeighbours\dg.GetNeighbours(LocalNode)
PendingNeighbours.RemoveAll(exPendingNeighbours)
//send back a NetworkView if neighbourhood views are different
if(dg.GetNeighbours(nv.Source) 	= nv.Neighbours)
QueueNetworkViews ({nv.Source })
}
AddNeighbour(Node neighbour)
{
Neighbours.Add(neighbour)
DelaunayGraph dg = CalculateDelaunayGraph ({ LocalNode} ∪ Neighbours)
exNeighbours = Neighbours\dg.GetNeighbours(LocalNode)
Neighbors.RemoveAll(exNeighbors)
QueueNetworkViews(Neighbours ∪ exNeighbours)
}
ConnectNeighbour(Node neighbour)
{
PendingNeighbours.Add(neighbour)
BeginConnect(neighbour)
}
Listing 4.1: NetworkView processing
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OnConnectionOpened(Node node)
{
if(node ∈ PendingNeighbours)
{
PendingNeighbours.Remove(node)
AddNeighbour(node)
}
}
OnConnectionClosed(Node node)
{
if(node ∈ PendingNeighbours)
PendingNeighbours.Remove(node)
if(node ∈ Neighbours)
{
Neighbours.Remove(node)
QueueNetworkViews(Neighbours)
}
}
Listing 4.2: Connection state change
4.3.3 Pending Neighbours and Queuing of NetworkViews
However, b might not be connected to c when receiving the NetworkView from a.
Every new neighbour a node is not connected to is added to the set PendingNeigh-
bours, so b will make c a pending neighbour. Then it starts connecting to that
pending neighbour. The pending neighbour is not added directly because the Net-
workView might have travelled some time and the information within might not
be up-to-date. For example, the new neighbour c might have failed in between.
If a node added directly, it would probably remove some nodes that are no longer
neighbours due to the new neighbour coming in. After noticing it cannot connect
to the new neighbour, it would somehow need to reacquire its old neighbours. Even
worse, it might have told other nodes about its changed neighbourhood before it
could be sure all of its new neighbours are actually there. The information about a
non-existing node could spread in the network with many nodes trying to connect
to this node.
Therefore, a node only sends out information about its neighbourhood when it has
no more pending neighbours. This happens when a connection to a pending neigh-
bour was established and it became a neighbour, see listing 4.2. It also happens
when connecting failed and the pending neighbour is removed without any addi-
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tional action. Until then, NetworkViews are not sent out immediately but the re-
ceivers of NetworkViews are queued up. All queued NetworkView receivers get their
NetworkView when there are no more pending neighbours. This way nodes only
report neighbours they know they have a connection to at the time of sending the
NetworkView. Of course it could happen that a neighbour failed before sending out
the NetworkView but the sender did not notice this yet. But it never happens that
information about a failed node is spread because every node checks the existence
of the node by connecting to it first before reporting it to others.
During this phase of connecting to pending neighbours, a node still processes in-
coming NetworkViews as normal. Therefore, it might still add new neighbours it
is already connected to, it might add new pending neighbours, or it might remove
pending neighbours if it finds out another new node replaces a pending neighbour
it is currently connecting to. Queuing the receivers instead of the NetworkViews
gives them an up-to-date NetworkView from the time when there were no pending
neighbours and not from the time of queuing it. The downside of this approach is
that it slows down stabilization of the network compared to immediate reporting of
unchecked information. On the other hand, it saves a lot of messages as not every
single change in the neighbourhood is reported immediately but changes happening
during this phase are aggregated.
4.3.4 Comparing Neighbourhood Views
When a node a receives a NetworkView from b and adds b as a neighbour, it will
automatically reply with a NetworkView. If b is not a neighbour of a, then a has to
decide whether to reply with a NetworkView. If every received NetworkView led to a
NetworkView reply, nodes would be exchanging NetworkViews endlessly. Therefore,
a compares b’s reported neighbourhood with the neighbourhood of b calculated by
a using all nodes it knows. If both neighbourhoods are equal, a does not reply to b.
If b’s neighbourhood is different, a replies with a NetworkView to b.
Then b calculates the neighbours it is missing and adds them or connects to them.
Node b will in turn compare a’s reported neighbourhood with its own view of a’s
neighbourhood. It might again queue a NetworkView for a if there is still a dif-
ference. Thus, a and b will continue to exchange NetworkViews until they finally
reached an agreement on their neighbourhoods. They do not necessarily reach that
agreement after just two messages. It can happen nodes keep disagreeing and ex-
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Figure 4.8: Node b detects failure of node c later than node a and node d
change NetworkViews for some time if they notice the departure of nodes at different
points in time.
4.3.5 Node Departure
When a node left gracefully, it could inform all neighbours it is going to leave and
perform some kind of exit procedure exchanging additional messages and handing
off stored data. However, nodes are unreliable and they might also perform an
ungraceful leave. If the user shuts down the computer or kills the running process,
the operating system will still send out a connection close message and the node
neighbours will be notified. If the user just pulls the power plug or the Internet
connection fails, no notification will be sent. Only when a message is sent to the
failed node, its absence will be detected after TCP acknowledgement messages timed
out.
Thus, it might happen a node a detects a node failure of neighbour c really early
because the connection close message was fast or a just sent a message to c and the
timeout kicked in fast. Another neighbour b of c might receive the connection close
message later or it might try to communicate with c later also receiving the timeout
later. During that phase, a and b cannot agree on their neighbourhood views as the
set of nodes they assume is existing differs.
Even worse, when b replies to a because from its point of view a is missing neighbour
c, a might conclude c is a new node it has to connect to. It would add c as a
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Figure 4.9: Neighbours of failed node d establish new connections
pending neighbour and only when connection establishment fails would it notice c
does not exist. Until the last neighbour of a failed node actually notices it is gone,
its neighbours would exchange NetworkViews including the failed node and try to
reconnect to it, see figure 4.8. To prevent this situation, we temporarily remember
failed nodes and exclude them from calculating the Delaunay graph. Furthermore, a
does not reply to a NetworkView from b containing a neighbour he regards as failed.
Node b will finally also detect the failure, change its neighbourhood, and report this
change to its neighbours.
A neighbour c of node a is assumed to have failed whenever it closed the connection
without first sending a NetworkView giving a reason for the connection close. This
reason is always the existence of a better neighbour b replacing a in c’s neighbour-
hood. After adding this better neighbour b, c would have sent a NetworkView to its
ex-neighbour a before closing the connection to a. Therefore, after a learned about
b, both a and c would agree they are no longer neighbours. The failure of a node d is
something a and c could disagree about for some time, if they detect it at different
times. However, the failure of a node d is never the reason for a and c to end their
neighbour relationship. When a node d fails, only new neighbour relationships are
established among d’s neighbours but no relationships are cancelled, see figure 4.9.
Therefore, c is always able to convince a they are no longer neighbours by sending
a NetworkView to a. Consequently, if a was not convinced before the connection to
c was closed, c must have failed.
4.3.6 Reliability and Resilience
Ultimately, the goal of a malicious node is to influence the ability of the storage to
correctly answer queries. One way of doing this is by tampering with the message
routing in the overlay. Since the structure of the overlay determines how messages
are routed, an attacker will try to modify this structure. This allows an attacker to
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permanently influence the routes messages take. If a permanent modification is not
possible, an attacker might also try to cause temporary disorder in the structure to
influence message routing for a certain time.
Using self-stabilizing maintenance, the structure of the system converges towards a
Delaunay graph for honest nodes exchanging NetworkViews. A node not connected
to its Delaunay neighbours will gradually build connections to nodes closer to its
true neighbours until it connected to all of them. As long as a node exchanges
NetworkViews with other honest nodes, it will get closer to its true neighbourhood.
Therefore, the only chance for an attacker to prevent an honest node from reaching
its correct neighbourhood is to completely eclipse [109] it from the network. An
eclipsed node is only connected to malicious neighbours. All of its traffic passes
through its malicious neighbours and they also control the honest node’s view of the
network. They will send it NetworkViews containing only other malicious nodes.
The honest node will effectively be eclipsed from the correct network. Only then
can the network become stable albeit with a tampered structure.
For an attacker, this is easiest to achieve when a new node joins the system. If the
joining node only received malicious nodes after bootstrapping, it can be eclipsed
directly. Therefore, it is crucial the bootstrapping service does not supply malicious
nodes only, see section 4.4.
Once a joining node connected to other honest nodes, the success of the join process
is determined by the structure of the network and the locations of malicious nodes.
If at one point during the join process the joining node is connected to malicious
nodes only, it can be eclipsed. Figure 4.10 shows such a scenario. In this scenario,
the corridor of a joining node e to its true neighbours m, n, and d is blocked by a
kind of "wall" of malicious nodes m and n. After bootstrapping e was connected to
the honest nodes a and b that reported their true neighbourhood to e. Using this
information, e calculates m and n to be its neighbours and connects to them. Now,
n and m only report each other as possible neighbours but they exclude d which
would be necessary to reach the correct network structure. Node e is now eclipsed
only connected to the malicious neighbours m and n.
However, since attackers cannot chose their node positions it is unlikely there are
malicious neighbouring nodes forming a wall with the necessary positions. Just
a slight variation of the above scenario shown in figure 4.11 with honest node c’s
position being different makes it impossible for m and n to eclipse e successfully.
In this scenario, e will temporarily connect to c because it calculates c to be its
neighbour together with m and n. Node c will tell e about d. Since m and n know
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Figure 4.11: Eclipsing is not possible
this, they cannot benefit from suppressing the existence of d. Doing this would
only look suspicious to e. So e will correctly join the network despite two of its
neighbours being malicious. An attacker would need c as an additional malicious
node to eclipse e. Having three malicious nodes this close to each other is even more
unlikely due to the random distribution of nodes. Furthermore, we employed a join
procedure using multiple redundant joins paths so an attacker would need suitable
placement of malicious nodes on all join paths to be successful, see section 4.4.
If an attacker is not able to eclipse a node and modify the structure permanently,
he might try to cause temporary disorder by sending tampered NetworkViews from
his malicious nodes to honest nodes. If it only sent NetworkViews missing nodes
that should be its neighbours, the receivers would just answer with NetworkViews
containing the missing nodes. While he could use this to launch a kind of denial of
service attack consuming bandwidth of honest nodes, there is no amplification. For
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every tampered NetworkView sent out, one NetworkView will be returned and the
consumed bandwidth is the same on both nodes.
The only way for a malicious node to cause honest nodes to change their neighbour-
hood is by sending them better neighbours. They would become pending neighbours
on the honest node and it would try to connect to them. There is no way for an
attacker to just create identities of nodes that are better neighbours for an honest
node. Node identities are only created by the certification authority. However, an
attacker could store the identities of nodes that have been in the network before. It
could select the identities of nodes that would be better neighbours currently and
put them in a NetworkView. The honest receiver would try to connect to all of these
nodes. Until the connection attempts fail, it would not send out any NetworkViews
and it would not be able to receive routed messages as discussed in section 4.7.
Therefore, a malicious node can temporarily influence the processing of messages
in the network and timed right might be able to influence the outcome of storage
queries. The only way to deal with this misbehaviour is trying to detect it. It would
theoretically be possible for honest nodes to blacklist the non-existent node reported
by the attacker so they would not try to connect to it for a certain time and the
network stays stable. However, this mechanism could be exploited by an attacker
to prevent other nodes from joining the network for a certain time. Therefore, if an
honest node keeps receiving NetworkViews with non-existing nodes from some other
node, it concludes that node is trying to tamper and its NetworkViews should be
ignored at least for some time and this misbehaviour will be reported.
Finally, the influence gained this way is just slightly bigger than the influence gained
directly modifying the results of queries received by malicious nodes as can be seen
in section 5.5.
4.4 Bootstrapping and Join
With the self-stabilizing maintenance procedure, a joining node a connects to the
bootstrapper node it received from the bootstrapping service assuming it is a neigh-
bour. The bootstrapper will answer with a NetworkView and a will pick better
neighbours from this NetworkView. This procedure is repeated and a connects to
better neighbours until it cannot improve its neighbourhood. In the worst case, a
is located in the lower right corner of the key space and its bootstrapper is in the
upper right. Then a has to connect and exchange NetworkViews with all nodes in a
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Figure 4.12: Corridor of nodes contacted by joining node a with bootstrapper b
corridor around the diagonal through the key space from upper left to lower right,
while it gradually gets closer to its correct neighbours, see figure 4.12. In the worst
case, O(
√
n) messages have to be exchanged for just one node joining. Furthermore,
the more nodes involved in a join process, the more likely a constellation of malicious
nodes is able to eclipse the joining node.
Therefore, we use an alternate join process first bringing a close to its correct neigh-
bours in O(log n) steps before starting the self-stabilizing maintenance to integrate
a. Instead of sending a NetworkView to its bootstrapper b, a sends a special JoinRe-
quest. The destination of the message is a’s own position. This means the message
will be received by the node c currently responsible for the position of a after O(log n)
hops, see figure 4.13. This node c will definitely become a neighbour of a as no other
node is closer. Node c will reply to the JoinRequest with a NetworkView, starting
the self-stabilizing integration of a. As a’s new neighbours will be from c’s one-
and two-hop neighbourhood, the number of nodes involved depends on the node
degree (the number of neighbours). Although the node degree is only bounded by
n − 1 for special cases like a star topology, the average node degree in a random
Delaunay graph is a constant, see section 6. Thus, only a constant number of nodes
are involved in this part of the joining process.
However, this procedure is more vulnerable than the self-stabilizing procedure. In
the latter, a joining node is only eclipsed if the bootstrapper is malicious or malicious
nodes have a special constellation in the join corridor, see section 4.3.6. Since the
JoinRequest is routed on a single path, just one node on the path is enough to eclipse
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Figure 4.13: JoinRequest path from bootstrapper b to nodes involved in the join of a
a joining node. Therefore, we use multiple redundant join paths. An attacker would
need a malicious node on all of the r join paths to successfully eclipse a node.
To realize these r redundant join paths, the bootstrapping service has to supply r
bootstrapping nodes to a joining node. The choice of supplied nodes is a critical
one. At any time, the bootstrapping service will know a subset of nodes in the
network serving as bootstrapping nodes. From this subset, it will make a selection
of r nodes it will supply to a bootstrapping node. This selection process must fulfil
the same requirement the overlay hast to fulfil: the share of malicious nodes supplied
by the bootstrapping service must not be greater than the share of malicious nodes
in the whole network. If the bootstrapping service is compromised and malicious
nodes are delivered as bootstrapping nodes much more often, this will extend to
the overlay. If it only supplies malicious nodes, every joining node will be eclipsed
from the start. Therefore, a suitable bootstrapping service should effectively make
a random selection from the nodes in the overlay.
Ideally, the paths taken by the JoinRequests sent to the r bootstrappers are com-
pletely disjoint. This way an attacker would need one malicious one each of the r
paths. However, as all JoinRequests have the same destination, the join paths will
converge at the destination. Even worse, the last node to receive the message is the
same – the closest node to the destination. This means if the last node happens
to be malicious, the joining node will be eclipsed despite the r paths. Therefore
JoinRequests are routed slightly differently. A JoinRequest will be received by any
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node who would become a neighbour of the joining node. If messages are routed
towards the destination from different directions, they will end up on different nodes
and the paths will most likely be disjoint. However, this cannot be guaranteed.
Therefore, we additionally take advantage of a mechanism developed to initially fill
the routing table generating disjoint paths with a high probability, see section 4.5.5.
This makes it hard for an attacker to prevent the JoinRequests from reaching their
correct destination.
Finally, there is a second mechanism making eclipsing of nodes while joining ex-
tremely unlikely. It takes advantage of the special structure of the routing table
as a result of the way its maintenance is performed (see the next section 4.5) and
the fact that nodes perform a special storage query after joining the overlay (see
section 5.4 and the resilience discussion in section 5.5.3).
It is important to note that initially, when the overlay is started for the first time,
no malicious nodes should be present. If the very first node is already malicious,
all following nodes have no chances to create a correct overlay. All of them will be
eclipsed. Therefore, the operator has to supply some nodes known to be trustworthy
until a critical mass of honest nodes has been reached.
4.5 Routing Table Maintenance
When a node joins the overlay, it also needs to fill its routing table. For every entry
ei,j,k in the routing table, one node must be found matching the constraint given in
section 4.2.4, which means the node must be in the corresponding zone. While the
node is in the overlay, its routing table must be updated as other nodes join and
leave.
An attacker will try to tweak this maintenance process in his favour. Without
malicious nodes, each node will ideally have the same share of entries in other
nodes’ routing tables as any other node. If a node is one of 1000 in the network,
it should appear in 1/1000 of all routing table entries on average. Attackers will
try to let their malicious nodes get a more than proportional share of all routing
table entries. When a node sends query messages for nodes to fill its routing table
entries, malicious nodes will provide wrong answers putting them in place of honest
nodes.
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4.5.1 Constraining Routing Table Entries
An honest node will put the malicious node in the answer into its routing table as
long as there is no constraint prohibiting this. Lower layers of the routing table are
more tightly constrained because the zones node may come from get very small. The
lower the layer, the harder it becomes for an attacker to place a malicious node there
because its ID will not fit and the attacker cannot choose its IDs. However, on the
top layer the constraint is not tight and any node from the corresponding top-level
zone fits into an entry. Therefore, the basic idea is to put additional constraints on
the nodes that may appear in a certain entry [21].
In our system, each routing table entry is associated with a so-called target position.
Allowing only nodes within a certain distance threshold to this target position in
this entry could be an additional constraint. However, this threshold is hard to
pick as it depends on the number of nodes in the network. If there are only a few
nodes in the network, the average distance of nodes is large. Thus, the threshold
has to be larger to allow nodes in routing tables in the first place. As the number
of nodes grows and the average distance shrinks, the threshold must shrink to have
the desired effect of excluding malicious nodes. Global properties like the number of
nodes in the system are hard to obtain. A node could estimate it using the average
distance to its neighbours. However, even if a dynamic estimation of the threshold
was used, a hard constraint like this would only leave the options to accept a node
or to have no node at all in an entry of the routing table.
Having no node at all is not necessarily an improvement over having a node with
distance above the threshold. On one hand, the probability of an entry being ma-
licious grows with the distance to the target position. On the other hand, having
no node at all means a different routing table entry has to be picked when routing.
The empty entry would most likely have provided the shortest route. Thus, with
hard constraints routes get longer. This again introduces higher chances of having
a malicious node on the routes.
Therefore, we decided not to use hard constraints on the target positions but a pref-
erence of nodes closer to target positions. Every node fulfilling the zone constraint
may appear in an entry. In the moment a node learns about a node closer to that
entry’s target position, it will replace that node with the closer node. Even if a
malicious node manages to get into an entry by putting itself in the place of an
honest node, it will be removed as soon as the closer honest node is discovered. We
just have to ensure this discovery is possible.
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Figure 4.14: Node a with target positions and responsible nodes
4.5.2 Target Positions
The target position ti,j,k of a routing table entry ei,j,k of a node a should not just
depend on the zone of that entry. This would mean all nodes use the same target
position for the same zone. Consequently, the node closest to this target position
will receive all traffic from nodes in other zones to this zone.
Therefore, the target position ti,j,k on node a also depends on the position of a.
For an entry ei,j,0 with associated foreign zone Zi,j, the position ti,j,0 relative to the
borders of Zi,j is equal to the position of a relative to the borders of a’s zone. With
the zones translated to be on top of each other, the target position would be identical
to a’s position. The same principle is applied to lower layer entries associated with
sub-zones of a’s zone. More formally, if a’s ID is a = (a0,0...a0,l−1; a1,0...a1,l−1), then
the target position ti,j,k is ti,j,k = (a0,0...a0,k−1ia0,k+1...a0,l; a1,0...a1,k−1ja1,k+1...a1,l for
k > 0 and ti,j,k = (ia0,1...a0,l; ja1,1...a1,l) for k = 0. This means all digits are identical
except for the kth digit, which is equal to i and j, respectively. Therefore, on every
layer, the target position of a in another zone mirrors a’s position in its own zone
Figure 4.14 shows target positions of a node a with a routing table with bx = 2 and
by = 2. Thus, for each of the three layers (l = 3), there is one target position for
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Figure 4.15: Symmetry of Routing Table Relationships
each of the bx ∗ by − 1 = 3 entries. The nodes closest to the target positions that
will end up in a’s routing table are also shown.
Usually, the relation of one node being in the routing table of another node is not
symmetric. If a node b is in the routing table of node a, this does not mean a is in b’s
routing table. However, one effect of using target positions is that this relationship
tends to become symmetric. If b is closest to a’s target position in b’s zone, than
a is probably also closest to b’s target position in a’s zone. Figure 4.15 shows this
effect. Node b is closest to a’s target position and a is closest to b’s target position.
Therefore, one is in the routing table of the other. However, b is also closest to c’s
target position, so b is in c’s routing table. Node b’s target position is closest to
a and not to c, so a is in b’s routing table instead. Thus, the relationship is not
symmetric between b and c.
This symmetry is especially useful for the passive filling of routing tables as shown
in section 4.5.6 and to prevent eclipsing of node as shown in section 5.5.3.
4.5.3 Querying Routing Table Entries
To fill its empty routing table after joining, a node sends out a special routing table
request message (RtRequest) to the target position of each routing table entry. This
message is a unicast message and will be routed to the node closest to the target
position. This node will answer with an RtResponse message and the requester will
establish a connection and put this node into its routing table. However, the node
closest to a target position does not necessarily fulfil the constraint of the routing
table entry. It might be in a neighbouring zone.
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Figure 4.16: Different receivers for same destination with zone-constrained routing
This can be seen in figure 4.14. The node x responsible for target position t0,1,3 of
node a is not in sub-zone Z000,001. It does not match a’s ID in the first two digits
because it starts with (000∗, 010∗) while a starts with (000∗, 000∗). Therefore, it
does not fit the original constraint to appear in entry e0,1,3. If it answers with an
RtResponse, the requester cannot add it to its routing table and the entry will stay
empty.
Our first idea was to add an additional constraint to the RtRequest message. It
should cause the closest node to a target that fulfils the given constraint to receive
the message. By taking the constraint of the routing table entry the RtRequest
was generated for, the message should arrive at the closest node within the correct
zone. A node receiving such a message will forward it to a closer node as long as it
does not fulfil the constraint of the message. If the receiver fulfils the constraint, it
only forwards the message if it knows a closer node that also fulfils the constraint.
Otherwise it is the final receiver. Therefore, once the message is in the zone defined
by the constraint, it will never leave that zone and arrive at the closest node in that
zone.
If no nodes on the path including the closest node are in the correct zone, then the
closest node will have a neighbour in the correct zone if it shares a border with that
zone. Then it can forward the message to this neighbour. The target position is
always in the correct zone. The closest node might be on the other side of a zone
border in a different zone. As long as there are nodes in that zone, the closest node
will have a neighbour in that zone and can forward the message to reach a close
node in the correct zone.
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Figure 4.17: Closest node b in constrained zone is not a neighbour of closest node a
Unfortunately, this procedure does not always yield the same receiver for the same
message destination. In figure 4.16, two messages m1 and m2 are sent to the same
destination denoted by the red box. Due to the constraint, the messages should
stay in the lower zone. When m1 arrives at b, it will conclude that a is closer to
the destination but a is not in the correct zone. Furthermore, b does not have
a neighbour in the same zone closer to the destination so b is the receiver of the
message. Node b is also globally the closest node in the correct zone so this decision
is correct. At the same time, c will come to the conclusion it is the closest node
because it does not know a closer node in the same zone. This decision is globally
incorrect. As b and c are not Delaunay neighbours, they cannot compare their
distances to agree about who is responsible. Therefore, the receiver of the message
might be different depending on who sends the message and the path it takes.
Even if the routing procedure was changed to first route to the closest node and
from there to the correct zone, it is not guaranteed that one of the neighbours of
the closest node is in the correct zone. This can happen in the corners of a zone
with two neighbouring zones. In figure 4.17, a is closest to the destination denoted
by the red box. However, a is not neighbour of the node b in the correct zone, so it
cannot forward the message to b.
These problems only occur rarely for nodes and target positions close to zone bor-
ders. Furthermore, getting different results is not critical for filling the routing table
and the constrained routing might have been sufficient for this purpose. However,
the storage also needs a way to make sure only nodes from one zone are responsible
for data in that zone to realize data stored in different replication zones. This is
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Figure 4.18: Only keys from the marked sub-areas are generated
similar to only nodes in one zone being responsible for target positions in that zone.
Therefore, we only use keys from certain sub-areas of the key space to make sure
the closest node to a destination is always in the same zone as the destination.
4.5.4 Key Space Usage
The aforementioned problem is created when the target position to be requested is
too close to the zone border, so a node on the other side of the border is responsible
for this position. If there were only target positions far enough away from the zone
borders, no nodes in other zones could be responsible. Since target positions reflect
node IDs in other zones, node IDs may only be taken from certain sub-areas. This
is shown in figure 4.18. Only node IDs from the marked areas Si,j are actually
generated. Therefore, all target positions are also from these sub-areas.
The diagonal d is the longest distance within a sub-area Si,j. We picked the empty
space around this area to also guarantee a minimum distance of d between different
sub-areas. In the worst case shown in zone Z1,1, the target is in the top left corner
of the sub-area S1,1 and thus closest to nodes in other zones. The only node in the
same sub-area S1,1 is in the lower right corner at maximum distance d. Even then,
4.5 Routing Table Maintenance 77
d 
d 
0 1 
0 
1 
d 
d 
2 
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 
2 0 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 
1 
2 
3 
d 
0 
Figure 4.19: Key space sub-areas for bx = 4 and by = 4
this node in the same zone is still closer to the target than any node in another
zone.
The size of the sub-area sx and sy depends on the size of the zone zx and zy with
sx = zx − d and sy = zy − d. These depend on the bases used with zx = bl−1x and
zy = bl−1y . At the same time, the diagonal d can be calculated from d =
√
s2x + s2y.
Since our storage uses a square-shaped world we only consider the special case
bx = by and sx = sy to calculate s = sx = sy and omit the full derivation. Then
d =
√
2∗s and z = zx = zy = s+d. Thus, z = s+
√
2∗s. Consequently, s = z1+√2 .
The empty space around the sub-area Si,j means the next lower level of the routing
table cannot be filled completely. There are sub-zones with no nodes inside. Thus,
there is no node matching the constraint of a given second-level entry. In figure 4.18,
the second layer is actually completely empty for all nodes in the sub-areas as there
are no nodes in all sub-zones corresponding to the second level of the routing tables.
With higher bx and by, there are more sub-zones with nodes, see 4.19. However,
only one fourth of the entries can actually be filled. Since it is known in advance
which zones will definitely be empty, their entries can be excluded from being filled
by sending out RtRequests to not waste bandwidth.
We applied this scheme of using keys from sub-areas to the top-level routing table
entries only. Having a node for each top-level entry is critical to realize the desired
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reliability of retrieving stored data on disjoint paths, see section 5.2.2. Therefore,
we had to make sure the node closest to a target position is in the correct zone on
this layer. To use it on lower levels, every sub-zone currently holding keys would
have to be thinned out recursively the same way the top zones have been thinned
out. This creates a very uneven distribution of responsibility area sizes. Nodes at
the border to the empty space would have a much larger responsibility area. On the
top level, this does not matter because no data will be stored in the empty areas,
see section 5.2.1. On lower levels, nodes with larger responsibility areas would have
to store and maintain much more stored data than other nodes.
Therefore, we did not use this key space scheme for lower levels. Lower level entries
might still be empty in case a node in another sub-zone is closer to a target position.
However, this only occurs rarely and if it does, the path is not prolonged as much
as if it happens on the top layer where the largest jump is made.
4.5.5 Redundant Routing Table Entry Querying
After a node a joined the overlay, it sends an RtRequest to all target positions of
entries in its routing table. If these messages were only routed using a’s neighbours,
it would mainly depend on the neighbours whether a is able to fill its routing table
correctly. If the majority of neighbours happens to be malicious, the majority of
RtResponses a receives will be from malicious nodes and a will have a malicious
majority in its routing table. When another node b joins and becomes neighbour
of a, a will route some of b’s RtRequest messages using its routing table. Thus, a
will indirectly also supply malicious nodes to b although a is not malicious. One
coincidental local majority of malicious nodes can easily spread out to other joining
nodes.
Therefore, we would rather rely on the nodes supplied by the bootstrapping service
to fill the routing table. With a high probability, it should deliver only a share
of malicious nodes equalling the total share of malicious nodes in the network. In
addition, we assume the bootstrapping service is aware of zones and it supplies
exactly one node from each top-level zone, if existing. This way we can use these
nodes to fill the top layer of the routing table initially.
When sending out RtRequests to the target positions of the top-level entries, each
request will be forwarded to the initially supplied node currently holding the entry.
When the node closest to the target position replies, it will replace that node in the
routing table. However, this procedure has a flaw. It only allows our routing table
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entries to get worse with respect to malicious nodes. Even if all initial nodes were
honest, we could end up with a malicious entry if at least one node on one of the
paths to the target positions is malicious. An initially malicious entry will definitely
stay malicious.
Furthermore, this procedure relies on the one initial node from the same zone to fill
all the lower layers of the routing table. If that node was malicious, all lower layer
entry would become malicious, too.
Therefore, we send out multiple messages to redundantly query every routing table
entry. Instead of using the normal routing procedure to send a unicast RtRequest
message to the target position of an entry, we send one RtRequest for the same
target position to each top-level entry. Using the standard routing, the receivers
would normally forward these messages to the zone of the target position in the first
step. There, several messages might travel on paths with the same nodes. If there
is one malicious node on multiple paths, there would not be much benefit.
Therefore, we try to create disjoint paths to the target position of one entry by
letting the messages travel in all the different zones as long a possible. We use a
different kind of message that, when routed, first stays in the zone of the first hop
and performs the final jump into the zone of the target position last. There, it is
already at the responsible node or at least close to it so paths will be disjoint.
We realized this by using a message with an intermediate and final destination. It is
first routed to the intermediate destination with the usual routing procedure. After
arriving there, the final destination is put in place of the intermediate destination
and the normal routing procedure continues.
For an RtRequest message, we use the target position of the requested entry as final
destination. The intermediate destinations will be all the other target positions on
the top layer. When one message arrives at the node closest to such an intermediate
destination, and this node has a correctly filled routing table, the node will forward
the message to its top layer entry for the final destination zone. There, the message
will already be very close to the final destination because the receiver is closest to
the intermediate node’s target position.
Figure 4.20 shows the basic principle of this approach to fill one entry. Node a has
joined the overlay. Initially, it received nodes b, c, d, and e from the bootstrapping
service and put them into its routing table. These nodes are in all the different zones
but they are not necessarily the closest nodes to a’s target position on the top layer.
Then a starts to request entries for its routing table. In figure 4.20, the entry e1,0,0
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Figure 4.20: Node a requests entry e1,0,0 with bootstrappers b, c, d, e
from the top layer of the routing table in zone Z1,0 is requested. First, a calculates
the target position t1,0,0 in zone Z1,0 denoted a1,0. Then it sends out four RtRequest
messages with a1,0 as final destination and a0,0, a0,1, a1,0 and a1,1 as intermediate
destinations.
The intermediate destination of the first message is the target position a0,1 in zone
Z0,1. When a routes this message, node b from the top-level entry for this zone is
closest and the message is forwarded there. Node b routes this message closer to its
intermediate destination a0,1 until it reaches node x. Node x finds out it is responsi-
ble for the intermediate destination and exchanges it with the final destination a1,0.
The node closest to this destination known by x is node z in its top routing table
layer. Thus, x forwards the message to z. Since z is closest to x’s target position
x1,0 in zone Z1,0 and x is closest to a0,1, z is also close to a1,0. In this example, z is
even closest to a1,0. Thus, z will reply to a with an RtResponse.
The second message is routed similarly to the first one via zone Z1,1. Its interme-
diate destination is a1,1. Node a forwards this message to c from its routing table
corresponding to zone Z1,1. This message is forwarded within that zone until it
reaches node y responsible for the intermediate destination a1,1. Node y exchanges
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the intermediate destination with the final destination a1,0. It forwards the message
to node z which is in its routing table because it is closest to x’s target position
x1,0 in zone Z1,0. Again, the message arrives at node z responsible for a1,0 but on a
disjoint path.
The third message via zone Z1,0 is routed directly to a1,0 because intermediate and
final destination are the same and a normal unicast message can be used. Therefore,
a sends this message to node d from its routing table. Node d routes the message
closer to its final destination until it arrives at node z. This path is also disjoint
from the other paths.
The last message via zone Z0,0 would usually have a0,0 which is equal to a as inter-
mediate destination. Thus, a would receive its own message and replace this inter-
mediate destination with the final destination a1,0. This way the message would be
routed identical to the third message. Therefore, we pick the neighbour f closest to
a as intermediate destination. This is the node responsible for a0,0 before a joined
the overlay. So using it as an intermediate destination has a similar effect as before.
First, the message is routed to the intermediate destination – this time in one hop
directly to the neighbour. Then, the neighbour performs the jump into the final
destination zone Z1,0 passing the message to the node from the routing table closest
to f1,0. This time this is not z itself but it is a neighbour of z, so it is at least very
close to z. This node will finally forward the message to z.
In this example, a will receive four answers from z. Consequently, z will definitely
be put into a’s routing table. In general, this procedure creates different paths – one
for each zone – to route an RtRequest to its destination. These paths are likely to be
disjoint. Only in the final destination zone it might actually happen that multiple
messages arrive at the same node which is not the final destination node itself but
just a node close to it. However, this is not the common case. The multiple paths
make it hard for an attacker to prevent a node from filling a routing table entry
correctly. The attacker would need one malicious node on each of the paths, which
is unlikely due to random placement of nodes.
The same procedure is executed for lower level entries. For each entry a number of
RtRequest messages are sent equal to the number of zones. Each message is routed
via a different zone by mapping the target position to the respective zone and using
it as the intermediate destination for the message. Again, by routing to the mirrored
position and jumping from there to the target position’s zone, we get close to the
responsible node yielding disjoint paths with a high probability that are hard to
tamper with.
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As mentioned in section 4.4, the same principle is applied to route the initial Join-
Requests. The bootstrappers are from all the different zones making up the top
level of the routing table after the node joined. Therefore, each joining node sends
a message to the bootstrapper of a zone. The final destination is the node’s own
position but the final receiver can be any neighbour of this position. The interme-
diate destination is the node’s top level target position of the zone of the respective
bootstrapper. Therefore, the JoinRequest paths are also likely to be disjoint.
4.5.6 Active and Passive Filling
The initial filling of the routing table is done actively by the joining node sending out
RtRequest messages using the procedure described before. When a node in a routing
table fails, then a new node is requested using the same active filling procedure.
Using only this procedure, the set of nodes in the routing table would not change as
long as no nodes fail. However, there are also new nodes joining the network that
might be closer to a node’s target positions. Ideally, a routing table should always
contain nodes closest to the target positions for the assumptions we used before to
hold. So it should be updated as new nodes join.
A straight-forward solution would be to just regularly update all entries of the
routing table actively. However, a routing table has got bx ∗ by − 1 entries per
layer. If the number of layers is l there are l ∗ (bx ∗ by − 1) entries to be requested.
Each entry will be requested using bx ∗ by messages on the overlay layer each of
which will be routed via O(log(n)) hops in the worst case. Having to transfer
l ∗ (b2x ∗ b2y − bx ∗ by) overlay messages on each routing table update of a node incurs
a considerable overhead. For bx = 2, by = 2, and l = 4 this means every node would
generate 48 overlay messages. For bx = 4, by = 4, l = 4 every node would generate
960 overlay messages on each routing table update.
Therefore, we only use an approach to passively update a node’s routing table taking
advantage of the active filling done by a joining node. When a node receives an
RtRequest from another node, it also checks whether this node would fit in its
routing table. If it is closer to an entry’s target position, it replaces the current
node in that entry.
This is more likely to happen the closer an RtRequest gets to the target position of
an entry in one of the zones. If a joining node finds one node to be in its routing
table, the joining node is likely to also end up in the routing table of the node it
found or on one of the nodes close to it that were on the path of the RtRequest.
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Figure 4.21: Node a requests entry e0,0,0 with bootstrappers b, c, d, e but y does not put
a into its routing table
Considering the example in figure 4.20, the nodes x, y, and z will put the joining
node a in their routing tables because a is closer to their target positions than the
nodes currently in their routing tables.
An attacker could only prevent z from adding a if he controlled one malicious node
on all paths to z. While he could more easily prevent x and y from adding a for
the shown retrieval of entry e1,0,0, x and y will get RtRequests from a on redundant
paths when the entries e0,1,0 and e1,1,0 are requested by a. Therefore, an attacker
would need one node on each path to an entry to tamper with the passive filling.
However, since the relationship of being in the routing table of another node is not
always symmetric, the passive filling does not guarantee a joining node ends up in
all routing table entries where it would be closest to the target position. Such a
scenario is shown in figure 4.21. Node a joins and sends out its RtRequests for entry
e0,0,0 with final destination a0,0. It bootstrapped with nodes b, c, d, e which have
been put into its routing table. Its RtRequests are routed via all different zones and
arrive at the node x closest to a0,0. Thus, a can fill its entry. However, a is closest
to node y’s target position y0,1 of entry e0,1,0. Before a joined, z was responsible for
84 Chapter 4 A Self-Stabilizing Delaunay Overlay
y1,0 
a1,1 
e 
c 
0 1 
0 
1 
b 
d 
a0,0 x 
a1,0 
y 
z 
m m0,0 
a 
Figure 4.22: Node y passively updates its routing table after joining node a requests entry
e0,0,0
this entry. Therefore, a should replace z in the routing table of y. However, y does
not receive any message from a and therefore does not know about a.
On the other hand, just a slightly different placement of the nodes in zone Z1,0 makes
node m responsible for a1,0, see figure 4.22. Since y is closest to m’s target position
m0,0, y is in m’s routing table responsible for zone Z0,0. Therefore, a’s RtRequest
will be routed via y and y will replace node z in its routing table with node a.
Although the passive filling does not guarantee a node to always know the clos-
est nodes to its target posititions, it performs reasonably well as we will show in
section 6.3.
4.5.7 Connection Management
Connections are often symmetric in the sense that both connected nodes agree they
both need the connection. This is always true for neighbours. After one established
a connection and NetworkViews were exchanged, they agree about being neighbours
and keeping the connection open or not. Routing table connections are not always
symmetric in that sense. When a node a opens a connection to a node b, then b
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does not know the reason why a was interested in this connection. It might regard
b as a neighbour, sending it a NetworkView shortly after. It might also try to add b
to its routing table while b did not necessarily receive an RtRequest before. Node a
might not have requested the entry using active filling but he could also have learned
about b passively. So b does not know why a opened the connection.
However, connections also have to be closed when they are no longer needed to make
room for new connections. If b is replaced by a better fitting node on a, a is no longer
interested in the connection and might try to close it. However, in the meantime b
might also have put a into its routing table. Thus, a may not immediately close the
connection to b. Just letting the one who initiated the connection decide when to
close it would not work.
There are also more complicated scenarios with interactions between neighbours
management and routing table management. For example, node a and b agree they
are no longer neighbours which means they could close the connection. However,
one might be in the routing table of the other and might still be interested in
the connection. The reason for keeping a connection open might change over time
without both nodes noticing this change.
Therefore, the connection management has to keep track of the open connections
of a node and the reasons for keeping it open. Furthermore, both nodes of each
connection have to agree on whether it is still needed. A simple idea would be to just
send a message to the other node signalling the kind of interest in the connection.
However, on the receiver side there will be a delay between establishment of the
connection and reception of this message. With awkward concurrent processing of
messages, a node might decide to close a connection in this short time frame.
Thus, we slightly modified this idea to only send out a message when a node is no
longer interested in a connection. Every node implicitly assumes that the other node
it is connected to is interested in the connection and will not close it on its own.
When a node is no longer interested in a connection, it sends out a ConnectionInfo
message. When this message is received, the receiver checks whether it is interested
in the connection. If it is not, it closes the connection. If it is still interested, it
stores the negative interest of the other side. If at one time a node is no longer
interested in a connection, it sends out a ConnectionInfo and closes the connection
only if it has stored a negative interest of the other side. This also saves a lot of
message compared to explicitly signalling the interest in a connection.
However, the network is dynamic but not all nodes notice changes at the same
time because of variable message delay. One node might signal it does not need a
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connection shortly thereafter noticing it does need it because of some change in the
network. Meanwhile, the other node might have initiated closing the connection.
In these cases, we simply reopen the connection and take care the signalling of the
connection close is not misinterpreted as a failed connection attempt interpreted as
a node not existing any more.
4.6 Shortcut Maintenance
The primary purpose of shortcuts is to speed up message transfer and to reduce the
influence of malicious nodes on queries by sending query replies back directly instead
of routing them. Whenever a node receives a routed message from another node, it
creates a shortcut connection to that node, because both are likely to communicate
again, e.g. because the receiver will answer the message or the sender will send a
second message.
The shortcut connection is kept open for a certain time because due to the way the
storage maintains the world state, the same nodes are very likely to communicate
again. After receiving an answer, the requester will also establish a shortcut connec-
tion. Therefore, very often messages can be transferred with one-hop latency and
queries can be answered with only two-hop latency.
Every time a message is transferred using a shortcut, that time is recorded. In fixed
intervals, a node checks all its shortcuts and removes shortcuts that have not been
used for message transfer for a certain time. The connection management can then
choose to close the corresponding connections.
In general, using shortcuts should help to contain the influence of malicious nodes.
Replies are sent directly instead of being routed. If no malicious node could tamper
with the query getting to its destination on the first time, future queries will also not
be tampered with. This might happen when the network structure changed and a
malicious node gets on the route between source and destination. When both nodes
created shortcuts to each other they will transfer all messages directly.
However, a malicious node could try to have more messages routed its way by becom-
ing a shortcut on other nodes. It could just send messages to random destinations
all over the key space to make the receivers create a shortcut connection. This def-
initely increases its chances of tampering. On the other hand, as long as it is not
able to replace other honest nodes, it will only receive messages if it is actually the
closest node. Its best chance to get more messages is to become shortcut of nodes
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in other zones. When these nodes route to a node in a specific zone, they would
normally pick the one node in the top level of their routing table responsible for
that zone. With no other shortcuts present, the malicious node would be closer to
the destination half of time on average. Thus, it would receive half of the messages
that would normally be routed via the routing table entry.
This should not be a serious problem, however. First, the node will probably have
other shortcuts reducing the share of messages the malicious node gets. Even more
importantly, when nodes in the storage communicate with nodes in other zones
to maintain the world state, they communicate with the nodes in the top level of
their routing table. Therefore, an attacker can most likely not influence this most
important part of the communication by creating shortcuts on other nodes. Finally,
using the stored world state, the set of nodes allowed to request data can be limited
as shown in section 5.5.4 so using storage-level knowledge can be used to prevent
shortcuts from being established.
Another issue raised by shortcuts is the number of open connections. The number
of shortcuts is normally unbounded. It might be necessary to introduce a maximum
number of shortcuts because there are too many open connections that cannot be
handled.
4.7 Message Routing
The overlay supports two types of messages: unicast messages that are targeted
at a single position in the key space and areacast messages that are targeted at a
specific area. A unicast message will be received by one node only, usually the node
responsible for the destination. An areacast message will be received by multiple
nodes. In our scenario, these are all nodes with a responsibility area overlapping the
given destination area. It would also be possible to target nodes inside the given
area only but this kind of areacast message is not employed by the storage. It would
be useful for an overlay to exchange actions of players to send them to all players in
range.
RtRequests and JoinRequests are a special kind of unicast messages. The only
difference to a normal unicast message is that they support the exchange of inter-
mediate and final destinations. Therefore, they are routed like two normal unicast
messages. Furthermore, JoinRequests do not have a globally unique destination be-
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cause any neighbour of the destination might receive the message and the receiver
of the message depends on the path the message takes.
The overlay supports two geometric shapes required by the storage for areacasts:
convex polygons and circles. These messages are routed like unicast messages target-
ing the centre of the shape first. When the responsible node is reached, a multicast
tree is created to get the message to all overlapping nodes.
4.7.1 Unicast Messages
The routing process of unicast messages is straight-forward. A nodes compares
the distances to the message destination of itself, nodes in neighbourhood, routing
table, and shortcuts set and forward it to the node with minimum distance, see also
section 4.2.4. The only exception to this simple procedure is when the local node is
closest. Normally, the message would be passed to the application directly.
Message Buffering due to local Network Instability
However, the network could not be stable on the local node at that time. It might be
joining the overlay or it heard of another joining node bound to become its neighbour.
Then it would currently be connecting to some pending neighbour. This pending
neighbour could be closer, but it was not included in the routing decision. If we just
passed the message up to the application during that time, it might easily happen
that two messages for the same destination arrive at different nodes at the same
time, because they use a different set of nodes to calculate node responsibility.
Therefore, if a node is closest to a destination considering the set of known nodes
but the network is locally not stable, the message is buffered. When the network
becomes stable, buffered messages are routed again and either passed up to the
application if the local node is still closest or they are forwarded to a closer node.
We say a node is stable or unstable if its local network environment is stable or
not.
To decide whether the network is locally stable, it is not sufficient to only check
whether there are no pending neighbours. When a node a notices it needs to connect
to a neighbour b, it will start connecting and add b to the pending neighbours
set. When the connection is established, b will automatically become a neighbour.
However, this does not mean a already found its final position in the network. First,
a would have to send a NetworkView to b. When b replies with a NetworkView,
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a might have to add additional neighbours or remove neighbours until it finds its
place. Only when b does not reply with a NetworkView because from b’s point of
view a’s neighbourhood is correct, a can consider its local network to be stable.
Defining a timeout to decide that b did not reply is difficult as it is not clear what
this timeout should be. Luckily, in the above scenario b will always reply. Node a
sent a NetworkView to b including b as a neighbour. If b does not agree with being a
neighbour of a because it knows nodes that would be better neighbours, b will send
a NetworkView back because the views did not match. If b agrees, it will add a as
a neighbour and send its updated neighbourhood to all neighbours including a.
Therefore, a will always have at least one NetworkView of each neighbour. It can use
these NetworkViews to find out whether its local view of the neighbourhood matches
the views of its neighbours. Only when the Delaunay graph created by incorporat-
ing all NetworkViews from all neighbours is consistent with the local neighbourhood
and all reported neighbourhoods of neighbours, only then node a considers its lo-
cal network to be stable. It will pass a message to the application if it finds itself
responsible. As long as NetworkViews of neighbours are missing or there are incon-
sistencies, a node remains in the unstable state and only forwards messages to other
nodes, buffering messages the local node is currently responsible for.
To take that decision, every node stores the NetworkViews of its neighbours in a set
called NeighboursNeighbours. When a neighbour is removed, its entry in that set is
also removed. There is one special case where the NetworkView has to be stored
although a node does not regard the source as its neighbours, see figure 4.23. If the
non-neighbours a and b have a common neighbour c that fails and causes a and b
to become neighbours, a and b might not detect the failure at the same time. Node
a might detect the failure earlier (1.) and send a NetworkView to b with b being a
neighbour of a (2.).
Node a already knows about b because of an optimization we used to speed up the
stabilization process. Node b is a neighbour of the common neighbours c and d.
Since a stored the NetworkView of c and d both having b in its neighbourhood, a
will directly try to connect to b as a pending neighbour. This also means it will
not send out NetworkViews only reporting the failure of c and afterwards reporting
the adding of neighbour b, because NetworkViews are only send when there are no
pending neighbours. This reduces the number of exchanged NetworkViews in this
scenario quite substantially. After the connection to b is established, a will send its
new neighbourhood to its new neighbours including b.
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Figure 4.23: Node b detects failure of c last and a does send a NetworkView to b after
becoming a neighbour of b
Since b still has c as a neighbour, it would not agree and normally not store the
NetworkView of a. Instead it replies with a NetworkView including c (2.). Node b still
keeps the connection open despite the neighbour relationship not being symmetric
as a did not send a ConnectionInfo and b assumes a is interested in the connection,
which it is.
When b also finally detects the failure, it will add a as a neighbour. After sending the
updated NetworkView to a including a as neighbour (3.), a will not reply because
it already added b as a neighbour before. Node a does not have to change its
neighbourhood and the reported neighbourhood from b is also correct from its point
of view. Finally, b would not have a stored NetworkView of a and cannot become
stable. Therefore, a node also stores the NetworkView of another node if that
node thinks both nodes are neighbours. Only when both nodes agree they are not
neighbours, the NetworkView is not stored and stored NetworkViews are removed.
When the local network becomes stable again, any buffered messages are routed
again. Consequently, the buffering mechanism also introduces additional delay.
Message Buffering due to Shortcut Establishment
When a node receives a routed message, it creates a shortcut connection to the
message source to prepare for possible replies to be sent back. However, the message
is processed immediately and the reply message is most likely generated before the
shortcut connection could be established. Therefore, messages directly targeted at
shortcut nodes – typical for reply messages – are handled differently. If the shortcut
connection is currently being established, the message is buffered instead of being
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routed. When the shortcut connection is established, buffered messages for the
shortcut node are transferred.
Establishing the connection should usually be faster than routing the message as it
takes fewer messages on the link layer if the routing path is long enough. In any
case, it is more reliable which is the main reason we use this procedure. However,
depending on the type of Internet connection, routing the message might be faster if
some expensive hole-punching procedure has to be executed to connect hosts using
NAT [66]. If traffic size is not an issue, both procedures could also be executed in
parallel and whichever message is first wins.
Reliability and Resilience
Routing of unicast messages is inherently unreliable. Even if we assume reliable
connections, a node might always fail while processing a message before forwarding
it correctly. Because of the buffering of messages, this problem is aggravated. When
a node buffering a lot of messages fails, all of them are lost. With longer paths
and increasing churn, the probability of a unicast message reaching its destination
drops. Therefore, routing tables and shortcut sets also increase reliability of message
delivery.
In addition to node failure, malicious nodes can also prevent a message from reaching
its destination. They cannot tamper with the message content without detection
because messages are signed but they can just drop it. The probability of a message
reaching its destination considering malicious node’s influence only can be estimated.
Considering a routing path with an average length logn as a random sub-selection
of all nodes 1 with a malicious node share of m, 0 ≤ m ≤ 1, the message transfer
will only be successful if there is no malicious node between source and destination.
Thus, we can calculate the probability p all of the picked nodes are not malicious
by p = (1 − m)(logbx∗by n)−2. For example for m = 0.1, n = 1000, bx = 2, by = 2 the
success probability is down to p = 0.73. For m = 0.1, n = 1000, bx = 3, by = 3 the
success probability is p = 0.89.
Another potential weakness is the fact that malicious nodes can delay the message
reception on other nodes by sending them false NetworkViews. This is similar to the
attack discussed in section 4.3.6 where malicious nodes provide false NetworkViews
with nodes that are not in the network currently. While the reported NetworkViews
1Which is not perfectly precise since nodes in the corner of the key space will forward fewer
messages and are less likely to be picked.
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are not consistent, the node will buffer all messages it is currently responsible for.
However, all other messages will be forwarded as normal. Again, this kind of mis-
behaviour can only be detected and punished. If it reports new nodes that do not
exist or it reports the failure of nodes that did not fail, it should finally be excluded
from the network.
4.7.2 Areacast Messages
Areacast messages will be received by all nodes with a Voronoi cell overlapping the
destination area. Convex polygons and circles are supported. When a node receives
an areacast message, it checks whether its Voronoi cell overlaps the destination area.
If not, the centre of the area is taken as the destination and the message is forwarded
exactly like a unicast message. For simplicity, from now on we will use the term a
node overlaps an area when we mean its Voronoi cell overlaps the area.
Multicast Tree
When the first node overlapping the destination area receives a message, the mul-
ticast handling of the message starts. A spanning tree embedded in the Delaunay
graph is generated in a distributed fashion as proposed in [87]. The first node to
overlap becomes the multicast tree root. This information is needed by the other
nodes to calculate the tree layout. Therefore, the root node sets itself as the mul-
ticast root in the message. Afterwards, it forwards the message to all neighbours
overlapping the destination area. When a node receives an areacast message with
set root, it has to decide which neighbours to forward the message to. For each
overlapping neighbour, it calculates how this neighbour would route a message to
the root using compass routing [81]. With compass routing, the neighbour with
minimum angle to the destination will be picked. The node can make that decision
because it stored the neighbourhoods of all of its neighbours. Only if the neighbour
would route via this node, it forwards the message to this neighbour. Otherwise an-
other node is responsible for forwarding. Since all other neighbours of this neighbour
can perform the same calculation using the same information – the neighbours and
the multicast root – they will all agree who has to forward the message. Therefore,
every overlapping node will receive the message exactly from one other node: its
parent in the tree.
Figure 4.24 shows the multicast tree for a circular area starting at root node a. After
a received the message, probably because it is in the routing table of some distant
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Figure 4.24: Multicast tree for a circular area starting at root node a
node, a forwards the message to its overlapping neighbours b, c, d, e. Node h is only
a non-overlapping neighbour. When b receives the message, it checks whether it has
to forward the message to its overlapping neighbours a and c. Node a is the root
so it does not have to forward there. Node c has got the root a as neighbour so
the angle from c to the root via a is zero. Therefore, b calculates c to receive the
message from a and b does not forward the message anywhere.
When c receives the message from a, it also checks its overlapping neighbours
a, b, d, g. Node a is the root and b and d are neighbours of a. Thus, they will
receive the message from a. Node g is not a neighbour of a so c calculates how
g would route a message to destination a using compass routing. Since the angle
∠dga is smaller than the angle ∠cga, g would pick node d and c does not have to
forward the message.
Node d considers neighbours a, c, e, f, g for forwarding. Nodes a, c, e are ruled out
since a is the root and c and e are its neighbours. However, doing the same calcu-
lation as node c above, d finds out it is responsible for forwarding the message to
g. Furthermore, when checking f , node d compares the angle ∠dfa and ∠efa and
forwards the message to f since ∠dfa is smaller. For the same reason, e does not
forward the message to f . It also does not forward to overlapping neighbours a or
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d. Finally, nodes f and d do not forward as their overlapping neighbours c, d and
d, e are all neighbours of the multicast root a and will receive the message from a.
Reliability and Resilience
An areacast is first routed like a unicast. Until the point the multicast is actually
started, it behaves exactly like a unicast reliability-wise. After that, additional nodes
are involved building the multicast tree.
As long as the network does not change, the multicast tree will cover all nodes
overlapping the destination area and all of them will receive the message. If nodes
join or leave while the areacast is in progress, it might not work correctly. First,
nodes can always fail. If a node fails while other nodes still assume it is there and
forward the message according to the tree, the whole subtree of the failed node will
not receive the message. The same way a malicious node can prevent its subtree
from receiving the message.
Areacasts are less reliable than unicasts, as additional nodes are involved and all
have to work correctly. Furthermore, it depends on the size of the destination area
and the density of nodes whether an areacast is received correctly. If the key space
has size s and the requested area has size a, we can estimate the success probability
as follows. The number of nodes with the ability to let the unicast part of the
routing fail is logbx∗by n − 2. The average number of nodes within the given area is
a
s
∗n. However, this is just a lower bound as we are actually looking for the number
of nodes overlapping the given area.
Therefore, we use an artificial number o describing the share of all nodes overlapping
the requested area. Then, the total number of involved nodes is logbx∗by n− 2+ o∗n
and the probability of a successful areacast is p = (1 − m)(logbx∗by n)−2+o∗n. For
m = 0.1, n = 1000, bx = 3, by = 3 and requesting an area causing a share of 0.01
of all nodes to take part in the multicast, p is down to p = 0.31. This means the
areacast dominates the reliability with its linear dependence on the total number
of nodes and the share of the requested area. Areacasts can be successful for small
areas only when churn is high or malicious nodes are present.
Malicious nodes outside of the multicast tree can exert additional influence on neigh-
bouring nodes in the multicast tree by sending them false NetworkViews similar to
the tampering with unicast message routing. Thus, they can delay the processing
of messages for that node and in the end they can let the area query fail as that
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Figure 4.25: Join of node j during multicast leads to message duplication on node f
node does not answer the query in time. Again, this kind of behaviour can only be
detected and should be punished by exclusion.
Duplicates
Node fail during a multicast may prevent nodes from receiving the message. How-
ever, nodes joining during a multicast alter the tree structure and can lead to nodes
receiving duplicate messages.
Figure 4.25 shows such a scenario. Node a starts building the multicast tree and
the message is forwarded to the nodes b, c, d, g, and f . The message forwarded to e
takes longer and while being transferred, a new node j joins. During the integration,
e buffers the message until j is integrated. Then, e decides which of its overlapping
neighbours a, d, j, f to forward the message to. Since a is the root and d is the
neighbour of the root, e does not need to forward the message to them. Comparing
the angles ∠dja and ∠eja, e concludes the latter is smaller and forwards the message
to j. When considering forwarding to f , e finds out the angle ∠jfa is smaller than
∠dfa and ∠efa so j is responsible for forwarding instead of e. For the same reason,
j forwards the message to f after receiving it so f receives the same message twice
– once from d and once from e.
Therefore, we use additional message IDs to remember the messages from one source
already received. Every sender assigns these message IDs sequentially. However,
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Figure 4.26: Node c cannot determine whether parent d of e overlaps and forwards
since messages can possibly overtake each other if routed on different paths due to
network structure change, it is not sufficient to just remember the highest received
message ID and drop any message with lower ID. Instead, all message IDs are
recorded and stored for an assumed maximum message transfer time. This is done
on each node receiving a message regardless of it being the final receiver. Therefore,
duplicate messages are suppressed on the first node in the tree to receive a duplicate
and not further down on the road when duplicates can spawn even more duplicates.
Overlap Determination
The areacast is used to reach all nodes storing data from a given area. If the Voronoi
cell of a node overlaps, it receives the areacast message. During the multicast, a
node has to decide whether another node overlaps. To make that decision, it actually
needs to know the neighbours of that node so it can calculate the Voronoi Cell of
that node. Consequently, a node can only decide overlap for its neighbours because
it only stores their neighbours. However, during a multicast a node has to compare
the angle of a neighbour to itself and the root to angles of other neighbours of that
neighbour. When it concludes another neighbour of that neighbour has minimum
angle, it will not forward the message. However, it cannot be sure this neighbour of
a neighbour actually received the message because it does not know whether that
neighbour’s neighbour overlaps.
Figure 4.26 shows an example of such a scenario. Node c calculates node d to be
the parent of e. Normally, it would not forward the message to e. However, c
only knows a node d exists because it is a neighbour of its neighbour e. It does
not know the neighbours of d. It cannot decide whether d actually overlaps and
forwards the message. In [2], this problem is solved by c additionally querying d for
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its neighbourhood. This delays the execution of the areacast by the time needed to
establish a connection and to query and reply the neighbourhood. In our solution,
c just forwards the message. If d also forwards, the duplicate will be removed at e.
This scenario was not very common in our tests since we only request small areas
with sizes similar to the sizes of Voronoi cells. Therefore, the multicast trees have
s small height and most of the time nodes are close to the root. Then, neighbours
of neighbours of a node are often neighbours of that node or the multicast root.
Thus, a node can mostly decide whether a neighbour of a neighbour overlaps and
unnecessary message duplicates are rarely generated.
4.8 Resilience
So far we have shown how some types of malicious behaviour can be prevented. Re-
dundancy in the join and maintenance process make it very unlikely an attacker can
eclipse nodes, tamper with the Delaunay structure, or get a more than proportional
share in routing tables.
When it comes to the routing of messages, a malicious node can simply drop a mes-
sage instead of forwarding it. Even an iterative routing procedure, where every hop
connects to the source and reports the next hop with the source finally transferring
the message directly to the last hop, would not be of much help. It would be very
expensive. The malicious node can also always claim being responsible and answer
the message. The source would have to detect there are nodes closer to the destina-
tion by sending additional messages on different routes to the destination. Instead,
we could just as well send the messages on multiple paths to the same destination,
like we do for routing JoinRequests and RtRequest. Thus, we do not try to detect
routing misbehaviour. We use redundant paths to increase the probability a message
reaches its destination.
However, there is one type of misbehaviour allowing malicious node to exert influence
on message routing even if they are not on the path of the message: sending out
false NetworkViews to prevent a node from processing a message when it is the
final receiver. A malicious node can report the failure of an existing neighbour and
cause another neighbour to buffer a message and not process it until it receives a
corrected NetworkView from the malicious node and all its stored NetworkViews
become consistent again, see also section 4.7.1.
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Even worse, a malicious node can temporarily destabilize any other node by sending
it a NetworkView containing a node bound to become its neighbour that is currently
not online. While the receiver is trying to connect to this pending neighbour, it will
not process any messages it is responsible for, see also section 4.3.6.
The key point to notice here is that the malicious node actually has to send out a
(signed) message to cause the destabilization. This creates the opportunity to prove
the misbehaviour to the central certification authority and punish the malicious
node by revoking its certificate and exclude him from the network. If a distant
node a sends a NetworkView containing a node c that is currently not online to
a node b, a can prove this action at the CA. The CA can ask b to give a reason
for sending this message to a. A possible reason would be a NetworkView from c
that b received just recently. Therefore, time-stamps of NetworkView creation are
included and signed in the NetworkView. If b is not able to give a reason, it might be
excluded immediately or after the same thing happened multiple times. Therefore,
destabilizing nodes by sending out additional non-existing nodes to distant nodes
can be detected and punished quite easily. Consequently, this type of tampering
should not occur as it is expensive to obtain new certificates.
However, the case a node reports a neighbour as failed cannot be proven so easily.
A node a receiving a NetworkView from b missing the node c can prove b sent out
this NetworkView. When asked by the CA, b can only justify this stating that c
closed the connection – but b cannot prove this. In fact, c could have been the
malicious node and on purpose closed the connection only to b to make b report
a false neighbourhood change. When such a dispute is started, it is only sure
that either b or c have acted maliciously. Therefore, the CA could only count the
number of times certain nodes are involved in these disputes and when a node
reaches a threshold depending on its lifetime it can exclude it. This could also be
exploited by malicious nodes by falsely raising disputes against honest nodes using
multiple malicious nodes. However, only malicious neighbours can actually send
out NetworkViews with missing neighbours. An honest node does not care about
distant nodes’ reported neighbourhoods. Only when an inconsistency in the local
neighbourhood is created, a node will become unstable. It is unlikely an attacker can
position many malicious node as neighbours to launch such an attack. Furthermore,
this will still end up being expensive for an attacker as he uses up his free disputes
at the CA.
In the end, more sophisticated detection procedure correlating more factors would
probably be necessary to safely identify and punish attackers destabilizing the net-
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work by reporting failed neighbours. However, there is a decisive difference between
the two types of sending false NetworkViews. Reporting failed neighbours is only
possible to neighbours and not to other nodes. It allows malicious node to exert
local influence only. Thus, nodes still have to be in the right position to tamper
with specific queries. Therefore, redundant paths should still be sufficient to make
successful tampering unlikely.
4.9 Discussion
The self-stabilizing overlay allows the storage to exchange unicast and areacast mes-
sage to store and retrieve data. Messages are routed in a logarithmic number of steps
allowing a scalable message exchange for applications. Since JoinRequests are routed
to get in a logarithmic number of steps to a node’s location and the self-stabilizing
algorithm exchanges messages only locally, the maintenance of the primary network
structure is scalable as well. Furthermore, routing tables are maintained using uni-
cast messages which are again routed in log n steps. It also uses an approach to
passively fill routing tables reducing the number of exchanged messages. However,
routing table maintenance depends with O((bx ∗ by)2) on the bases of the key space
adding a large constant factor to the logn steps for each message.
The overlay cannot guarantee reliable message delivery. Failure of a node means
messages being processed and forwarded on that node are lost. Therefore, logarith-
mic path lengths reduce the chances of message loss. The self-stabilizing algorithm
will repair the network structure after node fail and routing tables will be refilled by
the maintenance algorithm. Thus, the application can always retry to send a lost
message or it can exploit additional redundancy to compensate for the unreliable
message delivery.
Finally, the overlay is resilient to attackers with a certain probability by exploiting
redundancy. The primary structure cannot be tampered with without eclipsing
nodes. Eclipsing nodes is hard because multiple redundant join paths have to be
occupied by malicious nodes. The routing table maintenance uses redundant paths
as well and the use of target positions aims to keep the share of malicious nodes
in routing tables proportionally low to their total share in the network. Shortcuts
allow direct replies to queries halving chances for malicious nodes to tamper with
queries.
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Thus, our overlay provides facilities to realize a scalable, reliable, and resilient uni-
cast and multicast communication. A detailed evaluation of the actual results ob-
tained can be found in section 6.3.
Chapter 5
A Virtual World Storage
As outlined in section 3.2, the task of the storage is to reliably store the state of the
virtual world in a distributed fashion. Thus, players moving through the world can
check whether the state they retrieved from other nodes is correct. To do so, the
storage has to fulfil the following requirements.
5.1 Requirements
The main task of the storage can be divided into two subtasks. First, the state has
to be stored reliably. Second, it has to be updated reliably according to the actions
of players in the world. Thus, the storage has to support two main functions:
State Retrieval Nodes must be able to retrieve the state of the area they are in to
check whether it is correct.
State Updating The storage must provide a mechanism to record the actions of
players and correctly update the world state according to these actions.
Again, the non-functional requirements are reliability, scalability, and resilience:
Reliability Stored data must be preserved despite churn, failing nodes, and vary-
ing message latencies with late messages. The state update mechanism must
record player actions and update the state reliably. Finally, nodes should
always be able to retrieve stored data.
Scalability The storage must use the overlay in a way so message exchange is still
able to scale to large network sizes. Therefore, data has to be stored in a
distributed fashion and only a subset of nodes may be involved in operations
to retrieve and update the state in a certain area.
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Resilience The storage should still work reliably even if a certain share of nodes is
malicious, reporting tampered state on data retrievals and tampering with the
routing of messages.
In the following, we will first describe the storing of data before explaining the
update mechanism.
5.2 Retrieving and Storing Data
To store data in a distributed fashion, we have to define a responsibility function
mapping the position of a data item in the world to the node responsible for storing
it. The self-stabilizing overlay was designed to provide such a mapping. Every node
is responsible for storing all data items it is closer to than any other node. This
means every nodes stores all data within its Voronoi cell. However, we cannot map
the data space representing the area of the world directly onto the overlay ID space.
Nodes near zone borders have much larger responsibility areas than nodes inside the
zones creating an uneven distribution of load. Furthermore, we can take advantage
of the zoning in the overlay to realize a replicated storing of data. Replication and
redundancy are the main tools to provide reliability and resilience as shown in the
following sections.
5.2.1 Data Space and Replication
A straight-forward way for a malicious node to prevent correct storing of data or to
prevent honest nodes from retrieving the correct state is the storage and retrieval
attack [111]. Instead of forwarding a store or retrieve message, a malicious node
simply drops that message or replies with a faked result claiming responsibility for
storing that data. One way to counter this attack is to place replicas of data in
different locations in the key space so replicas can be stored and retrieved indepen-
dently [59]. Since one malicious node on multiple paths to the replicas can still
prevent the replica from being reached, it is beneficial to make this unlikely [5] or
even guarantee paths to the different replicas to be disjoint [51].
We adapted our idea presented in [106] to retrieve replicas of data in a Pastry ring
on disjoint paths to work in our two-dimensional overlay. Instead of mapping the
world area directly onto the ID space, we map every position in the world to one
position per overlay top-level zone. For every data item, one replica is stored in every
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zone. Thus, every replica has a different position in the ID space. The replication
factor r = rx ∗ ry equals the number of zones depending on the bases bx, by of the
numbering systems used.
Referring back to figure 4.18 the world area is mapped onto the marked areas Si,j
with size sx ∗ sy in the zones with size zx ∗ zy. We more formally define two linear
mappings s and t. The isomorphic mapping s maps the world area
W = {(x, y) ∈ R × R | 0 ≤ x < wx, 0 ≤ y < wy}
with size wx ∗ wy onto the sub-area S0,0: s : W → S0,0 with
s
⎛
⎝x
y
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝wx/sx 0
0 wy/sy
⎞
⎠ ∗
⎛
⎝x
y
⎞
⎠
Afterwards, t translates the sub-area S0,0 and the set of replica or zone identifiers
R = {(i, j) ∈ N × N | 0 ≤ i < rx, 0 ≤ i < ry}
to a key from the key space K ⊂ R × R using:
t
⎛
⎝
⎛
⎝x
y
⎞
⎠ , (i, j)
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝i ∗ zx
j ∗ zy
⎞
⎠+
⎛
⎝x
y
⎞
⎠
We denote the compound mapping m = t ◦ s.
Using s, any rectangular world area can be mapped onto any rectangular shape of
S0,0. As the shape of S0,0 depends on the zone shape depending on the chosen bases
bx and by, any bases can be used for the ID space.
In each zone, all nodes hold a replica of all objects in the world so there is a copy of
the world in each zone. This is also shown in figure 5.1 with s mapping an object
o in the world W to its replica o0,0 in S0,0 and t mapping o0,0 to the replicas oi,j in
the other zones. By sending an area query to each of the zones, every replica can
be retrieved independently and majority voting can be used to decide on the correct
state as shown in the following section.
5.2.2 Data Retrieval on Disjoint Paths
When a node n tries to retrieve world state, it specifies an area to retrieve all objects
lying in that area. This area A can be a single point A = p, p ∈ W or a sub-area of
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Figure 5.1: Mappings s and t map object o to its replica IDs o0,0...o1,1
the world A ⊆ W . The location is then mapped to the r different zones using the
function m generating areas A0,0...Arx−1,ry−1.
Every area Ai,j is a subset of the zone it is located in Ai,j ⊂ Zi,j. A node only
accepts retrieve operations for areas completely contained in W . Since s maps W
onto S0,0 and t just translates S0,0 into the other sub-areas, all Ai,j are even subsets
of the sub-area Si,j in zone Zi,j: Ai,j ⊆ Si,j.
Sending Retrieval Messages
For each of these mapped area Ai,j , n sends a message with Ai,j as destination using
the overlay. Depending on the type of area an areacast or a unicast is used. As the
overlay supports convex polygon and circle shapes only for areacasts, these are also
the only area shapes supported by the storage.
The message payload is a storage message of type RetrieveMessage specifying the
type of operation to be performed by the receiver. Furthermore, n remembers the
running retrieval and starts a timer specifying a timeout.
Assuming n lies in zone Za,b, then the top layer of its routing table contains nodes
from all other zones Zi,j, i 	= a, j 	= b. Since all destination areas Ai,j are in different
zones, n will forward the messages to each of the nodes in its top layer. Only the
message for destination Aa,b will be forwarded to a node in zone Za,b in a lower layer
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Figure 5.2: Node n retrieving all replicas of an object o creates disjoint paths
of the routing table. Therefore, in the next hop the messages will all arrive at one
node in each of the different zones as shown in figure 5.2.
As long as prefix routing is used, the messages will also never leave these zones.
The messages will only be forwarded to nodes matching the destination in more
digits but not less. Therefore, the leading digits of all receiving nodes will always
be the zone identifier of the zone the message was sent to by n. The only way for
a message to leave its zone is switching from prefix-routing using routing tables to
the neighbourhood-based routing.
However, the way IDs are distributed in the ID space actually prevents this. As we
have shown in section 4.5.4, if there is one node in a zone Zi,j, it is always closer
to any point from Si,j than any node from another zone. Since every Ai,j ⊆ Si,j,
the nodes overlapping Ai,j are all located in Zi,j. Therefore, even when switching to
neighbourhood-based routing, a message will not change zones.
Thus, the paths to the different replicas are completely disjoint except for node n.
This contains the influence of malicious nodes because an attacker needs a malicious
node on multiple paths to tamper with queries. For non-disjoint paths, an attacker
only needs one common node on multiple paths to tamper.
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Processing Reply Messages
When the overlay has routed the messages, all nodes overlapping the destination
areas receive the RetrieveMessage. They select all stored replicas lying in the
requested area from their local data store and answer with a reply message of
typeRetrieveResultMessage. This message will be sent directly to n using a shortcut
connection the overlay will establish automatically.
Node n will record all incoming reply messages until it is able to finish the query and
pass the final result back. If the query was a point-query, it will at most receive r of
these messages each containing a set of replicas. When n receives such a message, it
checks whether it has received more than r/2 messages in total. If yes, it performs
a voting on the result where each message counts as one vote. If more than r/2
answers contain identical set of replicas, this set is returned. If not, n continues to
wait for replies until r answers arrived or the timeout is reached. Then it returns the
set of replicas with most votes. Furthermore, it signals its confidence in the result
returning the share of votes the result achieved.
Area queries are handled in a similar way. However, for area queries the answer
for one destination area Ai,j might consist of multiple messages if multiple nodes
overlap the destination area. Therefore, the replica set of a destination area is
created by assembling the result sets of the individual reply messages from one
zone. Furthermore, n has to decide if all reply message for a destination area have
been received. This is the case when replies from all nodes overlapping Ai,j have
arrived. Since n does not necessarily know nodes in this area, this information has
to be sent to n.
Therefore, all reply messages include the neighbourhood of its sender. Thus, n can
check for each reply whether any neighbours of its sender also overlap the destination
area. If a neighbour overlaps and its reply message has not been received yet, the
replica set of this zone is still incomplete and n will wait for further replies. Only
when more than r/2 replica sets have been received, the above voting procedure
starts with each replica set having one vote. It returns, when a majority is reached or
waits for further replies until the majority or the programmed timeout is reached.
5.2.3 Storing Data
The storage does not only allow retrieving static state. It also updates the world
state. Consequently, the storage also allows storing of information. When a node
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wants to store an object in the world, it creates r replicas of this object and sends
a unicast StoreMessage containing the replica to the object position mapped to
the different zones. Nodes receiving such a message add the replica to their local
data store. Since storing and retrieving data both use the same mapping and the
same routing procedure, the message paths for storing data are again completely
disjoint.
Storing data is a fire-and-forget operation. No acknowledgement messages are sent
back. Replication and disjoint paths should be sufficient to have data stored at the
majority of responsible nodes. An alternative would have been to use r different
paths to each of the r replicas, similar to the routing table maintenance performed
by the overlay. However, storing data is a much more common operation than node
join and leave and the traffic overhead would probably be prohibitive.
5.3 World State Updating
A central server can update the world state directly after receiving an action from a
player. It can decide which actions are valid, calculate their effects, and apply them
to the current world state closely after the action has been issued by a player. These
updates happen continuously at a fast rate and the world state is always up-to-date
at the server. Only the client views experience a small delay displaying the world
state.
Unfortunately, realizing this in a peer-to-peer system is impossible for two reasons:
distribution of state and replication. The former is necessary to make it scalable.
The latter makes it reliable and resilient. In the following section, we will analyse
why state distribution and replication prohibit fast-paced continuous updating of
the world state.
5.3.1 State Distribution and Replication
In contrast to a central server, a node a is only responsible for storing and updating
a sub-area A of the world. This area contains the objects OA = {o1, ..., on} and t0 is
the timestamp of these objects – the world time they have been updated last. Node
a then updates these objects to time t1. Possible reasons include the arrival of a
player action with timestamp t1 or a continuous update is just scheduled to happen.
Using an event-based simulation, a needs all relevant actions of players that have
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Figure 5.3: Player p outside of A at time t0 moves to arrive inside A at t1
happened since the last update time t0 to calculate the new state of all objects in
OA.
Movement
Our main finding is that only including the objects in OA and the actions of all player
characters in OA is not sufficient to correctly update the state. A player character
p could be outside of A at t0 but moving into the direction of A at speed v with the
result of being inside of A at t1. Node a needs the old state of p at t0 including its
movement vector to calculate its position inside of A at t1. This scenario is shown
in figure 5.3.
On the other hand, p could also have stopped moving shortly after t0 so he will not
be inside of A at t1. To correctly reflect this, a does not only need the state of the
outside object p at t0, it also needs all movement actions generated by p between t0
and t1.
Finally, p could also have an indirect influence on objects inside of A. He could be
standing still just outside of A and an AI-controlled character executes an AI-update
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event between t0 and t1. The AI performed some random wandering behaviour
looking for players to chase and happened to move close to p. Executing the event,
the AI would inspect its environment and notice the player being inside its perception
range and would start to chase the player. Therefore, even if the player character
outside of A performs no actions and does not move, its mere presence can influence
the correct updated state.
However, not any object in the world can influence objects of A. A player character
can be sufficiently far away so he cannot move into the area A between t0 and t1 as
shown for player s in figure 5.3 moving towards A with speed vmmax. More precisely,
he could not be close enough to move into A or into the perception range dAI of any
AI inside A. Then, he cannot influence the state of objects in A at time t1. This
distance threshold d depends on two parameters: the maximum movement speed
vmmax of mobile objects and the time passed between t0 and t1: d = vmmax ∗ (t1 −
t0) + dAI .
Interactions
Outside player characters or AIs can also interact with objects inside A by perform-
ing actions. Fortunately, similar to the real world, actions only have local effect.
Throwing a stone at somebody or casting a spell can only affect objects in a certain
maximum distance to the object performing the action. However, just adding the
maximum interaction range di of any action to the above formula is not sufficient.
For example, player p3 outside A triggers an action to throw a stone at player p
inside A at time tp3 between t0 and t1 and they are exactly di distance away from
each other. Then, depending how fast the stone flies, it will hit p at some time
between tp3 and t1 and will have an influence on the state of p at t1. Now a third
player p2 behind p3 from p’s perspective at distance di from p3 throws a stone at p2
at time tp2 between t0 and tp3. If this stone hits p3 before tp3, it might have an effect
on p3’s ability to throw stones. It could reduce p3’s chances to hit p and p3’s stone
misses p leading to a different state of p at t1. Thus, actions can also have transitive
effects on objects in the world.
Whether such a transitive influence is possible depends on the maximum propagation
speed of interaction effects vimax. If performing an action with effect at distance di
only takes time x with t1 = t0 + 3x, this interaction can happen 3 times between t0
and t1 as shown in figure 5.4 giving a scenario of chained interactions from player
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Figure 5.4: Interaction chain with transitive effect from player p1 to p
p1 to p2, p3, and p. In this scenario, everything closer to A than 3 ∗ di – p1, p2, and
p3 – has to be included to update the state in area A at t1.
The maximum influence distance from A can be computed from d = vimax ∗ (t1 −
t0) + di. The first part is the maximum transitive range of action effects. The
maximum interaction distance di has to be added because it decides whether an
player outside A is able to start an interaction with any object inside A. Every node
has to maintain running actions affecting objects inside its area. Suppose action
effects propagate really slow but at a long distance di. This means it would take
long until a triggered action has an effect on an object inside A. Without adding
di in the formula, a would simply miss the triggering of the action by the far away
player character and would later not be able to update the state of the action target
correctly.
The interaction speed is usually much higher than the movement speed as a thrown
stone usually flies faster than any player can run. The maximum interaction range of
characters is also mostly higher than the AI perception range. Therefore, the above
interaction formula dictates the additional maximum influence distance around A
to calculate the new state of objects in A.
Effects of Distribution
This dependence of the updated state from an increased area does not allow fast
continuous updating of the state. Before any incoming event can be processed, the
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old state of the additional area has to be fetched from some other node updating
that particular state.
It is very unlikely a player at distance d moves towards A on the shortest path so he
ends up in A or that a chain of player interactions builds up from maximum range
in a way that they influence objects in A. However, a does not know this when it
starts updating the state at t1. It has to include all additional objects and player
actions only because they could have an influence to always calculate the correct
state. Most of the fetched objects will probably not end up in A and can be deleted
after updating. Node a would not be able to calculate the correct state of objects
outside of A anyway as it would need all objects inside distance d from these outside
objects. Updating these objects is the task of other nodes.
This mechanism actually depends on the game rules to realize a scalable solution.
Player actions with instantaneous effects on distant locations must not exist. Such
an action would mean a needs to fetch the whole world state as any player in the
world could have indirect effect on objects in A, preventing a scalable solution. From
a scalability point of view, low movement speed and low interaction propagation
speed would be best as they reduce the number of objects to be fetched.
Allowing only interactions with slow speed instead of fast-paced interactions would
probably be boring for players. However, actions like shooting an arrow could always
be realized by first adding a cast or aiming time after the action has been triggered.
When this time is over, the arrow flies at the expected high speed. The propagation
speed from triggering the action to the arrow hitting its target is slower, depending
on the aiming time.
Effects of Replication
Nodes can leave the network unexpectedly at any time. To prevent the loss of data,
stored data has to be replicated onto multiple nodes. These replicas have to be
consistent so nodes can retrieve the correct world state. The state of an object in
the world depends on the actions of players. Due to varying message latencies, these
actions can never arrive at the same time or in the same order on all nodes holding
a replica of an object.
Optimistic simulation techniques using rollbacks can be used to realize eventual
consistency. Thus, replicas would become consistent when no more actions are gen-
erated. However, actions will always be generated as long as players are in the world
so there would never be a point in time where replicas are actually consistent. This
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means voting procedures cannot be used to compensate for tampering by malicious
nodes as replicas would have different values anyway. Thus, fast continuous updat-
ing of the world state with immediate action processing is impossible when a state
of actual replica consistency should be reached. Then, voting can be used to make
the storage reliable and resilient.
5.3.2 Update Area Retrieval
As we have shown, processing actions immediately to update the state is impossible
when objects are distributed among the nodes. Therefore, nodes have to update
their object states at specific times t0, t1, .... These times are the same for all nodes
so updates will be synchronized and all replicas of an object will have the same
timestamp when the update is completed. This allows performing a majority voting
to obtain the correct state with a high probability. Updates happen in fixed intervals
with length I = ti+1 − ti, i ∈ N.
However, the latest state in the storage will always lag behind the current time
in the virtual world. Nodes trying to obtain the correct state around the current
position of their player characters at time t can only do so for the latest update time
ti with t − ti = min, t − ti >= 0. If it happens to request the state shortly before
the next update, the storage can only return a state with age nearly I. However,
we will show this state is still useful as it can be updated to the current time.
The update process is based on our analysis of distributed state updating in sec-
tion 5.3.1. Suppose node a is responsible for maintaining a sub-area A of the world.
This area A can be calculated by using the reverse mapping m−1 on a’s Voronoi cell
in the ID space transforming it into the world area. Now, a wants to update the
state of objects in its area A from time ti to time ti+1. To calculate the updated
state, it needs the state of an increased area around A from time ti. This area
depends on A and the maximum influence distance d around A according to the
formula d = vimax ∗ (ti+1 − ti)+di, with vimax being the maximum interaction prop-
agation speed and di the maximum interaction range. The shape of the resulting
area resembles the polygon A but has rounded corners as shown in figure 5.3.
Node a has to fetch this area by performing a retrieve operation on the storage. Bas-
ing on the overlay, the storage only supports retrieve operation for circle and polygon
shapes. While it would be possible to calculate area overlap between polygons and
the created more unusual shape, we opted to use simpler method by retrieving the
minimum enclosing circle covering this area instead. As shown in figure 5.5, a first
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Figure 5.5: Circle Ac covering A with increased circle Ac+d
calculates the minimum enclosing circle Ac around A and then adds d to its radius
to obtain the requested circle Ac+d. We call Ac+d the update area as it contains the
objects a uses to calculate the updated state.
The storage executes the retrieval operation, fetching the replicas and performing a
majority voting to return the state of objects in Ac+d at time ti. The result is the
set of objects that may have an influence on the state of objects in A at ti+1 and
that could be inside of A at ti+1. Now, a only needs the actions of all players inside
Ac+d between time ti and ti+1 to calculate the updated state.
5.3.3 Player Actions
The actions performed by players determine the state of the world. Starting from
the initial state, it is always possible to calculate any updated state if all player
actions are available. Node a needs all actions of players inside the update area
Ac+d between time ti and ti+1 to calculate the state of A at ti+1 so it has to obtain
them somehow.
Since player actions are so decisive for updates and we have to ensure nodes can
agree on the performed actions, we also use the storage to store these actions.
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Whenever a player performs an action, it also performs a store operation on the
storage. The position of the stored action in the world is the ID of the storing node
mapped into the world area using m−1. This means a node stores the actions of
its player character together with the nodes in other zones storing their replicas.
These nodes are the authority on the actions performed by a player. Similar to
the voting approaches in NEO [48] and SEA [30], only when the majority of these
nodes returns the same actions, these actions will be considered as being triggered
by the player. If a player wants to perform an action in the world, it must ensure
this action is actually stored. This principle also allows dealing with timing cheats
since the player has to commit itself by a certain time by storing its actions. Store
messages arriving late at the storing nodes will be rejected.
To not mix up world objects with stored actions, we introduced different storage
containers that can be addressed in the store operation: the world container storing
world objects and the action container storing player actions only. Nodes only accept
store operation for the action container to store player actions. Writing to the world
container is not possible. A node only changes the data in its world container during
the update process but not by executing store operations from other nodes, so state
cannot be modified by other nodes directly.
When a obtained the state of objects inside the update area Ac+d, it knows the IDs
of all player characters in that area. It retrieves all actions of these player characters
between ti and ti+1. Finally, it can compute the correct state of objects in area A
at time ti+1.
5.3.4 Circular Maintenance Area
Node a can actually compute the correct state in the minimum enclosing circle area
Ac around its polygon A. Since a retrieved the data and calculated its update,
a does not delete this data but keeps it after the update. Therefore, the area of
the world maintained by a is actually the larger circle area Ac. We call this area
the maintenance area. This area overlaps with the areas of a’s neighbours and the
objects in the overlapping areas are maintained on multiple nodes.
Upon retrieval, nodes will still return all objects in the requested area they are
maintaining. Thus, duplicates of objects might be created when the requesting
node assembles the result from one zone. If different versions of the same object
exist or one result message is missing an object which is contained in another result
message – which could only happen if malicious nodes tampered with object state
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T 
Figure 5.6: A malicious node can only tamper in the sub-area T of its responsibility area
due to overlap with honest neighbours
or created/dropped objects – voting is used. If one object version has a majority,
this one will be returned. If votes are equal, the complete result from the area is
discarded. Chances at least one of multiple objects with conflicting version is not
correct are very high so completely discarding the state and relying on better results
in other zones is a better alternative.
This mechanism makes it harder for malicious nodes to tamper with data. If it
tampers with objects in areas overlapping with its neighbours’ maintenance areas,
the result will not be counted. To successfully modify an object, it can only try to
get a majority in areas not overlapping honest nodes’ areas. Figure 5.6 shows how a
malicious node can only try to tamper successfully in the area T not overlapping the
maintenance areas of its honest neighbours. However, this mechanism also increases
sizes of retrieval return messages as more objects are contained.
5.3.5 Update Process Timing
The state retrieval and action retrieval operations have to be timed right so all nodes
synchronize updating their world state. Suppose the updated state of time ti has
just been calculated and nodes are preparing for the next update to time ti+1. After
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Figure 5.7: Timing of retrieve operations in the update process
a node a updated its state to ti, it has to retrieve the update area Ac+d from the
storage to obtain the set of objects able to influence Ac. However, before it can do
this it has to be sure the other nodes also successfully updated their state to time
ti. We denote this time tsi with ti < tsi < ti+1 and explain its calculation later. At tsi
nodes start to retrieve the state of time ti.
When this retrieve returns, nodes have to retrieve all actions of players in the re-
trieved update area Ac+d between ti and ti+1. Before nodes can request all actions
including ti+1, they have to make sure these actions have been stored successfully.
At latest, a player could generate a relevant action at ti+1. After generating, this
action still needs some time until all of its replicas are stored at the different nodes.
Since a player generating actions always stores these actions on the same nodes,
the overlay will have established shortcut connections to these nodes. Storing a
replica just takes the latency of one message on the link layer. We define lmax to be
an assumed maximum link layer message latency. All assumptions about whether
nodes have completed phases of the update process are based on this latency. Most
of the time, this assumption will hold. If it does not and a message is late, a node
will report wrong data. Replication corrects for this and ensures the updating works
correctly with a high probability.
Figure 5.7 shows the timing of the update process based on the assumed lmax.
To calculate the state at time ti+1, a node needs all actions of players generated
until this time. As lmax is the maximum duration of store operations, all actions
up to time ti+1 should be stored at tai+1 = ti+1 + lmax. At tai+1, nodes retrieve
the actions of players in their update area between time ti and ti+1. We assume
2 ∗ lmax as bound for the duration of the retrieve operation as it consists of one
retrieve message to the storing node and one result message back to the retrieving
node. Consequently, 2 ∗ lmax is the timeout for action retrieves. Therefore, at time
ti+1+3∗lmax all nodes should have completed their retrieve operations for all actions
up to ti +1. Therefore, they can calculate the state in their maintenance area Ac at
time ti+1. They actually perform that calculation upon retrieving the last missing
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player actions so the state updates at the different nodes will happen somewhere
between ti+1 + lmax and ti+1 + 3 ∗ lmax.
At tsi+1 = ti+1 + 3 ∗ lmax, nodes can be sure all other nodes finished their update to
time ti+1. Thus, nodes can start retrieving the state at ti+1 to prepare for calculating
the state at ti+2 and the update cycle starts again. The cycle length is I = 5 ∗ lmax,
yielding ti+1 − ti = 5 ∗ lmax. Consequently, the aforementioned tsi can be calculated
from tsi = ti + 3 ∗ lmax.
The operations State Retrieval and Action Retrieval shown in figure 5.7 run in-
terchangeably at the given times. Retrieving actions starts as soon as actions are
guaranteed to be stored as shown in row Stored Actions. When this retrieval is com-
pleted on all nodes and the state is updated as shown in row Stored State, retrieving
this updated state starts immediately. This gives the state retrieval operation a
maximum time of 3 ∗ lmax to complete. Since nodes permanently request the same
area, they will have shortcut connections to the multicast root nodes of the area in
the different zones after the first retrieve operation.
In total, the areacast probably needs two to three messages to reach all nodes in the
area since area sizes in the destination zone should be similar to the area sizes in the
source zone. The result of the retrieve will be returned in one hop using a shortcut.
Therefore, 3 ∗ lmax seems to be sensible timeout for area retrieve operations as three
messages in a row should rarely take the maximum latency. If timing bounds get
too tight and a lot of retrieve operations fail to obtain the necessary replica votes,
lmax can always be adjusted accordingly. This also increases the cycle length of the
update process.
As shown in figure 5.7, nodes are only guaranteed to store the state of time ti between
time ti + 3 ∗ lmax and time ti+1 + lmax. When the first node completed retrieving
all player actions, it will update its state to time ti+1. The earliest theoretically
possible time for this is right after the start of requesting actions ti+1 + lmax. After
that, requesting an area might yield an inconsistent state containing objects that
have already been updated and objects that have not been updated yet. Therefore,
players trying to check whether they are seeing the correct state of the world can only
do this during the state retrieval phase when the world state should be consistent.
Clock Skew and Drift Compensation
The clocks of the different nodes are only loosely synchronized within the bounds
obtainable by NTP. When a node reads the current time to program a timer to start
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the action or state retrieve at times tai or tsi , the timer will fire around these times
on the local clock. However, this time will slightly deviate from the true global time
according to NTP accuracy. It is not a severe problem if the retrieval process starts
a little late as still the other nodes should have completed their update and store
operations. However, the retrieval process should not start too early to give other
nodes the chance to complete their operations within the specified bounds.
This can easily be compensated by adding the maximum deviation td to the true
global time to the programmed time. This way a node will start operations td later
on average and 2 ∗ td later in the worst case if it runs slower but was compensated
for running faster. In this worst case, the node will itself have less time than the
specified bounds to complete its operations. However, retrieve operations have a
2 ∗ lmax and 3 ∗ lmax bound which are less likely to be exceeded as multiple message
need to be late. On the other hand, the actions store operation has got a lmax
bound that could be violated more often as only one store message has to be late.
Therefore, we opted to ensure retrieve operations never run too early.
If we also assumed a minimum latency for messages, this minimum latency might
have been sufficient to compensate for operations starting too early. However, it
would be harder to decide on a minimum latency as messages could be really fast on a
local network. Actions are also stored on the local node meaning no communication
is necessary for the local store. Consequently, we did not use a lower bound for
message latency higher than the implicit zero bound.
5.3.6 State Initialization
The update process initially starts at time t0. At that time, no prior state can be
retrieved. Thus, the world state at time t0 is just defined statically in the game
code. When the storage is running and t0 is reached, the initial state is created out
of nowhere. In the worst case, only one node is present having to create the state of
the whole world. In practice, the operator should supply a sufficiently large number
of initial nodes so the world state is distributed right from the start. Since all nodes
will have the state at t0 right from the start, they can start retrieving the state in
the update area right after the start.
At t0, player characters could also be created automatically for every node. However,
players usually want to customize their characters or add new player characters later
on. Adding new characters must be an action leading to a new state including the
created character like any other player action. This could be realized by placing a
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special character for each player in the world able to spawn new player characters.
He can use this special character to generate an action to spawn a new player
character. This special character could also check whether the player still has got
free character slots to limit his number of player characters.
5.4 Storage Maintenance
The storage has to ensure replicas of all data are updated correctly in all replication
zones as nodes join and leave the network. Changes in the network change the
responsibility areas of nodes and require replicas to be transferred between nodes
while the update process is running. This section explains how the storage handles
joining and leaving nodes.
5.4.1 Node Join
When a node a joins the overlay, its JoinRequests will be routed to its future neigh-
bours and it will be integrated into the network exchanging NetworkViews with
neighbouring nodes. During that time, the network is locally not stabilized and the
nodes there will not be able to receive messages buffering them instead. Any queries
to that area will not be answered but processing the queries will be delayed until the
network becomes stable again. This reduces the chances of successfully completing
a query before the requesting node hits its timeout depending on how much time
the integration into the network takes.
Even when the network join is complete, the storage will not be able to answer
queries correctly in the area of the joined node. After the network join, the respon-
sibility areas of nodes have changed and messages will be routed according to the
new network layout. The responsibility area of the joined node a is a Voronoi cell
consisting of fragments that formerly belonged to the Voronoi cells of its neighbours,
see figure 5.8.
The neighbours currently store data belonging to a while a is still missing data
it is responsible for. At this time, a’s neighbours can still answer queries for areas
overlapping their Voronoi cells while a cannot answer queries for its area successfully.
It first needs to receive data it is responsible for from its neighbours. Therefore,
after the network join, each of a’s neighbours in the same replication zone sends
one PushData message with data now inside a’s Voronoi cell to a. Furthermore, a’s
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Figure 5.8: Node a receives PushData messages from its neighbour upon joining
neighbours will remove data they are no longer responsible for – data outside their
maintenance areas.
Until a received a PushData message from every neighbour in the same zone, it will
buffer all other messages coming in not processing any store and retrieve operations.
However, the update process runs concurrently to a’s join. Node a’s neighbours
update their world state at different times, depending on when they retrieved the
last player’s actions.
Pushing Data during the Update Process
If a joins during the action retrieval phase (see 5.7), it may end up with an inconsis-
tent world state. Entities from one neighbour may already be updated to the new
time while entities of other neighbours might still be old.
Even updating the world state from ti−1 to ti synchronized among all nodes at
ti + 3 ∗ lmax would not be helpful. If a joins before the synchronization time, it will
receive the old state of entities from time ti−1 with no way to update it to ti at the
synchronization time. To do this, it would need the state at ti−1 of its update area
and all events of players in that area up to ti.
Without synchronized updates, there is a chance for a all received PushDatas to be
with state from time ti if a joined sufficiently late in the action retrieval phase. Then,
a can start retrieving the state of its update area for time ti at time ti + 3 ∗ lmax.
Furthermore, a will be able to correctly answer queries of other nodes requesting
their update areas for time ti. If a joins earlier in the action retrieval phase, it might
receive an inconsistent state mixed of times ti−1 and ti. Then, it cannot correctly
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answer the queries of other nodes in the next state retrieval phase and the other
replication zones have to compensate for this. Still, a can start retrieving its update
area at ti + 3 ∗ lmax and start its update process.
If a joins during the state retrieval phase of time ti, it will take over a consistent
state of time ti and other nodes will be able to retrieve their update areas for that
time. The join of a may only cause a delay in the answering of the retrieval in this
replication zone. However, at ti+1 + lmax, when the action retrieval phase starts, a
is missing its update area to decide on which actions to retrieve. Thus, it will not
be able to calculate the state of time ti+1 at time ti+1 + 3 ∗ lmax. In the next state
retrieval phase, a will return only old state.
This means depending on when a new node joins, it may result in sub-areas of one
replication zone to not be able to correctly answer retrieve operations for a certain
time. The continuously running update process will fix this and requesting data from
these sub-areas will work again correctly when the next update interval completed
successfully. Until then, the other replication zones have to make up for this and
provide the necessary reliability to answer queries. However, not all stored data is
dynamically updated in the update process. There is also static data that has to be
handled differently.
Static and Dynamic Data
The current world state consists of objects like player characters or non-player char-
acters. These dynamic objects will be updated in the update process. On the other
hands, the stored actions of players are static. Once they are stored, they will not
be modified. They will just be removed when they are no longer needed to calculate
a new world state. They will also not be refreshed as part of the update process.
Furthermore, at any point in time, the vast majority of players will not be in the
virtual world. Their player characters will not be active and not perform any actions.
Despite that, the storage has to store them reliably even if their state will not
change as long as they are not in the virtual world. The state associated with a
player character is much larger than the state of any other object in the world. In
addition to the basic state like position and movement, player characters also have
an inventory of items or state describing the progression of the character through
various quests.
Since an inactive player character cannot interact with any other object in the world
and given their data size, it would not make sense to include all player characters in
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the state retrieval of the update process. Therefore, each player character has a flag
marking it as active or inactive. If it is inactive, it will stay at its current position
in the world but it will be invisible and no interactions with it are possible.
Inactive player characters and player actions are considered static data. A node
executing a retrieve operation can decide to only include static or dynamic or both
kinds of data. As part of the update process, only dynamic data will be retrieved.
Static data will be retrieved when retrieving player actions. Static data will also be
included in the PushData messages sent to a newly joined node.
Dynamic data is redundantly stored on neighbouring nodes if it is inside the over-
lapping parts of their maintenance areas. Using area retrieves, multiple duplicates
of the same data can be retrieved decreasing chances of malicious nodes to tamper
with data. This would not make sense for static player actions. They are retrieved
using unicast messages that will only arrive at the one responsible node. Duplicates
on neighbouring nodes will never be retrieved and would just waste space.
Therefore, a node a uses two kind of responsibility areas to decide on whether it
is responsible for storing and maintaining a data item: its Voronoi cell A is used
for static data and its maintenance area Ac is used for dynamic data. A node
a pushing data to another node will always push dynamic and static data inside
the other node’s Voronoi cell and will afterwards remove dynamic data outside its
maintenance area Ac and static data outside its Voronoi cell A.
The dynamic data a node received will be updated in the update process. Even if
one of the neighbours was malicious and sent tampered data, this can be repaired if
the majority of the other replication zones report a correct state on the next update.
If a malicious node pushes tampered static data to a new node, there is no automatic
mechanism to repair this. If at one point in time a malicious node happened to be
responsible for a large area in one zone, all static data in that area it pushed to other
nodes would always stay tampered. This is especially severe because it includes the
state of player characters not in the world. Players want the storage to store their
characters reliably while they are away. Therefore, we need a mechanism to deal
with nodes tampering with static data in PushData messages.
Static Data Retrieval
The repair effect of the update process lies in periodically refreshing the state of the
local replicas based on the replicas from all other replication zones. Therefore, to
repair any tampered static data in PushData messages, a joined node also requests
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the same data using a retrieve operation from the other replication zones. More
precisely, a node a requests all static data from its Voronoi cell A after joining the
overlay and adds it to its stored data.
To make sure player actions up to the time where a joined the network have suc-
cessfully been stored, a delays this retrieve operation by lmax. This is the assumed
maximum duration of the store operation. After joining the overlay, newer player
actions will automatically be routed to a and do not have to be retrieved.
It would theoretically be possible to also retrieve dynamic data together with the
static data. However, there would be no benefit in doing this as a really needs its
update area that will be requested in the next update interval anyway.
Player Activation and Deactivation
When a player wants to leave the world, it can simply perform an action setting the
state of its player character to inactive upon execution. During the update process,
this action will be retrieved by the storage and all nodes storing a replica of a player
character will set its state to inactive transforming it to static data.
To activate its player character, a player performs an action to activate the player
character. However, nodes with replicas of that player character will not automati-
cally fetch this action. They only fetch actions of player characters that have been
active because inactive player character cannot perform any actions normally. The
activation action is the only exception to this.
Therefore, the player sends a notification message to the nodes holding a replica
of the static player character. This will cause these nodes to temporarily set the
state of the character to active making it dynamic data. On the next state retrieval,
the other node will fetch this temporarily activated character. This causes them to
retrieve any actions this player character might have performed in the last interval.
When they retrieve the activation action, they will consistently and permanently
set the state of this player character to active until it will be deactivated again.
5.4.2 Node Departure
When a node leaves, its neighbours will take over shares of its responsibility area
reversing the change shown in figure 5.8. The neighbours have to take over the
data the node was responsible for. If a node performs a graceful leave, it would be
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Figure 5.9: Failure of neighbour c does not add responsibility area to a
possible to prepare for the departure, pushing data to the neighbours and waiting
for the right time to leave. However, nodes are generally considered to be unreliable
and we expect them to leave unexpectedly just closing all connections. Therefore,
we designed the storage maintenance procedure around this case.
The neighbours of the failed node will detect the failure and the self-stabilizing
algorithm will repair the network structure. Once a neighbour gets a consistent
network view with all its neighbours, it can calculate the additional area it is now
responsible for and will start to obtain the data in that area. Similar to the join
procedure, we treat static and dynamic data differently.
Retrieving Static Data
When a node fails, the replicas of static data in its replication zone are immediately
lost as the Voronoi responsibility areas for static data do not overlap. To repair this,
the neighbours of a failed node that have taken over parts of its responsibility area
request this added area at the storage to retrieve it from the other replication zones.
To make sure any store operations of player actions arrived at the responsible nodes,
this retrieve operation is again delayed by lmax. Actions from after the fail time will
already be routed to the correct neighbour that became responsible.
When all neighbours completed their retrieve operations, the static data in the area
of the failed node will be available in its replication zone again. Until then, the other
zones have to make up for the temporary unavailability of that data.
As shown in figure 5.9, not every neighbour of a failed node will get a share of its
responsibility area. If a neighbour does not share a common border within the world
area in the current zone, the added area is in the part of the current zone that does
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not contain any data. Requesting this area will not yield any results and will be
skipped. For neighbours within the world area, the added area will always be a
convex polygon as shown in figure 5.8. Thus, it can be requested from the storage
as retrieval of convex polygons is supported.
However, if multiple neighbours of a node fail simultaneously, the added area con-
sists of multiple convex polygons that usually do not add up to a convex polygon.
Instead of requesting multiple convex polygons, the node requests its own Voronoi
cell completely reducing the number of retrieve operations at the cost of increased
message size and more messages for this one operation. However, for reasonable
churn rates this should be a rare case.
Retrieving Dynamic Data
When a node fails, only the dynamic data from the node’s area not overlapping any
maintenance area of neighbours is immediately lost. Depending on the size of the
maintenance area in relation to the area of the failed node, it is actually possible
that no dynamic data is lost in the node’s replication zone. Therefore, we do not
perform a dedicated retrieve operation for this data. Instead, any missing dynamic
data will automatically be requested during the next update interval. However, if
data was lost, nodes will not be able to retrieve that data from this replication zone
and the other zones will have to compensate for it.
5.4.3 Effects of Churn
As shown, both joining and leaving of nodes may result in data becoming temporarily
unavailable. The self-stabilization of the overlay and the waiting for PushData
messages delays the processing of any retrieve operations. The inability to update
its dynamic state after joining or the failure of nodes may lead to data replicas
missing until the next update cycle is completed or the missing static data has been
retrieved.
Redundancy by replication is the basic principle to deal with this unreliability. Static
data will be made available again by retrieving it from other zones. Dynamic data
will be retrieved from other zones automatically during the update process. This
only works correctly if the worst case does not arise: the same data becomes unavail-
able in all replication zones. If there is a change in the network at nodes covering
the same world area in all replication zones, data will be lost. The replication factor
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must be sufficiently high assuming a certain maximum churn rate, so the probabil-
ity of this happening is close to zero. We evaluated the reliability gained using this
approach in section 6.4.
5.5 Resilience
Malicious nodes can tamper with any data they store and reply with this tampered
data on any query they receive. Furthermore, they can also claim being responsible
for data and answer with tampered data when they should have forwarded the query
message closer to the node really responsible. They can never tamper with replies
to responses of other nodes as they are always sent directly using shortcuts. The
influence an attacker gains depends on the type of query performed as shown in the
following sections.
5.5.1 Area Queries
When a malicious node receives an area query, it can claim to be the only responsible
node if the message has not reached its target destination yet and the multicast for
the message has not started yet. It can report any result about the current state
of the world in the requested area. It can reply with any forged neighbourhood of
existing node IDs to create any responsibility area. However, it should be careful
not to create areas suspiciously big, like reporting only neighbours in other zones
claiming responsibility for the whole zone. This might be used to detect and punish
it. If it cannot claim being responsible, it could always drop the query message
increasing its chances to tamper with the same query in other zones containing
malicious nodes, too.
If the multicast has already started, it can only tamper with data in the area it is
actually responsible for. It could also let the multicast fail by replying with a wrong
neighbourhood or not replying at all. However, we assume it chooses to tamper
if possible, as its primary interest lies in modifying the world state. A malicious
node is only guaranteed to successfully tamper with data in one replication zone
if that data is not inside the area overlapping with the maintenance areas of its
honest neighbours. If it tampered with data in the overlapping part, conflicting
versions will be sent back. If one version does not have a majority, the result from
that zone will be discarded. So unless there is the rare case of two malicious nodes’
maintenance area overlapping the maintenance area of an honest node creating the
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Figure 5.10: Node a requests its own area overlapping the areas of malicious nodes b and
c in other zones
local majority, the malicious node can only hope to tamper successfully with data
in the non-overlapping areas.
However, this is only true for dynamic data. The Voronoi responsibility areas for
static data do not overlap and a malicious node can tamper with any inactive player
character or actions of player characters it stored. This static data will be retrieved
using an area query when a node joins, requesting the static data inside its Voronoi
cell. It will also be retrieved by neighbours of a failed node retrieving their added
responsibility area. To be able to tamper successfully, an attacker needs multiple
malicious nodes in the majority of replication zones covering the same world area
as shown in figure 5.10. There, node a requests its own area after joining and the
requested area mapped to the other zones overlaps with the responsibility areas of
malicious nodes b and c in the small dark red triangular area. If a malicious node
just tampered with all data without caring about the results that will be delivered
back from other replication zones, it risks being detected and punished. A clever
attacker will try to prevent this and report tampered data only for areas where he
can obtain a majority.
Obtaining a Tampered Majority
The scenario shown in figure 5.10 is not the only way to obtain that majority. In this
scenario the attacker actually gained the authority over an area and will always be
able to tamper. Due to the random distribution of nodes and with a sufficiently high
replication factor, this is very unlikely to happen. However, he could also obtain a
relative majority. If two malicious nodes in two zones are responsible for the same
world area and the attacker controls malicious nodes in other zones to let the queries
in these zones fail, it can still obtain a relative majority on the returned answers. It
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would also be sufficient to tamper in one zone, intercept the query in another zone
to create any forged answer, and let the queries in other zones fail.
The bigger the requested areas, the more nodes are involved in replying to a query.
The more nodes involved, the higher the chances one of them is a malicious node
able to let a query fail with the goal of obtaining a majority using the results from
other zones. Therefore, not all types of area queries are equally susceptible to being
tampered with.
The biggest area query is the state retrieve query in the update process, requesting a
node’s update area including everything that could have influenced its maintenance
area since the last update. As we will see in section 6.4, these areas are much bigger
than the other area queries. On the other hand, the overlapping of the maintenance
provides additional resilience to tampering.
The second biggest area query is the Voronoi cell retrieval of static data when a node
joins or when multiple neighbours of a node fail simultaneously. No overlapping with
neighbours provides additional resilience for these queries.
The smallest area queries are the retrieve operations of the area of interest around
the current position of a player character. These areas are usually much smaller
than the above areas and thus least vulnerable to being tampered with. Even if
they get tampered, the result is not severe because it means a single player will
probably only temporarily see a tampered state. Permanent state manipulation by
tampering the above state retrieval is much more severe.
Propagation of Tampered Data
If a node receives a tampered state for its update area during the update process,
the updated state of its maintenance area will also be tampered. On the next update
cycle, it will also report this state to other nodes giving the tampered state one more
vote on all nodes requesting this area. However, this does not necessarily mean the
node will always contain tampered state. It is possible the circumstances caused
messages from zones containing the correct state to be late and their correct replies
did not arrive in time. The tampered state was returned only because it obtained a
relative majority due to the lateness of messages. Depending on the paths messages
take and varying latencies of messages, the nodes in other zones might still receive
a correct result for the same area. In the next update cycle, the node might be able
to obtain the correct state again if the replies arrive in time.
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However, it is also possible the one more vote the tampered state obtained is the
decisive vote causing all nodes in other zones to retrieve a tampered state in the
next update. Calculating their update even based on only one tampered object,
the whole updated state can be considered as tampered because the one tampered
entity can lead to all other objects getting an incorrect updated state. Then, nodes
in all zones will contain tampered state in that area. Even worse, this tampered
state will spread out through the world. In the next update, the neighbours of these
nodes will request their update area and retrieve a tampered one. Calculating their
update, their whole area will also be tampered and after a few update cycles, the
whole world state will not be correct any more.
Tampered static data will not spread out in a similar way. A malicious node cannot
modify or create actions of players as they are signed. It can only drop actions. Since
actions lose relevance in the next update cycle and get deleted anyway, dropped
actions will only spread to other nodes if nodes responsible for the same world area
join or leave in the same update cycle. In this case, joined node a obtaining a result
with missing actions may cause joining node b responsible for the same world area
in another zone to not be able to retrieve all actions as well. When this happens in
more zones, it can cause actions of players to get lost. On the next world update,
these actions will be missing and the calculated state will not be correct. However,
failure or join of nodes in multiple zones responsible for the same world area causes
reliability problems anyway and is unlikely to happen.
If a joining node receives tampered inactive player characters, the replicas of these
characters in that zone will be tampered. The node will report these tampered
characters when other nodes join and leave and responsibility for the tampered
characters in the other zones changes. However, this tampered character does not
necessarily spread to other zones, depending on whether there are still enough zones
with correct replicas and they can be requested successfully. Upon activation of
the player character, it will become dynamic data and will be updated in all zones.
Depending on how the first retrieval of the player character as dynamic data went,
it might be tampered or correct. If most zones still contain a correct version and all
zones are able to retrieve their update area correctly, the tampered player character
will automatically be corrected.
Influence of Routing Paths
The number of nodes involved in a query not only increases with the size of the
requested area but also with the length of the routing path. Both the retrieval of
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dynamic data in the update process as well as the retrieval of static data on node
join and leave target the same world area the node is responsible for. Due to the
way the entries of the top routing table layer mirror the world position of a node
in the other zones, requesting its own area will most likely lead to the first hop of
the path already lying in the requested area starting the multicast. In addition to
the nodes overlapping the requested area in the target zone, no other nodes will
be involved. If the first retrieval was successful, any future retrieval will be routed
using the established shortcut connections if the top layer routing table entry is not
already inside the requested area.
In contrast to that, the area of interest requested by players to check the state of
their local area is most likely far away from the world area the node is responsible
for. The queries will be sent to the other zones on the first hop where they have to be
forwarded with logarithmic path length until they reach their destination. Compared
to requesting its own area, the number of involved nodes might actually be bigger
increasing the vulnerability of this type of query. However, retrieving tampered
results for the area of interest is not as severe as only one player is affected and the
tampered data will not spread out.
5.5.2 Point Queries
Point retrieves are used to request actions of players. A node updating its update
area retrieves the actions of all player characters in this area. Since player actions
are signed, a malicious node can only try to drop actions of honest players. It cannot
create new actions in the name of other players or tamper with existing actions.
Obtaining a Tampered Majority
After retrieving the actions of a player character, the requesting node will perform
a majority voting on the result sets from the different zones. The goal is to decide
whether an action was successfully triggered by a player. It is not sufficient to only
show a player created the action using its signature. Then, only one node presenting
the action would suffice. The majority of nodes responsible for storing this action
have to agree whether the action arrived in time. Otherwise a malicious player can
always wait for other players to take their actions before creating matching past
actions giving him an advantage. Storing nodes will always discard late actions. If
a majority of nodes does not include a certain action in their replies, this action is
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deemed to not have been triggered. Therefore, a malicious node can try to obtain a
majority not including certain actions of a player to undo these actions.
Since player characters are moving through the world, the set of player characters
a node has to request when updating the world state will change all the time. It
might have to request the actions of all player characters over time. Whether it
can update the state in its area correctly depends on whether it can retrieve the
actions of all player characters successfully. Being able to update correctly for some
time might change when a new player character gets into the node’s area it cannot
correctly retrieve actions of. If multiple player characters are in the same area, not
being able to successfully retrieve the actions of one player character leads to an
incorrect update of the state.
Dropping the actions of one player character is probably not as severe as directly
modifying the state of the world, because the effects on the world state of undoing
some actions are limited compared to direct state modification. However, the up-
dated state might actually diverge from the replicated states in other zones if the
nodes there were able to retrieve all player actions correctly. On the next state re-
trieval, the votes for the correct state will be lower increasing chances for an attacker
to obtain the majority for a state he tampered with in other zones. This tampered
state can than propagate through the world.
Influence of Routing Paths
The first chance for a malicious node to drop actions appears when the honest player
character stores its actions. A malicious node can drop any actions of all players
it is responsible for. It could also not forward the store messages preventing the
responsible nodes from storing the player actions correctly. However, the latter is
unlikely to happen. Since a player stores its action at its own ID position and the
top-level routing table entries mirror its position in the other zones, storing actions
will most likely only take one hop.
The second chance to drop actions is preventing nodes from retrieving all actions of
players in the area they are responsible for. A malicious node can simply drop the
request message and all actions of a player during the last update interval will be
dropped. If the malicious node is responsible, it can also select specific actions to
drop.
Unfortunately, the actions an updating node retrieves depend on the player charac-
ters currently in the node’s responsibility area. The points requested depend on the
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player characters static ID position. This means they will be distributed all over the
world area. Thus, the point queries will be routed with O(log(n)) expected hops.
The chances for malicious nodes to tamper with action retrieves are consequently
higher than the chances to prevent the storing of actions. However, since there is no
area overlapping multiple nodes to be requested at the end, it should still be lower
than the chances of tampering with retrievals of the area of interest.
5.5.3 Preventing Eclipsing
After joining the overlay and filling its routing table a node a in zone Za retrieves
the static data in its Voronoi cell A. It will send a retrieve message to each of the top
layer routing table entries to request the area A mapped to all other zones. A top
layer entry b receiving this message will most likely already be inside the requested
world area A mapped to its zone Zb. It will start the multicast and forward the
request message to its neighbours.
From the requested Voronoi cell A, every receiver can actually calculate the neigh-
bourhood of a. Furthermore, each node knows one node in every other zone because
it stored it in the top routing table layer. Every receiver of a’s query in the Zb can
check whether its top layer entry for zone Za should be a neighbour of a. Due to
the symmetric structure of top layer routing table entries, nodes close to b receiving
the query because they overlap A mapped to zone Zb are likely to have nodes close
to a in their top-level entry for zone Za. These nodes are the correct neighbours for
a. If a receiver notices a is missing a closer node as neighbour, it will notify a about
this. Node a can exchange NetworkViews with this nodes and the self-stabilizing
algorithm will cause a to join the overlay with the correct neighbourhood.
This scenario is also shown in figure 5.11. Node a joined the overlay in its zone
but was eclipsed by the malicious node m1, ...,m4 preventing him from obtaining its
correct neighbours, the honest nodes h1, h3, h4. However, a filled its routing table
successfully and b ended up as the top-layer routing table entry for zone Zb. Thus,
requesting its own Voronoi cell A, a sends a retrieve message to b. Node b overlaps
this area and will start the multicast, forwarding this message to all its neighbours
overlapping A mapped to Zb. When neighbour c receives this message, it checks
whether the neighbourhood of a indirectly reported through the area seems legit or
if its top layer routing table entry for zone Za would be a better neighbour for the
source of the message a. Node c’s top-layer entry being closest to c’s target position
in zone Za is the node h2. Since h2 is closer to a than its current neighbours, c
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Figure 5.11: Node a is eclipsed initially but retrieves its true neighbourhood after querying
its area A
notifies a about this. Node a contacts h2 and begins to exchange NetworkViews.
Thus, a will learn about the other honest nodes and will finally be integrated into
the network successfully.
If a node a was eclipsed, it will retrieve a Voronoi cell bigger than the correct one
with malicious neighbours farther away. More nodes in the other zones will receive
this message increasing chances one of the receivers has a better neighbour for a in
its top layer. Area A is retrieved in all zones and one zone alone reporting a closer
node is enough to prevent a from staying eclipsed. As long as a has at least one
honest node in its top routing table layer and this node has got honest neighbours
with a correctly filled top routing table layer that will process the query, a cannot be
eclipsed. Due to the highly redundant filling of routing tables, eclipsing is extremely
unlikely to happen.
5.5.4 Preventing Shortcut Tampering
Obtaining a more than proportional influence on message routing is effectively pre-
vented for the primary structure only allowing to connect to neighbours and for
routing tables containing only nodes close to target positions. However, as shown
in section 4.6 there is no such limitation in place for shortcuts. If a malicious node
appears in the shortcut sets of all other nodes, it increases its chance to have mes-
sages routed its way. It will appear in these sets as a result of retrieving data at
other nodes because they will return data using shortcuts that will stay open for a
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certain time. This will be most effective using large area queries as multiple nodes
will provide a part of the result on a shortcut connection.
Fortunately, the areas a node may request can be constrained. There are only two
reasons for a node to request an area. The requested area can be related to its
responsibility area which is requested in the update process or as part of storage
maintenance. The requested area might also be the area of interest around the
current position of a player character.
This information can be used by honest nodes to not answer queries that do not
belong to the two categories. In the first category, the requested area is always
around the node’s own ID position. In the second category, the receiving node
knows the state of the world in the area that is requested. It especially knows
whether the requesting player character is really inside the requested area. Thus, a
malicious player character would have to move through the world in order to create
shortcuts on other nodes this way. Given the limited movement speed and the fact
that shortcuts are only opened temporarily, this constrains the number of shortcuts
a malicious node can keep open.
Limiting the areas a node can request can also partially prevent the information
exposure cheat. Using this cheat, players try to circumvent the usually limited
perception range of player characters by obtaining information about distant areas.
This will only be possible for the responsibility area of a node, but not for any other
area.
5.6 Discussion
The storage performs a replicated distributed simulation of a virtual world. Since
fast-paced continuously updating the world state is impossible, updates are per-
formed in regular intervals creating snapshots of the world state at certain times.
These snapshots can be used by players to check whether the current state of the
world they see is based on a correct state of the world as reported by the storage.
5.6.1 Reliability
To make the system reliable, the simulation is replicated in a configurable number
r of replication zones. On each update, the nodes in each zone request the relevant
information to calculate the updated state from all replication zones. This constantly
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refreshes the stored state in all replication zones based on what is stored in all zones.
In case errors occurred and the retrieved data is not consistent, a majority voting
among the results from the different replication zones is used to return the correct
state with a high probability.
Errors include store and retrieve operations taking more time than the assumed
maximum time which is based on an assumed maximum message latency lmax.
When these bounds are violated, some nodes might not be able to update the state
correctly. This will be compensated for by the nodes in other replication zones as it
is unlikely errors occur in the same world area in all replication zones.
Other reasons for consistency errors include nodes joining and leaving the system.
When a node leaves, all of its data is lost. When a node joins, it might not be able
to calculate the next updated state. This data loss will also be compensated by the
data stored in the other replication zones. Data will be stored reliably as long as
there as there is no data loss in the same world area in the majority of replication
zones.
The replication factor r is the most influential parameter for the reliability of the
storage. The higher r, the less likely the same world area is affected by errors in
all replication zones. However, the assumed maximum message latency lmax also
influences the reliability. Increasing lmax gives more time for operations to complete
successfully in case of late messages. However, it also increases the update interval
length. Thus, the system becomes more vulnerable to nodes joining and leaving
and data being lost until the next update cycle refreshes the data in all replication
zones.
5.6.2 Scalability
The scalability of the storage depends on the length of routing paths for messages
and the number of messages transferred. As long as the number of messages is
independent of the number of nodes and the number of nodes involved in transferring
a message is in O(log(n)) or a constant number, the system will be scalable.
Storing and Retrieving Player Actions
The overlay routes unicast messages in O(log(n)) hops using routing tables in ad-
dition to the primary Delaunay structure. These messages are used to store actions
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created by player characters and to retrieve the actions of all player characters in a
node’s update area.
A player character stores actions using its static ID position as key. Therefore,
the replicas are always stored at the same nodes as long as there is no change in
the network. After the first store operation, shortcuts will be established and store
messages will be transferred in one hop. If r replication zones are used, r messages
will be sent out.
When retrieving player actions, the retrieved actions depend on the player characters
in the node’s update area. On the first retrieval of each player character’s actions,
the path length will be O(log(n)) and the result will be returned in one hop due to
the established shortcut. As long as the player character remains in the area, future
retrievals will also be routed in one hop.
The number of retrievals depends on the area size. The bigger the area, the more
players are expected to be inside. With random distribution of node IDs, each node
should have a 1/nth share of the key space area on average. This number has to be
multiplied by r, as actions are requested from r replication zones. However, player
characters are usually not distributed uniformly. There might be hotspots in the
virtual world with a lot of players while other areas are empty. Nodes responsible
for hotspots will have to request more player actions than nodes responsible for
empty areas. However, players aggregating in hotspots cause scalability problems
for all kinds of architectures, including server-based ones. If the world is designed
to cause players to distribute sufficiently and not aggregate in hotspots too much,
player character action retrieval should still scale.
Area of Interest Retrieval
The number of nodes involved in an area retrieve operation depends on the length of
the path until the multicast is started and the number of nodes in the multicast tree.
The latter depends on how many nodes’ maintenance areas overlap the requested
area. When a player requests its current area of interest, the request will take
O(log(n)) hops on the first request and one hop for any additional requests if he
stays in the same area. The retrieved area is a fixed size circle – a compact shape
with equal extends in the x- and the y-dimension. We argue the Voronoi cells of
nodes also have a compact shape because node ID positions are picked by randomly
filling the key space. The distances to the next neighbours in x- and y-dimension
are more likely to be in the same range than distances in one dimension being
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Figure 5.12: Nodes only distributed in one dimension lead to every Voronoi cell in one
zone overlapping every Voronoi cell in the other zone
considerably larger leading to a stretched shape. Figure 5.12 shows a worst-case
example of stretched shape, where every retrieval of an area in one zone would
lead to the requested area overlapping the areas of all nodes in the other zone.
However, usually Voronoi cells have the more compact shape as shown in figure 5.10
or figure 5.11 where Voronoi cells does not overlap all cells in another zone.
When both requested area and Voronoi cells have a compact shape, the number of
overlapped cells can be estimated using the ratio of requested area size and average
Voronoi cell size. The smaller the size of the Voronoi cells compared to the requested
area size, the more cells will overlap. Since the Voronoi cell size decreases with
increasing number of nodes in the network and the requested area of interest stays
the same, the number of overlapping nodes actually increases with the network
size.
However, the area of interest should usually be much smaller than the Voronoi cells
of nodes for any reasonable network size. Thus, we mostly expect up to three nodes
to be involved in the multicast for an area of interest retrieval if the retrieved circle
overlaps the points of contact of three Voronoi cells. More Voronoi cells having the
same point of contact is only possible if their centres are aligned on a circle which is
unlikely to happen. Adding this constant amount of nodes involved in the multicast
to the maximum O(log(n)) nodes on the routing path yields a scalable O(log(n))
number of nodes involved in an AOI retrieval. Again, the constant r has to be
factored in as the retrieval is performed in all replication zones.
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Update Area Retrieval
When a node retrieves its update area during the update process, the size of the
requested area depends on the size of the Voronoi cell of the requesting node. The
requested area is a the minimum enclosing circle of this cell with radius increased by
the world-specific maximum influence range depending on effect propagation speed
and update interval length. The size of the update area will be larger than the size
of the Voronoi cell, but not by orders of magnitudes because the Voronoi cell has
a compact shape, see also figure 5.5. Assuming this size factor to be constant, the
size of the update area linearly depends on the size of Voronoi cells.
As we argued before, the number of Voronoi cells overlapping the requested area
can be estimated using the ratio of requested area size to average Voronoi cell size
for compact requested shapes. If update areas are just by a constant factor larger
than Voronoi cells, this ratio will be constant. Increasing the number of nodes in
the network, decreases Voronoi cell size and size of requested areas in the same
way. No matter how many nodes in the network, the number of nodes overlapping
a retrieved update area should remain the same. Since nodes keep requesting their
own area, messages will only need one hop to reach that area using top-layer routing
table entries. Therefore, the update retrieval of a nodes update area is a perfectly
scalable operation, also taking the constant factor r for the different replication
zones into account.
Consequently, requesting a node’s own Voronoi cell with static data upon join or
the added area in case of neighbour fail are also scalable as the requested areas are
always smaller than the update areas.
Bandwidth Requirements
Whether node bandwidth is sufficient to complete operation within the assumed
time bound lmax not only depends on scalability of operations with respect to the
number of messages a node has to transfer. The number of operations in a given
time frame and the message sizes also determine bandwidth requirements.
Message sizes requesting data or storing actions are very small as they do not con-
tain much data. The only large messages are response messages containing world
data. These will generally be transferred in one hop using shortcuts so they will
only consume bandwidth of requesting and replying node. The amount of data
transferred in one retrieval depends on the data describing the state of the world
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in that area. With nodes retrieving their own update area and an assumed con-
stant average amount of world state per area, the amount of transferred data on one
retrieval actually decreases with growing network size and decreasing Voronoi cell
size. However, at some point world size would have to be increased or more objects
would have to be added to the world in order to accommodate larger amounts of
players so this cannot be used to reduce traffic indefinitely.
The number of operations in a given time frame depends on different factors some
of which we cannot influence. For example, the number of static data area retrievals
depends on the churn rate we cannot control. The number of player actions stored
depends on the activity of players and can only be influenced indirectly by modifying
the rules of the world. However, the number of update area and player action
retrievals linearly depends on the update interval frequency.
In every update interval, every nodes requests its update area and the actions of
players in that area. If we halve the update frequency by doubling lmax, we would
only transfer half of the messages, giving each message more time to arrive at its
destination effectively halving the required bandwidth. However, this is not entirely
true. Increasing interval length also increases the size of requested areas and the
number of player characters contained therein. At some point, every node would
have to retrieve the whole world area and the system would not scale. Furthermore,
increasing the update interval also increases chances for the storage to lose data
under churn. Since reliability is the primary concern, lmax should be kept low and
high bandwidth requirements are just the price to pay to make the storage reliable.
Resilience
There is a large variety of ways malicious nodes can use to tamper with data. Mali-
cious nodes can tamper with data they are responsible for and reply with tampered
data when it is retrieved. Depending on the replication factor and due to overlap-
ping maintenance areas, it is unlikely malicious nodes obtain an absolute majority
for a sub-area of the virtual world.
However, malicious nodes can also obtain a relative majority by preventing correct
results to be included in the voting. One malicious node that is involved in the query
for a zone can always let the query fail by not answering the query or not forwarding
a message it is supposed to forward. A correct result can only be obtained from a
replication zone if no malicious nodes are involved.
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In addition to that, malicious nodes can also prevent nodes that obtained a correct
world state from calculating the correct updated state. Although they cannot create
actions for other player characters, they can prevent nodes from retrieving all actions
of a player character. When lying on the path of an action retrieve message they
can just drop it. They can also drop the actions to be stored if these are routed their
way. A node trying to calculate an updated state will miss player actions, calculate
an incorrect update, and the malicious node has successfully reduced the number of
votes for the correct state on the next update. In hotspot locations, just one of the
many players’ actions not being retrieved correctly leads to an incorrect state.
Replication of the world simulation in multiple zones is the main tool to counter
the influence of malicious nodes. It should make it unlikely malicious nodes can
successfully tamper in the majority of replication zones. Using shortcuts to transfer
replies directly, malicious nodes can never tamper with the query replies of other
honest nodes. If the first of multiple repeated queries ran correctly, shortcuts will
be used for all following queries shortening paths and speeding up query completion
increasing chances for correct replies to return before timing bounds are violated.
Considering the large number of ways malicious nodes can use to tamper, we expect
the necessary replication factors to deal with a certain share of malicious nodes to
be much higher than what is usually required to make a system reliable. This is
especially true since replication also serves to compensate for the unreliability of
individual nodes. It could happen malicious nodes tamper successfully only because
some honest node’s area failing at the right time in the right zone. Details on how
many malicious nodes can be tolerated depending on the replication factor can be
found in section 6.4.4.
Chapter 6
Evaluation
6.1 Network Simulation
To find out how well our system performs, we have to evaluate it with a number
of nodes similar to current real-world MMVEs which means we have to test it with
node number up to one thousand nodes. We can achieve test runs of this size only
by means of simulation even if the final feasibility can only be shown in real-world
tests [34]. Instead of running the system on real computers connected by a real
network, we have to simulate the behaviour of nodes and the message transfer on
the network.
There are well-known network simulators like ns-3 [102] or Omnet++ [117] with
extension specifically targeted at simulating peer-to-peer overlays like OverSim [12].
Using these would have the big advantage of providing realistic network models
while yielding results comparable to other works.
On the downside, these simulators require very specific ways the application under
test has to be developed, e.g. by allowing only certain programming languages or
even requiring specialized scripting languages nobody would use to develop real-
world applications. Our goal was to implement our system in a way so it can be run
in the real world, ideally by just exchanging real-world implementations of interfaces
by simulator implementations. We wanted to prove our solution works in reality
without hiding some real-world problems in a simulation-adapted implementation.
We implemented our system in C# because the C#-based XNA framework eases
implementing real-time applications with 3D graphics. Furthermore, our implemen-
tation is based on the link layer implementation of a layered peer-to-peer architec-
ture [65] also implemented in C#. Since there were no suitable network simulators
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supporting C#, we had to develop a custom simulation. In the following, we will
shortly describe the design of this simulator and its features to explain how we
obtained our evaluation results.
6.1.1 Simulator Environment
The simulator defines interfaces for the application to interact with the environment.
It provides communication facilities to connect to and disconnect from other nodes
and to send and receive messages. It also allows a node to specify timed behaviour
by programming timers and to obtain the current time so nodes can coordinate their
actions based on the current time. The simulator also controls the lifecycle of nodes
by invoking a start- and stop-function mimicking the user as it starts and exits the
application. A bootstrapping procedure is also part of the simulated environment
allowing a node to obtain the set of bootstrapping nodes to join the overlay and to
register itself at the service to become a bootstrapping node for other nodes.
The actions of players and the movement of characters are not part of the simulated
environment. Instead, the application is built to automatically generate player ac-
tions and movements according to some specified scenario.
The provided interface only provides asynchronous non-blocking functions. An ap-
plication may not wait for the establishment of a connection or the reception of a
message. After invoking a function to establish a connection, the function returns
immediately. Connection establishment is signalled via events or callback functions.
Internally, the simulator only schedules events to decide when a callback has to be
executed on the different nodes.
This way the system can be simulated in a single thread. Therefore, operating
system scheduling of threads does not interfere with the order of operations executed
by the scheduler. The simulation becomes completely deterministic. Simulation runs
can be repeated and will deliver the same results with the same settings. Pseudo
random number generators with seeds as part of the simulation settings serve to
generate deterministic random behaviour. This determinism is also tremendously
helpful when developing a large decentralized system to understand the system and
to find implementation errors.
When the simulation is started, the simulator will use the provided configuration
parameters to initialize the simulation setting. It initializes properties like random
distributions and random seeds, instantiates the configured number of nodes with
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their application code, and schedules initial events. Then it starts processing these
events.
6.1.2 Event Processing
Internally, the simulator performs a discrete event-based simulation [45] similar to
the one used to realize consistent simulations of a virtual world. It uses a single
global event queue containing all future events to be processed. Each event has got
an execution wall time and events in the queue are ordered in time-ascending order.
Every event is associated with a node. When executed, the event happens at that
node. An event has a type specifying what operation will be performed when the
event is executed.
The simulator starts its main loop by searching for the first event in the queue. This
will be an event of type StartEvent that has previously been added to the event
queue as part of the simulation setup. The simulator will advance its current global
time to the time of the event and will execute it. A StartEvent will be executed by
invoking the start() function on the corresponding node. Upon invocation of that
function, the node will perform any actions necessary to initialize itself and to start
running.
The node will start joining the overlay by invoking a function of the bootstrapping
service to obtain bootstrapping nodes. The node also passes a callback function to
be invoked when bootstrapping is completed. The bootstrapper function is imple-
mented by a component of the simulator. Thus, the invocation will pass control to
the simulator. The simulator will then create an event of type BootstrappingCom-
pleted initializing it with the node and its callback function. Then, it schedules this
event assigning an execution time and adding it to the event queue. The difference
between execution time and current global time is the duration of the bootstrapping
process of that node.
After adding the event, the bootstrapping function of the simulator returns to the
start-function of the node. This function could invoke more functions of the simula-
tor, each of which will add more future events to the event queue. Our application’s
start function will simply return to the simulator’s main loop. The node will continue
running when the simulator finally invokes the callback function in the Bootstrap-
pingCompleted event. The simulator’s main loop will then search for the next event
in the queue and process it by invoking a function on the corresponding node, which
will in turn invoke functions of the simulator to generate and schedule events.
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This fetch(event)–execute(event)–callback(event.node)–schedule(events) loop is the
basic cycle performed by event-based simulators. Combined with wall time, it al-
lows to measure the durations of all environment operations implemented by the
simulator. The durations depend on the scheduling of events. However, the du-
rations of calculations on individual nodes is not taken into account. Time in the
simulation only passes when the simulator advances to the next event in the queue.
When a node takes a long time to perform an expensive calculation, this calculation
still happened instantaneously in one step from the perspective of the simulator
– although the simulation will take that additional time. However, in reality the
processing of messages should not be computationally expensive compared to the
rendering of a 3D-world and there should be enough computational power to process
any callbacks of the simulator reasonably fast.
In addition to the non-existing limit on the amount of calculation a node performs
in a callback, the simulator also does not enforce a limit on the amount of environ-
ment functions a node can invoke in a callback. A node could send out thousands
of messages in one step with memory for the event queue being the only limit. In
practice, operating system message buffers will probably provide a lower limit. How-
ever, message transfer events will be scheduled in a way that all messages will be
transferred sequentially taking the available bandwidth into account.
This means simulated applications have to be well-behaved in the sense of not doing
unrealistic amounts of work in one step (one callback function) to provide realistic
simulation results. Furthermore, they may only use the functions provided by the
simulator to interact with their environment.
Despite being single-threaded, the simulator simulates parallel execution of opera-
tions on different nodes. The trick is while parallel operations are running – e.g.
messages are being transferred – the simulator does not have to perform any cal-
culations. It just schedules an event when the operation is started and executes
the event when the operation has finished. The sequential processing of events in
the queue creates a serialization of all events in the system. Thus, events totally
ordered. This is just one of multiple possible interleavings of parallel actions on
the different nodes. Different scheduling decisions, e.g. because of different random
seeds, would create different serializations of events.
In the following sections, we will present the models underlying the scheduling deci-
sions of the different operations like network communication and timed operations.
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6.1.3 Network Communication
The main environment communication functions are connection establishment, dis-
connection, and message sending and reception. When a node wants to send a
message to another connected node, the simulator has to schedule a reception event
on the receiving node. The time between sending and receiving is the latency of the
message.
Message Transfer
There is a wide range of different network models to predict the latency of messages
passing through the Internet. Some apply queuing theory modelling the transfer of
packets through the Internet as a series of queues passed by the packet at the different
routers [84]. Empirical approaches perform latency measurements embedding nodes
into a higher-dimensional vector space using the Euclidean distance function to
predict message latencies [33]. Other approaches fit random distributions like the
Weibull [61] or the Pareto [131] distribution to measured network latencies.
We decided to use a simple hybrid model combining a random distribution to model
Internet latencies with FIFO queues at sender and receiver to model the bandwidth-
limited up- and downstream of DSL-connected hosts. The first part provides varying
message latencies and out of order delivery modelling congestion and routing via dif-
ferent paths. However, the random distribution models message latency independent
of the message size. Since we expect the bandwidth of ADSL-connected PCs, espe-
cially the upstream, to be a bottleneck handling the high amount of traffic caused
by replication, we added FIFO queues modelling the upstream and downstream
channel of these hosts.
When a node sends a message, the message first passes through the upstream chan-
nel. If the channel is currently in use by another message, the message stays in the
queue until the channel is free. A message blocks the channel for a time equalling
the message size divided by the bandwidth of the channel. When the message has
passed through the channel, an Internet latency is drawn from the random distri-
bution to calculate the time it arrives at the downstream channel of the receiver.
There, messages are again queued when the channel is occupied by other messages.
When the message finally arrives at the node, it is first checked whether any older
messages are still in transit. If not, it is passed to the application. Otherwise, it is
buffered until the older messages arrived and are passed up. Consequently, FIFO
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message order is preserved. This is consistent with our system model and our real
implementation of the link layer using TCP guaranteeing FIFO order.
We implemented this model by scheduling four different types of events within the
simulator. When a node invokes the function to send a message, the simulator
schedules a MessageSend event with a small constant delay to model the internal
computation that happens when sending a message. When processing this event,
the simulator schedules a MessageSent event modelling the passing of the message
through the upstream channel. Therefore, this event is scheduled for execution at
the next time the upstream channel is free plus the time to transfer the message
using message size and channel bandwidth. The channel is marked as being occupied
accordingly. When the MessageSent event is processed, a MessageTraversed event
is scheduled drawing a latency from the Internet latency distribution. Processing
this event creates a MessageReceived event which is scheduled the same way as the
MessageSent but using the downstream channel of the receiving node. Processing
the MessageReceived event passes the message to the reorder buffer which in turn
passes the messages up to the application in FIFO order of message sending.
Based on our network model, we can record all messages, their size, and the message
latency. However, our model is not a precise simulation of TCP. It only captures the
major characteristics of real TCP/IP link layer implementations: limited bandwidth
and varying Internet message latencies. The biggest deviation from reality is the
missing splitting of messages to comply with maximum transfer unit (MTU) sizes.
Every message is handled as one message with regard to its Internet latency inde-
pendent of its size. The only influence of message size is up-/downstream channel
transfer time. We also do not model packet loss, TCP acknowledgements, message
retransmits, and the traffic caused by these additional messages. The increased
latency due to message loss is subsumed in the Internet latency random distribu-
tion. Including this handling with more precision would mean reimplementing a
whole TCP/IP stack with all its timers and flow control algorithms which would be
infeasible.
When deciding on the latency distribution to use, we settled with the Pareto dis-
tribution. There are a lot of controversial results about which random distributions
capture packet latency best and which parameters to use. The Pareto distribution
is used in some works e.g. [131] and it stood out because of its simplicity and it is
computational inexpensiveness. Furthermore, its two parameters k and xmin define
a lower latency bound and the expected value of the distribution. The cumulative
distribution function of the Pareto distribution is defined as FPar(x) = 1 − (xminx )k
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for x ≥ xmin and FPar(x) = 0 for x < xmin. Therefore, xmin is the lower bound for
latencies. The expected value of a Pareto distribution is defined as E(Par) = k∗xmin
k−1
for k > 1 and E(Par) = ∞ for k ≤ 1. Thus, the parameters of the Pareto distri-
bution can be calculated from a desired lower latency bound and expected value of
latencies.
The Pareto distribution is a heavy-tail distribution. This can be informally char-
acterized as a distribution with a larger part of the weight (the area under the
probability density function) in the tail of the distribution which is the area of high
latencies and low probabilities. This means although the probability is very low, it
will generate latencies as big as hours, days, weeks, and years. In the Internet, a
packet will never travel this long as it will be dropped when its TTL reaches zero.
Furthermore, it will be retransmitted when the retransmit timeout kicks in. There-
fore, we use a truncated Pareto distribution also specifying a maximum latency.
This kind of distribution is commonly used when there is a natural upper bound on
the probability tail [1].
In [131], the Pareto distribution models packet latency. As mentioned before, we
use it to model latency of arbitrarily sized messages. In reality, packet latency is
not message latency. Therefore, our results will only match the results of [131]
suggesting similarity to real-world latency for small messages only. Our results will
differ for large messages. However, it was most important for us to model varying
message latency and bandwidth limitation and we did not focus on most precise
capturing of real-world latency.
Message Layout
A node can send a message to another node with a certain link layer address. The
message payload is a byte sequence. The size used by the simulator to calculate the
message transfer time consists of the number of payload bytes plus header informa-
tion. In the link layer model [65] we used, the link layer allows to establish logical
connections between arbitrary peers. As peers might be connected to the Internet
using NAT routers, relaying is the only possible connection strategy in the worst
case. Therefore the link layer features its own header containing internal and exter-
nal TCP/IP endpoints of sender and receiver and additional information to establish
a logical connection. This header information sums up to 74 bytes. Furthermore,
we also consider the TCP/IP header as part of the message size adding another 40
bytes to the message size. For small payloads like RtRequests, this might actually
create a considerable overhead.
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Connection Handling
Before nodes can exchange messages, they have to establish a connection. The con-
nection establishment is simulated using a three-way handshake of TCP/IP control
messages followed by a three-way handshake to exchange certificate information and
agree on a common symmetric key for data encryption as implemented in the link
layer. Therefore, establishing a connection might take a considerable amount of
time in the simulation, depending on the individual message latencies. However,
we did not include procedures like hole-punching [66] and relaying that would cause
additional delay.
Disconnection is also performed using a three-way handshake like TCP/IP. If a node
with open connections fails, there is no automatic notification of the other nodes.
Instead, the next message sent to the failed node causes the simulator to send a
TCP reset message back to the source when the message arrives at the failed node.
In practice, this is not guaranteed to happen and node fail could be detected on
timeouts only. However, we used this simpler version to not have to implement
retransmit timers of the TCP stack. Since node fail is only detected on message
sending, it might actually take some time for a node to detect the failure of a
connected node. Therefore, the simulator allows nodes to program a ping interval
for each connection and the simulated link layer will automatically generate ping
messages and answer incoming pings with pong messages. Round trip times will
be calculated automatically and can be read by applications similar to the real link
manager implementation. Furthermore, connected nodes can detect node failure on
ping messages if no user traffic happens in that time.
Since connection and disconnection takes some time due to the message exchange,
certain special cases can arise. Nodes might try to connect to each other in parallel
or disconnect in parallel. A node might try to connect to a node while a disconnec-
tion is in progress and vice versa. This happens because nodes do not necessarily
have the same knowledge at the same time and might change their decisions on
whether they need a connection at any time. These cases are also handled correctly
by matching parallel handshakes to each other and delaying new handshakes until
current handshakes have been finished.
6.1.4 Time and Clocks
Nodes can read the current time using a clock provided by the simulated environ-
ment. Furthermore, they can perform actions at certain times by registering a timer
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Figure 6.1: NTP-inspired clock resynchronization of drifting clocks
callback function at the simulated environment to be invoked after a specified time
has passed. Using clocks and timers, nodes are able to coordinate their actions.
However, in reality clocks are never synchronized and we need to show our system
also works when clocks are not perfectly synchronized. In our system model, we
assume clocks being synchronized within bounds that can be realized using NTP
as clock synchronization algorithm. Therefore, we have implemented the simulated
clocks to drift with a constant drift rate away from the global simulation time. The
drift rate is different for each node and randomly picked from a given bounded
interval. Furthermore, each node resynchronizes itself with the global system in
fixed intervals. We assume NTP is able to synchronize within certain bounds and
the obtained time is normally distributed around the global time. If the obtained
time is ahead of the time on the local clock, the clock is directly adjusted to the
obtained value. If the obtained time is behind the local clock, the clock is not
set back but is runs with a drastically reduced speed for the time difference to
the obtained time. This way the local clock always runs within an interval of the
global time. Figure 6.1 shows an exaggerated example of a fast clock running at
1.5 times normal speed and a slow clock running at 0.75 the normal speed and a
resynchronization accuracy of one second so clock differences become visible.
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The resynchronization is scheduled every 10s. However, resynchronization is sched-
uled using the local timer which is drifting according to the local clock drift. There-
fore, the fast clock performs resynchronization more often than the slow clock. Fur-
thermore, the phase of reduced clock speed is not able to actually catch up with the
global time as its lengths is also determined using a local timer.
Local timers are not adapted when clock values are synchronized, consistent with
the timer behaviour of operating systems. If a programmer specifies a timer to
run in one second, he would rather accept a small deviation from the one second
because of clock drift than the timer running in two seconds because the clock was
synchronized and stopped for a second. As long as timers are programmed with
short time spans, drift will not have a major impact.
If timers are used to coordinated actions of nodes run at a certain clock time, it
is often desirable to have all nodes start their actions no earlier than the given
time. This can be achieved by incorporating the maximum clock drift and the
minimum synchronization accuracy in the programmed time span. To mitigate the
larger deviations created when the target time is still far away, two timers can be
combined. The first is set in a way that it will run shortly before the target time
and the second timer is programmed with the shorter remaining time span.
In our simulation, we used a drift bound of maximum 1% speed deviation from the
perfect clock, a resynchronization accuracy of 10 ms, and 10 s resynchronization
interval yielding a much tighter clock synchronization than shown in figure 6.1.
Internally, reading the clock just maps the current global simulation time to the local
time of the node incorporating clock drift and normally distributed synchronization
accuracy to get NTP-like behaviour. NTP is not simulated directly so no messages
are generated for clock synchronization. Timers are implemented by scheduling a
TimerEvent in the global event queue for a future time considering the drift of the
local clock. When this event is executed, the callback functions will be invoked
on the respective node. It is also possible to use periodic timers by scheduling
PeriodicTimerEvents automatically scheduling new events on execution.
6.1.5 Node Lifecycle
During simulator initialization, a configurable number of nodes are instantiated and
a StartEvent is scheduled for every node. Furthermore, it is already decided when
the node will leave the network by scheduling a StopEvent in case the user exited
the application. A FailEvent is scheduled to denote a silent fail e.g. because of a
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system crash at the user or a disconnection from the Internet. The execution times
of these events can be preconfigured to generate specific test scenarios. However, it
is more common to generate scenarios by specifying a churn rate and use random
distributions to decide on the node start and stop time.
Churn can be modelled in terms of two probability distributions [62]. The first is
the inter-arrival distribution (IAD). It specifies how much time passes between the
arrivals of nodes in the network. The second is the session length distribution (SLD)
specifying the duration a node stays in the network. Experimental results in peer-
to-peer file sharing networks suggest the exponential or the Weibull distribution can
be used to describe churn [114].
Internally, executing the StartEvent invokes the callback function on the node so it
can initialize itself and start running. Executing a StopEvent invokes a stop function
on the node giving it the chance to shut itself down. Finally, the node can invoke a
stop function on its simulated link layer closing all connections to other nodes and
preventing the node from receiving any further messages. By closing all connections,
other nodes notice the departure of the node.
The FailEvent on the other hand simply removes all scheduled events at the failed
node. Any events of received message events or timer events will be removed so
the node will never run again. Messages towards that node will be answered by
connection reset messages signalling the failure of the node. Thus, other nodes will
detect the failure when next sending a message to that node, e.g. a ping message.
6.1.6 Bootstrapping
The simulator features a simple simulated bootstrapping service. In its start func-
tion, a node usually invokes a function of the simulated bootstrapper to receive its
bootstrapping peers passing a callback. When this happens, the simulator sched-
ules a BootstrappingCompleted event for a random time taken from a configured
interval. Upon execution of this event, the simulator randomly picks nodes from the
overlay and returns them to the node invoking its callback function.
The bootstrapping service is actually aware of zones in the overlay and is able
to supply one node from each zone at random. The bootstrapping service is not
perfect in the sense of guaranteeing to return at maximum a number of malicious
nodes proportional to the share in the whole network. However, due to the random
selection it is unlikely it returns more than this number of nodes. Therefore, it is
ideal with respect to what could practically be achieved by a bootstrapping service
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knowing all nodes in the system. In practice, if a bootstrapping service maintains
only a subset of all nodes, it might be more vulnerable to malicious nodes obtaining
a bigger influence.
When a node joined the overlay, it registers itself at the bootstrapping service to
become a potential bootstrapping node for others. If it is stopped, it also de-registers
itself. If it fails, the simulator also takes it out of the set of potential bootstrapping
nodes.
6.2 Common Simulation Parameters
The simulation features a large set of configuration parameters to initialize the
simulator and the test scenarios. It is not possible to systematically evaluate the
effects of all parameters. Some of them had to be picked based on assumptions and
common sense. These parameters were the same for all simulation runs. However,
we believe we picked parameters good enough to obtain realistic results and picking
different parameters would not deliver qualitatively different results. Usually, we
used more conservative assumptions than probably necessary.
6.2.1 Communication Parameters
As mentioned before, the Internet message latency is calculated using a Pareto
distribution with a minimum latency of 20 ms. Every message transfer takes at
least that time plus the time to pass through up- and downstream channels. The
distribution parameter k is picked as 1.5 yielding an average latency of 60 ms. We
truncated the Pareto distribution at a maximum latency of 5 seconds. In an Internet
settings, most message will be much faster and TCP retransmit timers can always
be adapted to retransmit sooner to get lost messages through in that maximum time
with a high probability.
At first, the bandwidths of nodes were set using a scenario where most nodes had
an ADSL connection with upstream bandwidths down to 192 KBit/s. We quickly
recognized this to be a major bottleneck with messages in the upstream channel be-
ing delayed by several seconds. Therefore, we decided not to systematically evaluate
the influence of this parameter because for most settings this would just mean the
storage could not work correctly. Instead, we picked a fixed symmetric bandwidth
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of 100 MBit/s that should be realistic in a few years as fibre Internet access becomes
more common.
The link layer added 42 bytes of TCP/IP header data and 74 bytes of link layer
data to each transferred message. During the certificate exchange on connection
establishment, the three exchanged messages had a size of 1028 bytes, 1060 bytes,
and 32 bytes respectively in line with the used real link layer implementation.
6.2.2 Timing parameters
Errors in physical processes like measuring time are typically modelled using normal
distributions in absence of any additional information. Therefore, the clock drift of
each node is drawn from a normal distribution with mean value one – the speed of
the perfect clock. The standard deviation is set at σ = 0.1%. Therefore, clock drift
is practically bounded at 3 ∗ σ = 0.3% using the common estimation that 99.73%
of all values lie within 3 ∗ σ. The maximum allowed drift rate is 1%. This is a
very conservative assumption as nowadays the timestamp counter bound to quartz
crystal oscillations is used as a timing source yielding much lower drift rates [88].
The resynchronization difference to the perfect clock of each node is calculated by
drawing a value from a normal distribution with mean value zero on each resynchro-
nization. The standard deviation is set to σ = 3ms so clocks can be synchronized
within a maximum distance of 3 ∗σ = 9ms to the global time. Resynchronization is
scheduled to happen every ten seconds, which is the minimum interval time allowed
by the rules of NTP.
6.2.3 Lifecycle Settings
Regarding the arrival and departure of different nodes as independent, we decided
to use the exponential distribution for both the inter-arrival distribution (IAD) as
well as the session length distribution (SLD). We fixed the expected value of the
SLD at two hours regarding this as the average time a player stays in the system.
A study of MMORPG session lengths [97] suggests this is a reasonable value. We
varied the IAD expected value creating an equilibrium of node join and departure
at different node numbers in the network. Figure 6.2 shows the number of nodes
in the network over eight hours with an expected value of 25 seconds for the IAD.
Ten different random seeds were used to create ten scenarios with an equilibrium
between 250 and 300 nodes after eight hours.
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Figure 6.2: Number of nodes in the network with E(SLD) = 2h and E(IAD) = 25s
Node departure was realized as graceful stopping of nodes instead of node failure.
The ping messages to detect node failure within reasonable time quickly dominated
the traffic and slowed down the simulation as 1000 nodes exchanged messages on
each link several times a minute. In reality, people usually at least shut down their
computer with the operating system closing all open connection rather than just
turning it off. Furthermore, varying latency of close messages still means connected
nodes do not immediately notice the departure at the same time. Therefore, this
scenario is still reasonably realistic.
6.2.4 Bootstrapper Settings
The time the bootstrapping service needs to return bootstrapping peers is taken
from a uniform distribution on the interval from 100 ms to 300 ms. The time for
the bootstrapping service to add a node to the set of potential bootstrapping peers
and to remove it when it leaves is also drawn uniformly from the interval 200 ms to
500 ms. The delays are mainly introduced to not rely on the bootstrapping service
to always know the global state of the network. The delays may cause scenarios
where a node has already left but is reported as a bootstrapping peer to new nodes.
Furthermore, the bootstrapping service might exclude nodes from the selection that
have already started to register themselves as potential bootstrapping peers.
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6.2.5 Overlay Settings
In all test scenarios, 5000 node IDs were randomly generated first. This was the
maximum number of nodes that could join the network in one test run. However,
only a subset of these nodes was in the network at the same time in all scenarios.
The virtual world size was 6700m × 6700m yielding an area of 44.89km2. This is
roughly equal to the size of one continent in World of Warcraft.
However, picking IDs at random does not create even distributions where all nodes
have similar distances to each other and Voronoi cells have similar sizes. Instead,
nodes form clusters in some areas giving them very small Voronoi cells whereas
only a few nodes with large cells are located in other areas. Therefore, we put a
rasterization of 5000 IDs on the space guaranteeing a minimum distance between
nodes. This way we can also ensure no two IDs have the same integral part. However,
since only a fraction of all nodes are in the network at any given time, this random
sub-selection still creates variations in the sizes of Voronoi cells.
No matter which replication factors were chosen in the different scenarios, the num-
ber of routing table layers was always set to four – despite IDs having different
lengths. Considering how sparsely populated the ID space is, additional layers would
have stayed empty for the most part and would only have caused unnecessary traf-
fic.
Finally, shortcut connections are kept open for a maximum of 90 seconds without
traffic in all test scenarios.
6.3 Overlay Evaluation
This section presents our evaluation result comparing these results with our initial
requirements. We will present results on the structure of the created overlays over
multiple test scenarios suggesting it can serve as a reliable base for the storage. Af-
terwards, we show the overlay features a scalable maintenance mechanism. Finally,
its resilience against attackers is shown by adding various numbers of malicious
nodes to the test scenarios.
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6.3.1 Overlay Test Szenarios
In the overlay test scenarios, the storage runs on top of the overlay without any
stored data and without performing any queries. The only exception is performing
the initial query for the nodes responsibility area as this is necessary to make sure
a node is not eclipsed. We tested the network maintenance under several churn
scenarios. We used 14 different scenarios with varying churn rates reaching from
E(IAD) = 6s to E(IAD) = 25s, to evaluate reliability and scalability. In [97]
current population on a World of Warcraft server was shown to vary between 400
and 1600 players and using these values for the IAD created similar populations in
our test runs.
Each scenario was tested with the three different replication factors r = 4; 9; 16 with
(rx = 2, ry = 2), (rx = 3, ry = 3), and (rx = 4, ry = 4). We picked these to have one
set of tests with only light, medium, and heavy amounts of redundancy. We used
identical values for rx and ry so the ID space structure and thus the layout of the
routing tables is identical with different replication factors.
One test run simulated eight hours of overlay maintenance. Each scenario was run
ten times each with different random number seeds. Thus, all random behaviour
like start and stop times and message latencies were different on the runs of one
scenario. However, for the same run of a scenario with different replication factors,
the times at which nodes join and leave are exactly the same. The nodes will be at
different positions as the ID space is different for different replication factors. The
amount of running nodes at any given time is identical making it easier to compare
the results for the same run under different replication factors.
To test resilience, we later added varying numbers of malicious nodes to one of the
scenarios. In total we ran 420 tests to evaluate the influence of churn and additional
240 tests to evaluate the resilience. One test run lasted between 0.5 hours and 6.5
hours using one core of our Intel Xeon X5650 server running at 2.67 GHz. This
limited the number of tests we could perform in a reasonable amount of time.
Table 6.1 shows the number of nodes that have been started over eight hours for
each test run. Table 6.2 shows how many nodes have been in the network when eight
hours were over. This number can be used to estimate the churn equilibrium – the
average number of nodes in the network as it continues running. Even for identical
settings, there is still some variation in the number of started and running nodes in
the different runs. This can also be seen in figure 6.3 showing the number of nodes
in the network for the IAD6 scenario similar to figure 6.2 showing this for the IAD25
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Table 6.1: Number of started nodes in each run
IAD n¯ R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
6 4799 4787 4771 4716 4767 4750 4769 4929 4846 4864 4789
7 4129 4106 4097 4095 4070 4099 4253 4190 4158 4151 4073
8 3610 3594 3597 3596 3545 3588 3713 3658 3633 3637 3542
9 3195 3185 3183 3205 3155 3169 3180 3292 3233 3211 3134
10 2874 2823 2851 2860 2836 2855 2972 2914 2924 2877 2827
11 2616 2567 2595 2595 2597 2595 2700 2656 2676 2639 2540
12 2407 2359 2393 2412 2368 2383 2489 2422 2491 2436 2320
13 2221 2173 2208 2209 2185 2214 2289 2273 2288 2247 2119
14 2065 2003 2046 2029 2029 2059 2134 2115 2131 2101 1998
15 1918 1844 1906 1875 1895 1909 1999 1957 1985 1963 1851
17 1697 1622 1680 1675 1676 1703 1776 1725 1746 1732 1631
18 1602 1539 1589 1589 1578 1599 1663 1622 1652 1632 1557
20 1445 1384 1411 1423 1423 1445 1524 1456 1476 1501 1407
25 1157 1075 1163 1153 1117 1143 1232 1159 1188 1196 1141
scenario. However, the numbers are still close to each other so aggregating the data
over multiple runs of the same scenario should yield meaningful data.
6.3.2 Reliability
To find out whether the network works reliably, we first needed to ensure the created
primary network structure is actually a Delaunay graph. We checked the neighbour-
hood views among all neighbours are consistent so nodes are actually able to receive
messages. As long as messages are in transit, the neighbourhood state might not
be consistent. Therefore, we did not allow node join or leave in the last minute of
the eight hour runs. This minute is more than enough to reach a consistent state
considering the maximum message latency. After that, we recorded the state of the
network.
Furthermore, we were also interested in the sizes of neighbourhood sets and routing
tables. The former allows to estimate how even the user traffic will be distributed
and how tightly a node is integrated in the network. The routing table sizes show
whether the overlay can actually provide disjoint paths that are reasonably short
to contain the influence of malicious nodes. Both together show the routing state
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Table 6.2: Number of running nodes at the end of each run
IAD n¯ R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
6 1169 1218 1197 1129 1177 1181 1133 1159 1157 1183 1153
7 1015 1019 1019 1040 1017 985 1026 1029 978 1021 1019
8 893 930 921 923 863 864 897 908 856 880 888
9 788 836 813 796 754 782 768 791 762 772 801
10 707 716 726 709 696 669 743 680 692 683 751
11 639 660 651 642 653 613 668 595 625 634 649
12 593 616 593 624 582 560 620 527 622 608 577
13 546 549 563 587 539 529 538 531 568 546 506
14 507 498 525 514 496 498 487 513 519 523 497
15 465 460 470 456 472 442 460 462 504 493 426
17 409 408 416 406 414 410 411 406 423 429 364
18 384 383 387 390 376 372 384 383 400 404 357
20 346 340 326 340 355 334 361 335 344 397 324
25 276 241 283 282 270 264 288 266 296 299 266
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Figure 6.3: Number of nodes in the network with E(SLD) = 2h and E(IAD) = 6s
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Table 6.3: Neighbourhood Sizes Evaluation r = 4
IAD n¯ ¯¯x s¯x sx¯ ssx minx sminx maxx smaxx
6 1169 5.9601 1.3244 0.0045 0.0369 3 0.0000 14 0.9487
7 1015 5.9566 1.3746 0.0058 0.0310 3 0.0000 14 1.0750
8 893 5.9497 1.3806 0.0059 0.0383 2 0.3162 13 0.5270
9 788 5.9484 1.3766 0.0087 0.0446 3 0.0000 15 1.1738
10 707 5.9379 1.4116 0.0052 0.0527 3 0.0000 14 1.2472
11 639 5.9349 1.4025 0.0050 0.0459 3 0.0000 14 1.3703
12 593 5.9350 1.4207 0.0077 0.0406 3 0.0000 13 0.8233
13 546 5.9249 1.3735 0.0122 0.0323 3 0.0000 12 0.8756
14 507 5.9219 1.4073 0.0105 0.0402 3 0.0000 15 1.2472
15 465 5.9191 1.3843 0.0112 0.0389 3 0.0000 13 0.8756
17 409 5.9068 1.4080 0.0133 0.0474 3 0.0000 13 0.6992
18 384 5.9027 1.4334 0.0131 0.0456 2 0.3162 13 1.0750
20 346 5.8942 1.4229 0.0113 0.0518 3 0.0000 14 1.1595
25 276 5.8615 1.4278 0.0189 0.0619 3 0.0000 12 0.6667
and the number of open connections since there will only be a few shortcuts without
user traffic.
Primary Structure
In all of our test runs, the neighbourhood views were consistent. We conclude our
self-stabilizing algorithm reliably creates a Delaunay graph. The average number of
neighbours for the scenarios with r = 4, 9, 16 is shown in the tables 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5.
The first column IAD shows the average inter arrival time used in the exponential
distribution. The second column n¯ contains the average number of nodes running at
the end of the scenario. The column ¯¯x shows the average number of neighbours per
run averaged over the ten runs. It varies from 5.86 for the smaller networks to 5.96 for
the larger networks. This variation is pretty small and consistent with the property
of planar graphs having a maximum average node degree of six. Surprisingly, the
number of zones k does not seem to have an influence on the average number of
neighbours as the range is nearly identical in the three tables.
Table 6.6 shows the same evaluation performed on random graphs of sizes 250, 500,
and 1000. These sizes are similar to the sizes created in the IAD25, IAD14, and
IAD7 scenario. Comparing their average node degree to the respective scenarios
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Table 6.4: Neighbourhood Sizes Evaluation r = 9
IAD n¯ ¯¯x s¯x sx¯ ssx minx sminx maxx smaxx
6 1169 5.9634 1.3789 0.0034 0.0302 2 0.3162 15 1.3333
7 1015 5.9559 1.3878 0.0023 0.0367 3 0.0000 16 1.2293
8 893 5.9527 1.4095 0.0037 0.0363 3 0.0000 14 0.9189
9 788 5.9507 1.4374 0.0067 0.0440 2 0.3162 14 1.1005
10 707 5.9410 1.4408 0.0081 0.0499 3 0.0000 14 0.9944
11 639 5.9400 1.4333 0.0086 0.0189 2 0.3162 15 1.3166
12 593 5.9310 1.4461 0.0136 0.0378 3 0.0000 16 1.4181
13 546 5.9236 1.4792 0.0077 0.0492 3 0.0000 14 0.9487
14 507 5.9174 1.4778 0.0109 0.0607 3 0.0000 14 1.0593
15 465 5.9095 1.4780 0.0069 0.0452 2 0.3162 14 0.9661
17 409 5.9020 1.4515 0.0103 0.0590 2 0.3162 14 1.1353
18 384 5.8992 1.4711 0.0149 0.0748 3 0.0000 13 1.0750
20 346 5.8967 1.4994 0.0111 0.0596 3 0.0000 13 0.6325
25 276 5.8719 1.4958 0.0112 0.0484 3 0.0000 13 0.9189
Table 6.5: Neighbourhood Sizes Evaluation r = 16
IAD n¯ ¯¯x s¯x sx¯ ssx minx sminx maxx smaxx
6 1169 5.9629 1.4018 0.0044 0.0268 2 0.3162 14 0.9718
7 1015 5.9584 1.4270 0.0055 0.0466 3 0.0000 14 0.8433
8 893 5.9517 1.4569 0.0054 0.0452 3 0.0000 14 0.6325
9 788 5.9492 1.4498 0.0073 0.0416 3 0.0000 14 0.7888
10 707 5.9428 1.4406 0.0088 0.0395 3 0.0000 14 1.2293
11 639 5.9393 1.4542 0.0062 0.0547 3 0.0000 14 0.9944
12 593 5.9321 1.4795 0.0083 0.0256 3 0.0000 14 0.9189
13 546 5.9267 1.4755 0.0079 0.0429 3 0.0000 15 1.6465
14 507 5.9164 1.4649 0.0098 0.0662 3 0.0000 12 0.6992
15 465 5.9118 1.4649 0.0118 0.0709 3 0.0000 15 1.2867
17 409 5.9004 1.5112 0.0114 0.0529 3 0.0000 13 0.8433
18 384 5.9049 1.4683 0.0140 0.0694 3 0.0000 13 0.6992
20 346 5.8914 1.4987 0.0145 0.0347 3 0.0000 13 0.6325
25 276 5.8648 1.4905 0.0164 0.0594 3 0.0000 12 0.4830
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Table 6.6: Neighbourhood Sizes Evaluation of Random Delaunay Graphs
n ¯¯x s¯x sx¯ ssx minx sminx maxx smaxx
250 5.8624 1.3335 0.0172 0.0451 3 0.0000 11 0.5676
500 5.9260 1.3632 0.0081 0.0398 3 0.0000 12 0.6325
1000 5.9596 1.3654 0.0053 0.0149 3 0.0000 13 0.6992
shows a minimal increase. The difference is bigger in the fourth column s¯x showing
the average standard deviation of the distribution of the number of neighbours in
each run. For each run, we calculated the standard deviation using the estimator
s =
√
1
n
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2 and averaged it over the ten runs.
For the random graphs, the variation seems to be independent from the number of
nodes with a standard deviation of around 1.35. The recorded runs approach this
value only in the IAD6 run with the other runs showing a standard deviation close
to 1.45. This means smaller test scenarios create a larger variation in the number
of neighbours. This is most likely an effect of the distribution of nodes in zones.
Nodes at the border of a zone connected to nodes from other zones are more likely
to have a higher number of neighbours – especially nodes at the corner of a zone.
This can also be seen in the maximum node degree in the column maxx. More nodes
increase the chance of one of the nodes having a higher maximum node degree in the
random graph. This trend seems to exist in our recorded runs as well. However, the
maximum number of nodes is two nodes greater. On the other hand, there seems
to be a larger variation in the maximum number of nodes among the different runs
as can be seen in the last column smaxx . Thus, the maximum number of neighbours
seems to depend more on the distribution picked and is less stable among runs with
the same settings.
On the contrary, both the average number of neighbours as well as the standard
deviation of neighbours show much less variation among different runs with standard
deviations being close to zero as shown in columns sx¯ and ssx .
Finally, all evaluated random graphs and the majority of the test runs feature a
minimum node degree of 3. In some test scenarios, there were also single runs with
a minimum node degree of 2. These loosely integrated nodes are more likely to have
a considerable share of their traffic not being forwarded by malicious neighbours.
However, these minimum node degrees can only be created at nodes in the corners
of the ID space, so there are only a few nodes integrated that loosely.
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Table 6.7: Filling degree of the routing table for r = 4
IAD n¯ ¯¯x s¯x sx¯ ssx minx sminx maxx smaxx
6 1169 0.7388 0.0301 0.0022 0.0026 0.5833 0.0000 0.7500 0.0000
7 1015 0.7383 0.0315 0.0023 0.0032 0.5000 0.0439 0.7500 0.0000
8 893 0.7371 0.0320 0.0032 0.0041 0.5000 0.0351 0.7500 0.0000
9 788 0.7374 0.0322 0.0032 0.0041 0.5000 0.0351 0.7500 0.0000
10 707 0.7355 0.0334 0.0052 0.0049 0.5000 0.0264 0.7500 0.0000
11 639 0.7344 0.0357 0.0023 0.0024 0.5000 0.0403 0.7500 0.0000
12 593 0.7303 0.0397 0.0045 0.0040 0.5000 0.0430 0.7500 0.0000
13 546 0.7308 0.0389 0.0031 0.0029 0.5000 0.0403 0.7500 0.0000
14 507 0.7288 0.0403 0.0039 0.0030 0.5000 0.0264 0.7500 0.0000
15 465 0.7292 0.0403 0.0050 0.0045 0.5000 0.0439 0.7500 0.0000
17 409 0.7275 0.0425 0.0039 0.0048 0.4167 0.0583 0.7500 0.0000
18 384 0.7246 0.0437 0.0059 0.0057 0.5000 0.0430 0.7500 0.0000
20 346 0.7250 0.0421 0.0079 0.0053 0.5000 0.0351 0.7500 0.0000
25 276 0.7204 0.0486 0.0063 0.0066 0.5000 0.0351 0.7500 0.0000
To sum up, our algorithm reliably creates Delaunay graphs with properties very
similar to those of random Delaunay graphs. The small differences can be attributed
to the zoned distribution of IDs in our test runs.
Routing Table
Routing tables need to be filled to achieve a satisfying routing performance. The
more entries are filled, the shorter paths become. It is especially important the
top layer of routing tables is filled. This layer allows the direct far jump into the
different zones and is necessary to realize disjoint paths. Therefore, we measured
filling degrees of routing tables in the different scenarios.
The filling degrees of the routing tables for replication factors r = 4, 9, 16 are shown
in tables 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9. The number of routing table layers was fixed at four in
all test scenarios.
With r = 4, the routing table offers 4 ∗ 3 = 12 entries in total. The average filling
degree ¯¯x is close to the maximum filling degree maxx which is 75% equalling 9 filled
entries in all scenarios. This is actually the maximum possible degree with our
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distribution of IDs in the key space as defined in section 4.5.4. It causes the second
routing table layer to be completely empty as no nodes are in the sub-zones targeted
by this layer. Only three of the four layers can theoretically be filled. It is important
to note that this does not have a negative effect on the expected routing performance.
The second layer being empty means the routing cannot directly jump into the sub-
zones of this layer. Routing there would only be possible by going through the
current sub-zone. However, there are no nodes in these sub-zones so jumping there
is simply not needed. Target nodes are either in the current sub-zone or in another
top-level zone which could all be reached efficiently by using layer three and below or
the top layer. Thus, a filling degree of 75% actually means perfect O(log4n) routing
performance can be expected.
The average filling degree ¯¯x varies from 72.04% for the IAD25 scenario with 276
nodes on average to 73.88 for the IAD6 scenario with 1169 nodes on average. At the
same time the average standard deviation s¯x shrinks from 4.86% to 3.01%. Thus,
more nodes have a filling degree close to the average with increasing network size.
Both the average filling degree ¯¯x as well as the average standard deviation s¯x do not
fluctuate a lot among the different runs as can be seen from columns sx¯ and ssx .
The minimum filling degree minx is around 50% in most runs and does not vary
much among runs as shown in column sminx . With r = 4, the routing table is nearly
filled completely even in the small scenario with only 276 nodes. There are only a
few nodes deviating from this value and at least 50% of the tables are filled in all
except one scenario with a minimum degree of 41.67%. Due to the very good overall
filling degrees of routing tables, we can expect a O(log4n) routing performance.
We also performed the same evaluation on the top layer of the routing table to find
out how well disjoint paths routing will work. In seven out of 14 scenarios, the
average filling degree was 100%. The other seven scenarios had an average filling
degree between 99.83% and 99.99%. This means only a few nodes were not able to
fill their routing table completely in some of the runs.
Inspecting the cause of this, we discovered a limitation of the connection manage-
ment. In conjunction with a certain constellation of operations, it can lead to nodes
closing routing table connections leaving entries empty until they are refilled auto-
matically. This happens when node a opens a shortcut connection to node b and
b signals a it is not interested in the connection by sending a ConnectionInfo to a.
Then node c in the routing table of b fails and a is the best replacement for c. Then,
a is added to b’s routing table while a has still stored b does not need the connec-
tion. When a performs its shortcut maintenance and discovers it no longer needs the
164 Chapter 6 Evaluation
Table 6.8: Filling degree of the routing table for r = 9
IAD n¯ ¯¯x s¯x sx¯ ssx minx sminx maxx smaxx
6 1169 0.6957 0.0370 0.0021 0.0025 0.4688 0.0428 0.7500 0.0000
7 1015 0.6825 0.0375 0.0034 0.0023 0.5313 0.0257 0.7500 0.0000
8 893 0.6728 0.0395 0.0046 0.0020 0.5000 0.0211 0.7500 0.0000
9 788 0.6600 0.0415 0.0043 0.0020 0.5000 0.0211 0.7500 0.0000
10 707 0.6492 0.0432 0.0053 0.0042 0.5000 0.0151 0.7500 0.0132
11 639 0.6406 0.0446 0.0038 0.0024 0.5000 0.0151 0.7500 0.0151
12 593 0.6342 0.0444 0.0066 0.0026 0.4688 0.0147 0.7500 0.0151
13 546 0.6234 0.0435 0.0058 0.0023 0.4375 0.0221 0.7500 0.0099
14 507 0.6200 0.0454 0.0049 0.0037 0.4375 0.0264 0.7500 0.0177
15 465 0.6108 0.0439 0.0046 0.0046 0.4688 0.0151 0.7500 0.0198
17 409 0.5988 0.0434 0.0056 0.0043 0.4375 0.0257 0.7188 0.0198
18 384 0.5935 0.0421 0.0057 0.0033 0.4375 0.0198 0.7188 0.0147
20 346 0.5829 0.0431 0.0041 0.0041 0.4375 0.0198 0.7188 0.0231
25 276 0.5638 0.0412 0.0076 0.0059 0.4375 0.0161 0.6875 0.0295
shortcut to b, it will close the connection to b. When b notices the connection close,
it will start looking for a new routing table entry and it will rediscover a and add it
again. This time, a already removed the stored ConnectionInfo and the connection
will stay open.
To fix this, b needs to send out a positive ConnectionInfo leading to a removing the
stored negative interest of b. However, this would still leave a short time window
during which a could still close the connection while the positive ConnectionInfo is
in transit. Furthermore, it would increase the number of exchanged ConnectionInfos
considerably. Finally, this constellation becoming visible is due to our scenario. The
system runs with joining nodes causing shortcut connections being opened when
filling the routing tables and requesting their own areas. Then suddenly before the
end of the simulation the churn stops and the system runs idle for a minute which
happens to be close to the shortcut timeout. Thus, shortcut connections are closed
because no additional traffic is generated. In practice, shortcuts will be kept open
much longer because of the ongoing user traffic.
With r = 9, the routing table offers 4∗8 = 32 entries in total. The maximum possible
filling degree is again 75% equalling 24 filled entries because of the distribution of
IDs. With 1169 nodes on average in the IAD6 scenario, the average filling degree
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¯¯x is quite close to this theoretical maximum with 69.57%. With fewer nodes, the
routing table becomes more empty down to 56.38% in the IAD25 scenario with 276
nodes on average. However, this is still about 75% of the theoretically obtainable
maximum.
The average standard deviation of filling degrees s¯x is quite similar to r = 4 growing
from 3.7% at the IAD6 scenario to 4.12% at the IAD25 scenario. Fewer nodes
introduce more variation as the ID space is filled less uniformly. The standard
deviations of average node degrees sx¯ and standard deviations ssx are very low
showing the results to be consistent among the runs.
The minimum filling degree minx varies from 43.75% to 53.13% showing a trend to
rise with increasing node numbers. Against this trend, a filling degree of 46.88% is
realized at the scenario with most nodes. The considerably higher standard deviation
sminx of 4.28% in this scenario suggests there is just a single outlier run in this
scenario and the minimum node degree was higher in the other runs following the
trend. The maximum filling degree maxx of 75% is reached only for scenarios with
at least 465 nodes on average. For all runs in a scenario to reach that maximum
degree, there actually need to be at least 788 nodes on average as shown by the
standard deviation of maxima smaxx .
The strong correlation between the number of nodes and the average, minimum, and
maximum filling degree suggests the routing table maintenance mechanism reliably
fills routing tables to the possible extent. If an entry is empty, this is most likely
due to the fact that there is no node matching the entry constraints. The more
routing table entries are used for the same ID space, the tighter the constraint on
each entry become. With r = 9, the number of routing table entries is large enough
to decrease the average filling degree considerably for scenarios with a lower number
of nodes.
On the other hand, since the filling mechanism fills to the possible extend, the lower
filling degree may not actually have a negative impact on routing performance. The
entries that cannot be filled are in the lower layers with the tighter constraints. If
they are not filled, the node density is too low to fill them. If the node density is
low, a jump in the low layer bridging a certain ID space distance would just not
save hops compared to using the neighbourhood for routing. If the distances to
neighbours are as big as the distances to entries on a routing table layer, that layer
is just not needed to improve performance.
Although the filling degree is smaller, the routing performance with r = 9 would still
be better than with r = 4 since the routing performance is O(log9n). However, in
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Table 6.9: Filling degree of the routing table for r = 16
IAD n¯ ¯¯x s¯x sx¯ ssx minx sminx maxx smaxx
6 1169 0.4756 0.0509 0.0040 0.0023 0.3333 0.0105 0.6167 0.0136
7 1015 0.4652 0.0511 0.0034 0.0021 0.3167 0.0118 0.6167 0.0141
8 893 0.4541 0.0495 0.0032 0.0031 0.3167 0.0095 0.6000 0.0158
9 788 0.4424 0.0476 0.0028 0.0038 0.3167 0.0118 0.5833 0.0196
10 707 0.4343 0.0459 0.0039 0.0027 0.3000 0.0131 0.5833 0.0192
11 639 0.4246 0.0442 0.0050 0.0043 0.3000 0.0111 0.5500 0.0157
12 593 0.4186 0.0447 0.0042 0.0028 0.3000 0.0123 0.5500 0.0196
13 546 0.4126 0.0441 0.0050 0.0040 0.3000 0.0086 0.5667 0.0211
14 507 0.4072 0.0433 0.0047 0.0046 0.3000 0.0086 0.5333 0.0131
15 465 0.4018 0.0433 0.0075 0.0054 0.3000 0.0086 0.5500 0.0192
17 409 0.3899 0.0383 0.0048 0.0041 0.3000 0.0070 0.5167 0.0189
18 384 0.3854 0.0372 0.0044 0.0043 0.3000 0.0053 0.5333 0.0299
20 346 0.3784 0.0361 0.0048 0.0038 0.2833 0.0079 0.5167 0.0225
25 276 0.3634 0.0322 0.0042 0.0030 0.2833 0.0053 0.4833 0.0183
scenarios with low node numbers there will be a lot of wasted messages as redundant
RtRequests will be sent out and answered that will not fill an entry in the end.
For the top layer, results were similar to the results achieved with r = 4. The
top layer was nearly always filled completely. The rare exceptions can probably
be attributed to the connection management issue involving shortcuts explained
before.
Finally, with r = 16, a total of 4 ∗ 15 = 60 routing table entries are available to
be filled. The theoretical maximum filling degree is slightly higher than 75% as
the second routing table layer might contain up to three nodes at maximum. The
2x2 top left of the 4x4 entries in that layer cover the used part of the ID space.
One of these will be empty because it is the part covered by the lower layers. The
other three entries might be filled leading to a maximum filling degree of 80%. This
maximum filling degree is not even closely reached in any of the scenarios. The
maximum filling degree maxx grows from 48.33% to 61.67% as average network
sizes go from 276 nodes to 1169 nodes. Variation among runs is very small for the
maximum smaxx as well as the minimum filling degree sminx . The minimum filling
sminx degree varies between 28.33% and 33.33%, so there is not a lot of improvement
even if the average network size grows by a factor of more than four.
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Figure 6.4: Number of fourth layer entries in scenarios IAD6 and IAD25 with r = 9, r = 16
The average filling degree ¯¯x also only improves from 36.34% to 47.56% with values
being consistent among different runs. Surprisingly, the average standard deviation
s¯x actually grows as network sizes grow. This also happens consistently among the
runs. We assume the scenarios are still very far away from high filling degrees. Then,
small network sizes provide bad filling degrees for all nodes – with small variation.
Higher node numbers provide a better average filling degree ¯¯x but with a bigger
variation s¯x. We did not reach node numbers high enough to increase the average
node degree close to the maximum lowering the variation around the average.
The filling degree of the top layer was nearly always 100% as before for r = 4
and r = 9 and exceptions are most likely due to the same connection management
issue.
The replication factor r = 16 will provide the best routing performance with O(log16n).
The low filling degree can mostly be attributed to layer four which would not provide
increased performance compared to using the neighbourhood set for routing. This
can also be seen by comparing the distribution of the number of nodes for r = 9
and r = 16 in the IAD6 and the IAD25 scenario in figures 6.4.
With r = 9, on average 55% of all nodes have two or three out of eight filled entries
in the IAD25 scenario. Thus, the average number of filled entries is around 2.5
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contributing a filling share of 31.25%. In the same scenario with r = 16, the average
number of filled entries is about 0.3 out of 15 entries resulting in filling share of 2%.
In the IAD6 scenario, the average number of filled entries with r = 9 is about 6.5
resulting in a filling share of 81.25% on the fourth layer. With r = 16, there are only
about 1.4 filled entries resulting in an average filling share as low as 9%. Therefore,
using routing tables with r = 16 and three layers would probably be sufficient for
our network sizes and save maintenance messages. At the same time, using four
layers seems to be reasonable for larger network sizes and r = 9.
In a second set of test runs performed while evaluating the storage, we started
200, 400, 600, 800, and 1000 nodes with replication factors r = 4, 9, 16 with ten runs
each as described in section 6.4.1. Afterwards, we evaluated how many routing table
entries actually contained the nodes globally closest to an entry’s target position to
find out how well the passive filling updates the routing tables. Furthermore, we
counted how many entries fulfil our claim of being symmetric. The results are shown
in table 6.10.
With r = 4, 88% of all filled entries actually contain the node closest to the entry’s
target position. This value increases up to 97% with r = 16 and 200 nodes. As the
replication factor increases, RtRequest messages take more different paths to reach
a target position. Therefore, more nodes have a chance to passively update their
entry when new nodes join. For r = 9 and r = 16, the ratio decreases slightly with
rising node number. This seems to be connected to the number of nodes per zone,
which is highest with a low replication factor and a high total number of nodes. The
more nodes per zone, the more nodes have a chance to actually miss the RtRequest
message of the joining node passing through that zone they would have needed to
update the corresponding entry. Nevertheless, about 90% of filled entries actually
being closest means the passive filling works well enough considering no effort is
needed to regularly refresh routing table entries.
The percentage of symmetric entries is actually below our expectations. With r = 4,
only about 45% of entries are symmetric. This increases to around 56% with r = 9
and 57% with r = 16. It seems the chance for an entry to be symmetric are around
equal to the chance that another node next to the entry is the one referring to the
original node as shown in 4.15. However, the way the overlay is used by the storage
leads to shortcut connections being established so nodes contained in routing tables
still know the referring nodes.
6.3 Overlay Evaluation 169
Table 6.10: Symmetric entries and entries closest to target position averaged over ten test
runs
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200 4 1,718 788 0.46 1,503 0.87
400 4 3,507 1,556 0.44 3,076 0.88
600 4 5,303 2,330 0.44 4,656 0.88
800 4 7,111 3,160 0.44 6,236 0.88
1000 4 8,902 4,003 0.45 7,822 0.88
200 9 3,452 1,939 0.56 3,112 0.90
400 9 7,669 4,276 0.56 6,903 0.90
600 9 12,179 6,841 0.56 10,959 0.90
800 9 16,994 9,685 0.57 15,208 0.89
1000 9 21,861 12,476 0.57 19,512 0.89
200 16 4,183 2,284 0.55 4,075 0.97
400 16 9,372 5,287 0.56 8,962 0.96
600 16 15,173 8,621 0.57 14,303 0.94
800 16 21,383 12,269 0.57 19,924 0.93
1000 16 27,888 16,102 0.58 25,814 0.93
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6.3.3 Scalability
We wanted to find out whether the network maintenance mechanism allows scaling
the network to large sizes with a thousand nodes. This would be the case if the total
traffic in the network grew linearly with the network size. Then, the average traffic
per node would be constant and adding new nodes to the network would not increase
load on existing nodes. In addition to that, the load should be distributed evenly so
no single node has to process a considerably higher amount of traffic then the rest.
We were also interested in how the traffic is distributed between the messages for
the primary structure maintenance, the connection management, and the routing
table maintenance.
Total Traffic
Figure 6.5 shows the total traffic in the network on the link layer. We recorded the
size of every message sent on the link layer on every node and aggregated the sizes for
each run. Every point in the figure shows the total traffic and the number of nodes
that have been started in a run. Using linear regression, we fitted our measurements
to create linear functions. The results suggest the overlay maintenance is in fact
nearly perfectly scalable as the traffic grows linearly with the number of nodes that
have been in the network during the tests.
Bandwidth per Node
We validated this result by evaluating the average bandwidth per node as shown in
figure 6.6. To calculate the bandwidth, we recorded the upstream link layer traffic
on each node and averaged it over the node’s lifetime. The results show the average
bandwidth stays nearly constant or increases only very slightly as network sizes
increase. The load on each node is independent of the network size meaning the
network maintenance is scalable. Higher replication factors increase the consumed
bandwidth as expected. However, on average the required bandwidth is far away
from saturating even today’s DSL connections.
Figure 6.6 also shows some outliers where the bandwidth requirements are consid-
erably higher than on the other runs of the same scenario. The outliers occur on
identical run settings for r = 4, 9, 16. At the same time, the total traffic in figure 6.5
does not show any outliers. This means these outliers must be due to short life-
times leading to increased bandwidth. The settings of these runs probably caused
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Figure 6.6: Average bandwidth per node depending on the number of started nodes
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some nodes to leave right after joining still performing the expensive join procedure.
The much higher bandwidth on these nodes caused the heavy bias on the average
bandwidths.
Distribution of Message Types
Whenever the overlay forwarded a message to another node, we recorded the type
and the size of the message payload. We aggregated this information over all nodes
for each run and then averaged the frequencies of the resulting frequency distribu-
tions. Figure 6.7 shows the absolute numbers and shares of each message type on
the total payload traffic for the scenario IAD6 and r = 4. The column Payload
Traffic considers only pure payload sizes as they could be recorded on the overlay
layer. The link layer is payload agnostic so recording traffic there does not allow
to differentiate between different payload types. The column Messages shows the
share of the total number of messages for each message type. The column Gross
Traffic estimates the real traffic on the link layer by adding the size of the header
information to each recorded payload. Figure 6.8 shows the same information for
r = 9 and figure 6.9 shows it for r = 16.
For r = 4, the net payload traffic sums up to 0.9 GByte. The majority of data
are NetworkViews for the Delaunay structure maintenance and RtRequests for the
routing table maintenance each accounting for around 42% of the net traffic. Con-
nection management messages and RtResponses each make up another 7% of the
traffic while JoinRequests represent only 2% of the payload traffic. Considering the
number of messages, RtRequests nearly make up two thirds of all messages and
the number of RtResponses and ConnectionInfos is around equal to the number of
NetworkViews. The NetworkView and RtRequest shares of net traffic being equal
is due to the much larger size of NetworkViews. This also explains the increase in
shares of RtRequests, RtResponses, ConnectionInfos, and JoinRequests in the gross
traffic column. The additional header information has more effect on small mes-
sages, resulting in 1.25 GByte gross traffic. In total, the routing table maintenance
accounts for half of the gross traffic for r = 4.
With r = 9, net traffic increases significantly to 2.8 GByte while gross traffic grows
even more to 4.3 GByte. The larger difference can be explained by the small mes-
sages of routing table maintenance making up for the vast majority messages and
traffic. The number of NetworkViews stays the same while the number of routing
table maintenance messages grows to make up 90% of the total number of messages.
The number of ConnectionInfos also grows but not as strong as RtRequests and
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RtResponses so its relative share still shrinks. ConnectionInfos are sent out before
connections are closed so its number is related to the number of connections growing
linearly with the routing table size. The number of RtRequests and RtResponses
grows proportionally to the square of the routing table size due to the r redundant
request paths for each entry.
Therefore, routing table maintenance completely dominates messages and traffic for
r = 16. It makes up 90% of the gross traffic and 95% of the number of messages.
Due to the majority of messages being very small, the difference between net traffic
and gross traffic is even bigger with net traffic accounting for 6.3 GByte in total
and gross traffic accounting for 10.5 GByte. This number is still smaller than the
ca. 12 GByte total traffic that have been recorded in the IAD6 scenario shown in
figure 6.5. This difference can be explained considering connection establishment,
certificate exchange, and disconnection messages that are also part of the total
traffic.
6.3.4 Resilience
To be resilient against attackers, the overlay must not allow malicious nodes to
occupy a more than proportional share in the routing state of honest nodes. There-
fore, we used test scenarios including malicious nodes and evaluated how often these
nodes occur in other nodes’ neighbourhood sets and routing tables.
Scenario Setup
Malicious nodes will not just randomly join the network and tamper with the routing
of messages. They will act in a coordinated way and try to create a worst-case
scenario for the overlay. Their chances to gain influence are best when the number of
nodes in the network is still very low and the network is growing. A certain minimum
number of honest nodes are necessary to start up the overlay. Otherwise malicious
node could just eclipse every joining node. Therefore, we assume an attacker will
let his malicious nodes join directly after the minimum amount of honest nodes are
in the network and it got opened to other nodes. Then, the malicious nodes join
and try to obtain more influence.
In our test scenarios, we first started up 100 honest nodes and then 5, 10, 20, and 30
malicious nodes. The share of malicious nodes after the last malicious node joined is
4.8%, 9.1%, 16.7%, and 23.1%, respectively. Controlling 30 malicious nodes paying
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for 30 identities is actually quite an effort for an attacker. However, in a second
set of test scenarios we started 200 honest nodes and afterwards 10, 20, 40, and 60
malicious nodes, increasing the attacker power and honest nodes numbers to obtain
the same ratio of honest to malicious nodes. By increasing the minimum number of
honest nodes, the resulting share of malicious nodes can always be toned down at
the price of having to supply more honest nodes initially. Once the network contains
thousands of nodes, an attacker will have a much harder time trying to increase his
influence.
We used the IAD6 scenario to let the network grow to around 1200 nodes and
performed ten test runs with the replication factors r = 4, 9, 16 totalling 240 runs.
The test runs were exactly the same as in the reliability and scalability tests so
nodes will join and leave at exactly the same time with one exception. Malicious
nodes will not leave the network as the attacker will try to keep any influence he
already gained.
Malicious Node Behaviour
A malicious node can show any kind of malicious behaviour. However, we have to
define how the malicious node acts taking the countermeasures in place into ac-
count. Depending on the countermeasures, the malicious behaviour can be grouped
into multiple categories. First, there is misbehaviour where countermeasures are
targeted at making its success very unlikely, effectively preventing it. This is gener-
ally achieved using redundancy. Wrong routing of messages is an example for this
kind of behaviour as we use redundant paths to compensate for wrong routing but
do not try to detect it.
Second, there is misbehaviour that can only be detected and punished. If it is easy
to detect and punish because proof of misbehaviour can be presented to the CA,
malicious nodes will not show this behaviour if they cannot gain much advantage
from doing it. An example for this is sending out NetworkViews with nodes currently
not in the network to destabilize other nodes. Therefore, we do not include this type
of malicious behaviour in the evaluation.
If detection and punishment only work by raising disputes at the CA using so-
phisticated detection algorithms with certain thresholds to identify malicious nodes,
implementing this kind of malicious behaviour in the evaluation will not create much
insight because it is just an arms race. If the malicious nodes know the thresholds
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and the detection algorithms, they can always stay just below the thresholds to re-
main undetected. Instead of reporting how many malicious nodes have been caught
and excluded, the thresholds will just permit tampering a certain number of times
before punishment occurs.
Sending out wrong NetworkViews suppressing neighbours is an example for this kind
of malicious behaviour. When to use this attack is actually very hard to decide. It is
only useful when messages do not directly pass malicious nodes but when receiving
the message can be delayed by destabilizing the receiver. The attacker needs to know
or predict the flow of messages passing nodes not under his control. Considering the
fact that an attacker can only slightly increase its influence at a considerable risk
compared to just tampering with message routing and the difficulties in modelling
the attacker behaviour, we also did not include this type of attack.
Finally, we also did not implement attacks like eclipsing that can only really succeed
if all nodes received from the bootstrapper are malicious due to the countermeasures
in place. We only counted the number of malicious nodes received from the boot-
strapping service and regarded a node that received malicious nodes only as being
eclipsed.
We only included attacks that are dealt with using redundancy: attacks on routing
tables. Since no detection and punishment takes place for this kind of attack, we
assume malicious nodes very aggressively answer every RtRequest message coming
their way with an RtResponse themselves and do not forward the RtRequest. This
way, they try to increase their share in routing tables to the maximum.
Routing Table Shares of Malicious Nodes
In the test scenarios, a group of malicious nodes joins the overlay after a minimum
number of honest nodes have joined. At this time, the malicious nodes have the
highest share of nodes in the network. The network continues to grow with honest
nodes joining and leaving and the share of malicious nodes shrinks. This should be
reflected in the share of malicious nodes in the routing tables. Ideally, it should also
shrink and be as low as the total share of malicious nodes in the network.
Table 6.11 shows the shares of malicious nodes in the routing tables of honest nodes
aggregated over all runs for a given scenario. The first column identifies the number
of honest (H) nodes that were started first followed by the number of malicious
nodes (M). The second column m/n¯ shows the average share of malicious nodes in
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Table 6.11: Share of malicious nodes in routing tables
Scen. m/n¯ r ¯¯x s¯x sx¯ ssx maxx maxx smaxx
H100 0.0043 4 0.0045 0.0218 0.0019 0.0045 0.2222 0.1466 0.0409
M5 9 0.0045 0.0139 0.0012 0.0019 0.1364 0.0946 0.0208
16 0.0043 0.0119 0.0011 0.0014 0.0909 0.0750 0.0074
H100 0.0085 4 0.0082 0.0294 0.0026 0.0049 0.2500 0.2198 0.0294
M10 9 0.0096 0.0208 0.0020 0.0024 0.1818 0.1333 0.0320
16 0.0087 0.0168 0.0016 0.0016 0.1200 0.0914 0.0152
H200 0.0085 4 0.0093 0.0317 0.0033 0.0056 0.3333 0.2264 0.0499
M10 9 0.0094 0.0202 0.0016 0.0019 0.1429 0.1166 0.0190
16 0.0086 0.0174 0.0012 0.0015 0.1379 0.1053 0.0185
H100 0.0168 4 0.0172 0.0431 0.0044 0.0057 0.5556 0.2851 0.1138
M20 9 0.0181 0.0283 0.0023 0.0022 0.1818 0.1618 0.0216
16 0.0172 0.0240 0.0017 0.0013 0.1600 0.1267 0.0184
H200 0.0168 4 0.0210 0.0476 0.0036 0.0035 0.3333 0.2861 0.0508
M20 9 0.0178 0.0274 0.0022 0.0014 0.2105 0.1558 0.0256
16 0.0172 0.0242 0.0012 0.0014 0.2069 0.1373 0.0278
H100 0.0250 4 0.0274 0.0547 0.0028 0.0024 0.5000 0.3486 0.0770
M30 9 0.0273 0.0342 0.0024 0.0013 0.2273 0.1973 0.0181
16 0.0261 0.0291 0.0027 0.0015 0.2400 0.1560 0.0341
H200 0.0331 4 0.0418 0.0672 0.0066 0.0055 0.5556 0.3722 0.0830
M40 9 0.0354 0.0392 0.0028 0.0018 0.3000 0.2287 0.0324
16 0.0341 0.0343 0.0019 0.0025 0.2308 0.1820 0.0263
H200 0.0489 4 0.0600 0.0804 0.0079 0.0047 0.5556 0.4472 0.0695
M60 9 0.0515 0.0466 0.0041 0.0014 0.3000 0.2598 0.0256
16 0.0500 0.0413 0.0033 0.0026 0.2500 0.2126 0.0196
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the network. The replication factor r used in a test scenario is given in the third
column.
The average share of malicious nodes in the routing tables in column ¯¯x is very close
to the share of malicious nodes m/n¯ in the network throughout all scenarios. Even
a replication factor of r = 4 is sufficient to keep the 6% average share of malicious
nodes in routing tables in the scenario with 60 malicious nodes just slightly above
the 4.89% share of malicious nodes in the network. With r = 9 and r = 16, the
shares get even closer to that value with 5.15% and 5%. Increasing the replication
factor yields closer results in all scenarios with at least 20 malicious nodes. The
more nodes are malicious, the more likely they can tamper successfully. Increasing
redundancy to prevent this has a visible effect only when there are enough malicious
nodes.
Higher replication factors also lead to the standard deviation of malicious nodes’
share to decrease as shown in column s¯x. Not only the average share shrinks, there
is also less variation around the average and nodes more consistently reach a lower
share as can be seen in column s¯x. Columns sx¯ and ssx show there is only very low
variation of average shares and standard deviations among the different runs.
The maximum share of malicious nodes in a honest node’s routing table is shown in
column maxx. It is the most interesting value because it decides whether the nodes
that are off worst still have an honest majority in their routing tables increasing
their chances to execute queries successfully. With r = 4, there are four scenarios
where at least one node has half or even more than a half of the entries occupied
by malicious nodes. These nodes will have difficulties executing storage operations.
With higher replication factors, the maximum value stays below the 50% threshold
in all scenarios. The same dropping of malicious nodes’ shares can be seen in the
average of maxima maxx among the runs. Going from r = 4 to r = 9 reduces the
maximum malicious node share by around 40% across the board. Increasing r to
r = 16 provides a smaller improvement. The standard deviation of maximum shares
among the runs smaxx also drops considerably as r is increased from r = 4 to r = 16
meaning for high replication factors the maximum share is pretty much identically
low on all runs.
Table 6.12 shows the shares of malicious nodes on the top layer of routing table in
the same test runs. This layer is especially interesting because it decides whether a
node can successfully start disjoint routing paths. The results are very similar to the
results over the whole routing table with one exception: the maximum share maxx
is considerably higher especially for the low replication factor r = 4. In scenarios
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Table 6.12: Share of malicious nodes in top layer of routing tables
Scen. m/n¯ r ¯¯x s¯x sx¯ ssx maxx maxx smaxx
H100 0.0043 4 0.0045 0.0384 0.0012 0.0055 0.6667 0.3667 0.1054
M5 9 0.0045 0.0233 0.0010 0.0024 0.2500 0.1375 0.0395
16 0.0041 0.0161 0.0012 0.0020 0.1333 0.0867 0.0322
H100 0.0085 4 0.0090 0.0539 0.0028 0.0079 0.6667 0.4000 0.1405
M10 9 0.0097 0.0343 0.0022 0.0041 0.2500 0.2000 0.0645
16 0.0085 0.0231 0.0021 0.0028 0.1333 0.1267 0.0211
H200 0.0085 4 0.0094 0.0549 0.0019 0.0056 0.3333 0.3333 0.0000
M10 9 0.0085 0.0320 0.0018 0.0038 0.3750 0.2000 0.0874
16 0.0086 0.0236 0.0015 0.0019 0.2000 0.1200 0.0422
H100 0.0168 4 0.0177 0.0763 0.0035 0.0081 1.0000 0.5667 0.2250
M20 9 0.0174 0.0456 0.0035 0.0051 0.3750 0.2500 0.0833
16 0.0171 0.0333 0.0011 0.0025 0.2667 0.1733 0.0466
H200 0.0168 4 0.0179 0.0773 0.0018 0.0039 1.0000 0.6000 0.2108
M20 9 0.0156 0.0434 0.0026 0.0032 0.3750 0.3000 0.0645
16 0.0171 0.0333 0.0011 0.0025 0.2667 0.1733 0.0466
H100 0.0250 4 0.0274 0.0958 0.0040 0.0075 1.0000 0.7667 0.1610
M30 9 0.0258 0.0558 0.0038 0.0043 0.3750 0.3125 0.0659
16 0.0257 0.0396 0.0043 0.0036 0.2000 0.1867 0.0281
H200 0.0331 4 0.0356 0.1088 0.0027 0.0051 1.0000 0.7667 0.1610
M40 9 0.0322 0.0623 0.0036 0.0034 0.5000 0.3500 0.0791
16 0.0337 0.0473 0.0016 0.0049 0.3333 0.2333 0.0471
H200 0.0489 4 0.0523 0.1303 0.0041 0.0057 1.0000 0.8333 0.1757
M60 9 0.0473 0.0745 0.0052 0.0043 0.5000 0.3875 0.0395
16 0.0492 0.0565 0.0030 0.0045 0.3333 0.2600 0.0492
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with at least 20 nodes, it goes up to 100% for r = 4 so there are nodes with their top
layer completely filled with malicious nodes. They will not be able to execute any
queries successfully. The average of the maxima maxx is also considerably higher
than 50% in all scenarios with at least 20 malicious nodes. This situation improves
with r = 9 and r = 16. Then, the average of maximum node shares maxx is always
below 50%. However, with at least 40 malicious nodes the malicious node share also
goes up to 50% with r = 9. With r = 16 the maximum is 33%.
The higher share on the top layer compared to the whole routing table is due to the
fact that the top layer is easier to tamper with as it does not put tight constraints
on the entries. If malicious nodes intercept the RtRequest on a lower layer, they
might respond to it but do not end up in the routing table as they do not fulfil the
tighter lower level constraint. On the top layer, they will be added if they are in the
correct zone. For the same number of malicious nodes, getting a large share becomes
harder if the size of the top layer grows with increasing r. Therefore, r = 16 and
for a reduced number of malicious nodes r = 9 contain their influence and also keep
the maximum share down at levels allowing successful sending of messages into the
majority of zones.
Eclipsing of Joining Nodes
Since nodes request their own areas after joining, the nodes in other replication
zones will notice this area is not correct and the node was eclipsed as discussed in
section 5.5. Therefore, eclipsing of joining nodes is only possible if the bootstrapping
service happens to supply only malicious nodes or nodes that have already been
eclipsed.
This can happen if there are malicious nodes in all zones and the bootstrapping
service picks them. The probability for this to happen depends on the number
of zones equalling the replication factor r. In all of our 240 test runs this only
happened one time in one run of the scenario with r = 4 and 60 malicious nodes
being started after 200 honest nodes. It never happened in any run with r = 9 and
r = 16. Considering the fact a node can always bootstrap again if it suspects it was
eclipsed, eclipsing does not seem to be a big danger if the bootstrapper service itself
does not return a higher than proportional share of malicious nodes.
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6.3.5 Discussion
Using a self-stabilizing algorithm, our overlay is able to reliably maintain its primary
Delaunay graph structure as nodes join and leave the network ungracefully. It also
fills its routing tables reliably and maintains them under node churn. Thus, using the
routing table, the storage can store and retrieve data on disjoints paths replicating
data to the different zones.
We have shown the maintenance to be scalable. The total traffic grows linearly
with the number of nodes in the network while the consumed bandwidth per node
remains constant. Higher replication factors increase the traffic only by a constant
factor. However, this factor depends on the square of the replication factor due
to the redundant messages to fill one routing table entry. With high replication
factors, the routing table maintenance makes up the vast majority of messages and
traffic. The routing table maintenance mainly employs multi-hop unicast messages
using them to look for entries. Therefore, we can expect multi-hop communication
of unicast user messages to be scalable as well.
Finally, the overlay is also resilient to attackers controlling a certain share of mali-
cious nodes if they are not part of the network when first starting it. Nodes tem-
porarily destabilizing the primary overlay structure can be detected and punished.
Eclipsing of nodes is very unlikely to happen, especially with higher replication fac-
tors. The redundant paths of the routing table maintenance successfully contain
the influence of malicious nodes. Their average share on all routing tables is pro-
portional to their share in the network, even if they had a much higher share at
some point. Higher replication factors actually ensure there are no honest nodes
with more than half of their routing tables being occupied by malicious nodes.
Thus, the overlay has the necessary properties for the storage to be reliable, scalable,
and resilient as shown in the next section.
6.4 Storage Evaluation
This sections presents our results evaluating the storage. First, we describe the
scenarios the storage was tested with. Then, we show reliability and scalability
results without the presence of malicious nodes. After describing the behaviour of
malicious nodes, we also show how many of these nodes can be tolerated by the
storage depending on total number of nodes and the chosen replication factor.
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6.4.1 Storage Test Scenarios
We tested the storage with different numbers of nodes. Instead of slowly increasing
node count by setting churn parameters accordingly, we used a ten minute setup
phase at the beginning of each test scenario starting the desired number of nodes
at random points within this phase. When this phase is finished, normal churn
kicks in targeted at keeping the number of nodes in the network constant. We
used test scenarios starting up 200, 400, 600, 800, and 1000 nodes in the range of
World of Warcraft player numbers reported in [97]. To keep these numbers roughly
constant, we used inter-arrival distributions with expected values of 25, 17, 11, 9,
and 7 seconds, respectively. Again, we used replication factors r = 4, 9, 16 to test
the storage with varying levels of redundancy.
When this phase is finished, there is a small delay of three minutes until all nodes
create the initial state of the world and start the update process. We used an initial
assumed maximum latency lmax of two seconds, leading to an update interval length
of ten seconds with timeouts of four seconds for player retrieves and six seconds for
area retrieves. When these ten seconds have passed, all player characters of nodes
in the network will activate and player characters will start to generate actions. We
assume a maximum interaction propagation speed of six meters per second and a
maximum interaction range of 40 meters. Therefore, the radius of the update area
is 100 m larger than the radius of the maintenance area of each node.
In addition to the update process, every node requests the area of interest around its
player character once per update interval representing the way the storage is used
to check the correct state in the world. We used an AOI radius of 100 m, which is
probably even bigger than the AOI used in most current MMORPGs. However, this
larger area allows a node to circumvent the disadvantage of the storage to return
state only for the specific update times.
It can use the storage to retrieve all player actions within the requested large AOI.
Using these actions, a node can perform the same update calculation as the storage
to calculate the current state in a sub-area of the AOI based on the old state of a
larger area and all actions of players in that area. This way, a node can check states
also for intermediate times not covered by the storage. The AOI is always retrieved
two seconds after the update process started retrieving the update area. This way,
most update area retrievals should already have finished but nodes will not have
completed retrieving player actions so the partial answers to the AOI queries should
have the same world time.
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To thoroughly test the storage, it would be desirable to have tests run over days
and weeks. Unfortunately, this is infeasible because of the high amount of messages
that will be transferred and have to be processed by the network simulator. In the
biggest scenario with 1000 nodes and r = 16, only simulating one minute of the
update process takes nearly six hours and consumes 20 GByte of RAM on our test
server. This severely limited the amount of time we could simulate the storage.
Instead of simulating a few longer runs, we decided to test many very short runs.
Once the update process started and shortcuts are set up, there will not be much
variation in the results obtained on each update because the same queries will be
issued. There are only a few factors causing variation. First, different message
latencies might cause queries from zones being late that arrived in time in former
updates which may lead to different query results. Second, nodes joining and leaving
may cause data loss and changes in the layout of the network leading to some of
the queries being handled by different nodes. Third, movement of player characters
causes nodes to request the actions of different player characters. All of these changes
only happen slowly over the expensive simulation time. Therefore, using short runs
with completely different setups is more suitable to evaluate the storage in a variety
of situations.
The update process runs for only one minute executing six updates. During the
last two intervals, node churn is deactivated so the storage has the chance to repair
any loss of data that occurred and we can check whether all data is consistent and
available at the end. Finally, the system runs idle for one minute to make sure all
late messages also arrived.
Stored Data
Our virtual world consists of objects making up the state of the world. Every object
has a GUID identifier, a name, and a position. There are two types of objects in our
world: player characters and non-player characters. An NPC only has movement
and rotation vectors, current health, and AI state in addition to the basic fields.
Therefore, an NPC has a data size of 158 bytes. We used a density of 1000 NPCs
per km2 resulting in a total of 44890 NPCs in our 44,89 km2 world. The total data
size of NPCs was 6,76 MBytes.
Storing player characters takes considerably more space. Player characters have a
big inventory of items each of which might optionally be enhanced. Character pro-
gression through quests in the world also needs to be stored. Player progression was
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picked at random with new player characters with small state consuming 374 bytes
and the biggest player characters consuming 12,24 KBytes. We stored 5000 player
characters matching the maximum number of node IDs in the key space totalling in
an estimated 30,8 MByte amount of player character data. The actions generated
by player characters contain data like GUID of the creating player character, time,
and type of action resulting in a data size of only 30 bytes.
Modelling Player Behaviour
Player characters and non-player characters are not stored at static positions. They
move through the virtual world. They are not randomly distributed in the virtual
world and their movement is not random as well [97]. Instead, players typically
move between locations performing specific activities while non-player characters
typically move in the area of a home location waiting for player characters to attack.
Therefore, we need a model to describe the locations of player characters and non-
player characters so objects move around in the world more realistically.
Unfortunately, traces of real player movement and interaction are not publicly avail-
able since commercial providers usually do not disclose this information. There are
studies of player mobility using in-world facilities to locate players like [97] studying
World of Warcraft or [86] and [118] studying Second Life. However, the provided
information is either too coarse-grained [97, 118], containing only the current world
zone players are located in, or the recorded player traces are not available [86].
Therefore, we developed a simple model to describe player behaviour and movement.
This model is based on findings in [86] and also inspired by our own observations.
We assume there are a number of points of interest where players go, for example
to solve quests they have been given. We placed 100 of these points at random
locations in the world. Initially, 50% of all players are placed at random locations
within a 50 m radius around a randomly picked point of interest. The remaining
50% were placed at random positions in the world. Active player characters can
choose to follow three types of activities: being idle and not performing any actions,
moving to a point of interest, and interacting at the point of interest.
Whenever an active player character has no activity to follow, he picks one of the
three at random with probability 10%, 50%, and 40%, respectively. If he picks
idling, he will stay in the same location for 10 minutes and will not generate any
actions. If he picks moving, he will pick one of the 10 nearest points of interest at
random and move there at a speed of 6 m/s until he arrived within a 50 m radius
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circle around this point. During this time he will generate a new action every 1
to 5 seconds representing the low interaction frequency that is necessary when just
moving. After arriving at the point of interest, the player character picks a new
activity. If he picks to stay there and interact with the point of interest, he will
randomly move within the 50 m circle for five minutes before picking a new activity.
During that time he generates a new action every 300 to 1000 ms, representing the
high interaction frequency while fighting.
Of the 44890 NPCs, one third were placed around points of interest. The other two
thirds were placed at random locations in the world. NPCs then randomly wander
around within a 40 m radius around their home location at a speed of 4 m/s.
This model creates a more realistic scenario for data to move around the world.
Players may aggregate at points of interest creating hotspots challenging for the
storage.
6.4.2 Reliability
To evaluate the reliability of the storage, we tested 10 runs of each scenario described
in section 6.4.1 ranging from 200 to 1000 nodes. Combining these scenarios with the
replication factors r = 4, 9, 16 results in 150 test runs. We first analysed the data
stored at the nodes at the end of each run, to find out whether the storage stores
the data reliably without losing it or creating inconsistencies. Afterwards, we also
analysed the results of the queries recorded while the storage was running to find
out how reliably the storage was able to return requested data.
Stored Data Evaluation
According to our test scenario, the storage should store 5000 player characters –
some of which are active while the majority is inactive – and 44890 NPCs totalling
49890 stored objects plus any actions of players that have been generated and stored.
Table 6.13 shows the amount of stored objects in all scenarios averaged over the ten
runs in the third column o. The total number of replicas is shown in column or
allowing to calculate the effective replication factor reff which is higher than r due
to the replicas of dynamic objects in areas overlapped by the maintenance areas of
multiple neighbours. Column dr contains the size of all stored replicas in MByte.
Finally, the column NPC contains the number of stored NPCs while NPCr contains
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Table 6.13: Average numbers for data stored at the end of all test scenarios
n r o or reff dr NPC NPCr r
NPC
eff
200 4 52,814 387,533 7.34 192.39 44,890 354,863 7.91
400 4 55,631 403,813 7.26 198.40 44,890 359,099 8.00
600 4 58,550 415,162 7.09 203.74 44,890 357,955 7.97
800 4 61,466 426,432 6.94 209.07 44,890 356,755 7.95
1000 4 64,392 438,479 6.81 214.55 44,890 356,264 7.94
200 9 52,825 846,261 16.02 426.49 44,890 772,834 17.22
400 9 55,747 896,682 16.08 442.71 44,890 795,131 17.71
600 9 58,606 920,584 15.71 454.01 44,890 791,547 17.63
800 9 61,499 949,782 15.44 466.75 44,890 792,873 17.66
1000 9 64,183 975,538 15.20 479.12 44,890 792,606 17.66
200 16 53,714 1,406,164 26.18 738.09 44,782 1,275,372 28.48
400 16 55,655 1,564,039 28.10 780.22 44,890 1,385,291 30.86
600 16 58,617 1,640,387 27.98 807.79 44,886 1,410,712 31.43
800 16 61,525 1,684,521 27.38 828.63 44,890 1,405,178 31.30
1000 16 64,287 1,722,009 26.79 847.67 44,890 1,395,413 31.09
the number of NPC replicas, allowing to calculate the effective replication factor
rNPCeff of dynamic objects in the world.
The number of stored objects o grows with the number of nodes independent of the
replication factor. Although the objects in the world are the same in all scenarios, the
number of generated and stored actions increases with the number of nodes. The size
of stored replicas scales with the number of stored objects o and the replication factor
r. The effective replication factor reff is nearly twice as high as r but decreases with
increasing node numbers. Higher node numbers increase the number and relative
share of stored actions that are not stored redundantly in overlapping maintenance
areas. This can also be seen considering rNPCeff being close to twice as high as r
throughout all scenarios. On average, all dynamic objects are stored at two nodes
in each of the replication zones, adding additional redundancy to prevent data loss
and tampering with data. In two scenarios with r = 16, the number of stored NPCs
did not equal 44890 meaning the storage lost data.
Throughout all of our runs with r = 4 and r = 9, replicas for all objects existed
and no object was missing any of the r replicas. This was different in the runs with
r = 16 as shown in table 6.14. There, three of ten runs in the scenario with 200
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Table 6.14: Number of lost objects with r = 16
n R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
200 1 0 0 0 938 143 0 0 0 0
400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
600 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 0 0
800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6.15: Number of objects missing replicas in at least one of r = 16 replication zones
n R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
200 25091 6158 21652 3342 7508 13693 30856 8600 13952 14094
400 212 0 0 743 1 0 0 553 521 1361
600 543 0 0 84 0 0 0 0 0 0
800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
nodes and two of ten runs in the scenario with 600 nodes lost all replicas for objects
that should be in the world.
Looking at the number of objects that should be in the world but are missing replicas
in at least one of the 16 replication zones shown in table 6.15, all runs with 200
nodes, five out of ten runs with 400 nodes, and two out of ten runs with 600 nodes
are missing replicas. With 800 or 1000 nodes, no replicas are missing, showing a clear
trend that the storage is more reliable with more nodes in the network. However,
there were no missing replicas with r = 4 and r = 9, even in the scenarios with
200 or 400 nodes. A higher replication factor leading to less reliability might seem
counterintuitive. However, we used the same world so the same amount of stored
data in all scenarios. In scenarios with fewer nodes, each node is responsible for
storing more data. Further increasing the replication factor increases the amount
of data each node is responsible for. Since each node periodically refreshes its data
during the update process, the load on each might increase up to the point where
its available bandwidth is too small to answer the queries of other nodes in time and
to retrieve the state it needs to update its own area.
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Table 6.16: Number of nodes with an incorrect state
n R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
200 196 195 199 200 201 197 194 199 197 198
400 398 0 348 400 385 0 397 366 317 403
600 418 0 458 548 0 444 399 132 244 466
800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
This can also be seen in table 6.16 showing the number of nodes not containing
the correct state for an object, either because the state it retrieved during the
update was already incorrect or because it was not able to retrieve all actions of
a player character in its update area, consequently not being able to update the
state correctly. In the runs with 200 nodes, virtually all nodes do not contain the
correct state. The actual number of nodes at the end of each run is different as the
number of joining and leaving nodes during the run is different. In the runs with
400 nodes, all except two runs had nodes with incorrect state and of the remaining
runs most had the vast majority of nodes contain and incorrect state. The runs
without incorrect states (R2, R6) also did not have any missing replicas and no lost
data before so these runs worked completely correct. With 600 nodes, all except two
runs had incorrect state but in these runs the number of affected node varied. This
improving trend continued since no node contained incorrect state with 800 and
1000 nodes. Again, no runs with r = 4 and r = 9 contained objects with incorrect
state.
We conclude the storage to store its data reliably. Even a replication factor r = 4 is
sufficient to not lose data up to network sizes of 1000 nodes and the corresponding
churn to keep the number of nodes stable. One reason for this is probably that just
one zone not losing data allows other zones to recover its data. So even if three of
four zones have nodes joining and leaving losing data, they will be able to recover
it on the next update. However, the storage stores data reliably only with enough
available bandwidth. Since it loses data with 200 or 400 nodes with r = 16 having
a symmetric bandwidth of 100 MBit/s, the bandwidth requirements are quite high.
We will further analyse the bandwidth consumption in section 6.4.3.
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Query Evaluation
Table 6.17 shows the average numbers of queries performed by the storage after the
update process has started, leaving out any queries performed while the network was
building up. The total number of queries increases with the number of nodes and
with the replication factor. The vast majority of queries are the retrievals of player
actions, increasing with node numbers and replication factor. The numbers of all
other types of queries only depend on the number of nodes. Scenarios with higher
node numbers have more churn causing more nodes to join and leave triggering the
respective queries. Similarly, the number of times nodes request their update area
during the update process and the number of times they request their area of interest
merely depends on the number of nodes and the number of update cycles. The only
type of retrieval increasing with the replication factor is the number of requested
player actions. A higher replication factor increases the responsibility areas of nodes
as fewer nodes cover the world area in each replication zone. More player characters
will be in the area retrieved for the update so more player actions will be retrieved
by each node.
Looking at the share of queries that returned the correct result, all scenarios with
r = 4 and r = 9 returned the correct result. Only the same scenarios with 200, 400,
and 600 nodes storing incorrect data also had queries with incorrect results as shown
in table 6.18. With 200 nodes, between 18% and 43% of player action retrievals did
not return the correct result, either because the retrieval itself was late in all zones
or because the storing of player actions did not finish in time in enough zones. The
incorrect player actions caused more than 60% of update area and area of interest
retrievals to return incorrect data. Node join and departure caused retrievals with
incorrect results but since only a few nodes failed and joined the share of incorrect
retrievals fluctuates a lot. The share of player action retrievals with incorrect results
decreased down to less than 1% as node numbers increase to 600. However, the
number of incorrect AOI and update area retrievals does not decrease accordingly.
Even only very few action retrievals returning incorrect results cause many updated
states to be incorrect leading to state retrievals returning incorrect results.
The durations of the different query types are shown in table 6.19. In each run,
we recorded the duration of each query and calculated the median instead of the
average which would be skewed by the timeout defining a maximum duration for
each query type. Afterwards we averaged the median over the runs of each scenario.
Retrieving player actions was the fastest type of query with a median of less than
100 ms far lower than the four second timeout for this query type. The duration
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Table 6.17: Average numbers of queries after update process start
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200 4 12,425 10,001 2 11 1,206 1,205
400 4 27,032 22,213 3 16 2,400 2,400
600 4 42,595 35,383 3 18 3,596 3,595
800 4 59,532 49,918 5 22 4,794 4,793
1000 4 77,445 65,421 7 32 5,993 5,992
200 9 22,708 20,287 2 9 1,205 1,205
400 9 48,881 44,063 3 16 2,400 2,400
600 9 76,246 69,034 3 19 3,595 3,595
800 9 105,955 96,339 5 24 4,794 4,793
1000 9 136,735 124,713 7 32 5,993 5,992
200 16 34,194 31,786 2 8 1,199 1,199
400 16 77,576 72,761 3 14 2,399 2,399
600 16 122,463 115,255 3 15 3,595 3,595
800 16 167,493 157,882 5 20 4,793 4,793
1000 16 213,836 201,814 7 26 5,994 5,994
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Table 6.18: Share of incorrect queries in runs with r = 16
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200 R1 0.0184 0.0000 0.0000 0.6516 0.5477
200 R2 0.0223 0.0000 0.0000 0.6616 0.6540
200 R3 0.0280 0.0000 0.0000 0.6578 0.6337
200 R4 0.0306 0.0000 0.0000 0.6473 0.5840
200 R5 0.0234 0.0000 0.0000 0.6631 0.6225
200 R6 0.0385 0.0000 0.0000 0.6497 0.6239
200 R7 0.0433 0.5000 0.1000 0.6377 0.6351
200 R8 0.0298 0.0000 0.0000 0.6590 0.6504
200 R9 0.0278 0.0000 0.0000 0.6536 0.6192
200 R10 0.0387 0.5000 0.0000 0.6550 0.6232
400 R1 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 0.5161 0.4017
400 R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
400 R3 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.3145 0.2042
400 R4 0.0056 0.0000 0.0000 0.5814 0.4769
400 R5 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.4265 0.2958
400 R6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
400 R7 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.4011 0.2741
400 R8 0.0041 0.0000 0.0000 0.3115 0.2031
400 R9 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 0.2775 0.1818
400 R10 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.4668 0.3470
600 R1 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.1727 0.0920
600 R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
600 R3 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.3200 0.2096
600 R4 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.3875 0.2487
600 R5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
600 R6 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.2499 0.1577
600 R7 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.2279 0.1333
600 R8 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0366 0.0183
600 R9 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.1039 0.0532
600 R10 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.2282 0.1563
194 Chapter 6 Evaluation
is independent of the number of nodes but increases slightly with higher replication
factors, due to the longer waiting for more than r/2 results from different zones to
return.
All the other queries are area queries with durations ordered by the expected size
of the requested area. The AOI and the area of failed neighbours are the smallest
areas with fastest area queries. Both retrieving the update area as well as retrieving
the own area when joining take considerably longer. Still, the median is far away
from the six second timeout used for area queries.
Interestingly, the duration of AOI retrievals, retrieving an area with constant size,
seems to increase slightly with the number of nodes for r = 4 and r = 9. This can be
explained by more nodes leading to longer paths. For r = 16, the duration actually
decreases with increasing node number which is a strong indication of bandwidth
saturation in the smaller scenarios.
All other queries scale proportionally with the replication factor and show the trend
of decreasing duration with increasing node numbers. This can be due to the sizes of
the requested areas shrinking with increasing node numbers as the Voronoi cells of
nodes determine the requested area size for all other types of area queries. A second
effect might be the higher available bandwidths as other queries also consume less
bandwidth. The strong effect bandwidth saturation has can be seen clearly in the
scenarios with 200 and 400 nodes with r = 16 with all durations being considerably
higher than in the other scenarios. We will analyse bandwidth consumption in more
detail in section 6.4.3.
We conclude the storage is able to answer queries reliably as long as bandwidth
requirements are met. Then, query durations are mostly shorter than timeouts
of the query types. However, as replication factors grow and node sizes decrease,
the available bandwidth becomes a limiting factor. This is especially true as most
queries retrieve player actions and not being able to retrieve the action of only one
player in time causes an incorrect state update. This incorrect state will be reported
to other zones on the next update and may finally cause the state to be incorrect in
the majority of zones.
6.4.3 Scalability
To find out how the storage scales with varying node numbers, we recorded the
total traffic generated and the consumed bandwidth at each node. We also recorded
the additional delay caused by up- and downstream capacity of the nodes being
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Table 6.19: Average of query duration medians in ms
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200 4 74.34 584.89 138.59 444.25 89.43
400 4 73.75 412.22 168.48 377.48 101.20
600 4 73.85 571.66 159.75 366.58 111.05
800 4 73.95 464.20 143.90 368.92 120.37
1000 4 74.18 482.52 134.53 374.88 129.62
200 9 108.36 824.91 210.90 1,488.63 149.09
400 9 97.77 580.74 155.27 1,028.70 112.65
600 9 93.62 473.34 164.72 856.37 118.80
800 9 91.81 482.71 131.65 788.64 127.90
1000 9 90.56 446.12 131.17 749.80 137.52
200 16 225.00 2,853.31 1,546.92 3,906.53 2,244.79
400 16 130.36 1,602.45 489.53 2,586.33 906.89
600 16 115.99 956.52 343.28 2,047.59 455.43
800 16 109.82 1,284.39 219.90 1,713.81 260.07
1000 16 106.18 644.33 241.10 1,548.78 202.97
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saturated to find out whether limited bandwidth already had an influence on message
latencies.
Furthermore, we wanted to know how evenly the load is distributed among the
nodes. We recorded the sizes of responsibility areas, the amount of data stored
at each node, the sizes of requested areas, and the data sizes of returned results.
We also evaluated how many nodes contributed to the result of a query for each
query type and how many hops messages of the different query types took. This
information allows us to characterize the traffic in the network with more detail and
to find potential bottlenecks
Total Traffic
The total amount of data transferred during the one minute the update algorithm
runs is shown in figure 6.10. The traffic increases linearly with the number of nodes
suggesting the storage to scale well with the number of nodes. Higher replication
factors lead to a higher absolute numbers and a higher slope, requiring the individual
nodes to handle more traffic.
However, the absolute numbers show the huge amounts of data to be transferred in
only one minute. Compared to the overlay maintenance traffic shown in section 6.3.3
transferring around 12 GByte over eight hours at maximum, the storage transfers
around 96 GByte within one minute with the same settings, equalling 45 TByte
over eight hours. In one update interval, 16 GByte are transferred. Considering the
total 848 MByte of stored replicas (see table 6.13) in that scenario, every piece of
data is transferred nearly 20 times on each update. The large amount of transferred
data consumes a considerable part of the bandwidth of nodes as we will show in the
next section.
Bandwidth per Node
Figure 6.11 shows the average amount of data transferred upstream per second on
each node. The consumed bandwidth actually decreases with rising node numbers,
making the storage appear to be perfectly scalable. However, the bandwidth only
decreases because the amount of data is largely independent of the number of nodes.
With more nodes, only a few more replicas of the active player characters and their
events have to be stored in addition. Therefore, with more nodes, each node is
responsible for maintaining less data causing less traffic on each node. However,
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Figure 6.10: Global link layer traffic depending on the number of initially started nodes
the network size cannot be scaled indefinitely because at some point the world itself
gets too small for many players and more objects have to be put into the world as
well.
Table 6.20 characterizes the distribution of bandwidth consumptions among the
nodes by averaging over all runs for each scenario. Considering the large deviations
of minimum minx and maximum maxx values from the average ¯¯x and median ¯˜x and
the standard deviation s¯x given, the distribution of load seems to be quite uneven
with some nodes having to transfer much more data than others. In the extreme case
with 200 nodes and r = 16, the 10 MByte/s maximum bandwidth is actually very
close to the 100 MBit/s channel capacity limit. Since the update process creates
bursty traffic pattern with most of the traffic occurring when nodes retrieve their
update areas, the channel on these nodes is overloaded most of the time as we will
show in the next section.
Channel Utilization
For every message sent and received on the link layer, we recorded the time the
message was delayed because the upstream or downstream channel was busy. We
calculated the average upstream and downstream delay for each node. To quantify
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Figure 6.11: Average bandwidth per node depending on the number of initially started
nodes
Table 6.20: Average values for bandwidth distribution characteristics
n r ¯¯x ¯˜x minx maxx s¯x
200 4 312,501 281,571 39,924 978,799 167,967
400 4 206,699 184,333 21,894 743,749 115,451
600 4 168,024 148,079 16,848 619,452 98,103
800 4 151,626 130,464 15,962 621,210 94,686
1000 4 142,510 120,135 13,686 623,968 94,200
200 9 1,402,574 1,282,548 207,646 4,326,873 746,766
400 9 900,363 822,925 97,234 2,978,757 484,893
600 9 706,211 639,285 63,156 2,520,191 379,140
800 9 619,602 562,754 68,448 2,313,356 339,014
1000 9 566,710 508,031 49,217 2,164,834 312,033
200 16 4,021,989 3,740,941 474,121 10,566,974 2,048,416
400 16 2,610,491 2,357,034 263,269 8,520,766 1,392,159
600 16 2,079,190 1,881,379 220,091 8,012,680 1,100,454
800 16 1,765,370 1,602,791 180,607 6,585,592 921,782
1000 16 1,576,419 1,442,091 157,521 5,729,352 816,822
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Figure 6.12: Average and maximum added delay due to channel saturation
the effect of high load on the ability of a nodes to process queries, we picked the
node with the highest average and maximum upstream and downstream delay from
each run. Figure 6.12 shows the results of this evaluation.
There is a general trend for upstream and downstream delay to decrease with in-
creasing node numbers. This is consistent with the decreasing bandwidth consump-
tion as update area sizes shrink and nodes experience less load. However, the delay
decreases less as node number get larger than 400 in contrast to the bandwidth
consumption that was decreasing at a similar rate all the way up to 1000 nodes.
This shows the burstiness of traffic. The bandwidth consumption is also averaged
over times with no message exchange while the delay is recorded only when mes-
sages are sent and received. Since all nodes retrieve data at the same time with
generous timeouts to leave room for late messages, the bandwidth consumption will
average out while the bursty update area retrieve phase still causes messages to be
delayed.
The upstream delay generally tends to be slightly bigger than the downstream delay
which is most likely due to the fact that nodes send out all the query messages to
the replication zones at once on the upstream channel while the replies on the
downstream channel will not arrive at the same time.
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With r = 4, the average delay is always smaller than 100 ms and the maximum
delay is always smaller than one second. Both values are well below the assumed
maximum message latency of two seconds so bandwidth is high enough to process
queries with minimum delay. With r = 9, the average delay is around 100 ms so
most queries will be processed fast. However, the maximum delay increases to more
than one second. In combination with a high Internet message latency, this value
can actually cause some queries to not complete successfully reaching their timeout.
In the scenario with 200 nodes and r = 16, the average message latency is around
ten seconds meaning there is a node basically unable to retrieve any data or reply
to any query in time. Going to 400 nodes, some runs still have a high average delay
of one second while other stay below that mark. This correlates with the fact that
some runs were already able to store data reliably in this scenario while others lost
data. The maximum delay is still between one second and ten seconds, so some
queries will not be processed in time. Increasing node numbers to 1000, the average
delay with r = 16 shrinks to around 100 ms meaning most queries will be processed
in time while the maximum delay is still between one second and ten seconds. With
1000 nodes, bandwidth is generally sufficient to only rarely cause queries to not be
handled in time with replication factors r = 9 and r = 16.
Responsibility Areas and Stored Data
To find the cause for the high bandwidth consumption on some nodes inducing addi-
tional message delay, we analysed the sizes of responsibility areas and the amount of
data nodes are responsible for. Table 6.21 contains the distribution characteristics
for the amount of data stored on each node averaged over the ten test runs.
As expected, average ¯¯x and median ¯˜x data sizes strongly depend on the replication
factor and the number of nodes, increasing with higher replication factors and de-
creasing with higher node numbers. The large difference between minimum minx
and maximum maxx sizes and the large standard deviation s¯x show the distribu-
tion of data sizes to be quite uneven, similar to the bandwidth distribution. In
the extreme case, nodes with the highest amount of data store 40 times as much
data as nodes with the lowest amount of data. We analysed the correlation between
bandwidth distributions and the amount of stored data by calculating the sample
Pearson correlation coefficients between the distribution characteristics in table 6.22
using:
rxy =
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)√∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2 ∗
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
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Table 6.21: Average values of the distribution characteristics of the amount of data stored
per node
n r ¯¯x ¯˜x minx maxx s¯x
200 4 1,001,903 896,530 89,077 3,491,244 586,639
400 4 519,579 454,540 41,002 2,038,621 324,674
600 4 356,020 305,940 28,681 1,572,228 238,941
800 4 273,875 223,161 18,281 1,287,423 190,866
1000 4 224,879 177,676 14,525 1,102,621 162,156
200 9 2,221,983 1,977,324 261,386 7,730,659 1,263,569
400 9 1,159,852 1,043,833 117,382 4,216,658 666,454
600 9 793,701 701,961 64,853 3,087,692 464,685
800 9 611,708 542,879 50,873 2,527,772 363,721
1000 9 502,412 440,936 41,016 2,084,350 302,606
200 16 3,845,811 3,433,743 431,467 13,552,313 2,180,240
400 16 2,044,399 1,829,569 172,586 7,316,606 1,161,363
600 16 1,412,377 1,270,325 128,280 6,188,916 800,310
800 16 1,086,139 974,240 107,865 4,251,297 607,026
1000 16 888,495 794,649 81,789 3,713,642 502,852
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Table 6.22: Correlation coefficients of distribution characteristics
Distribution 1 Distribution 2 ¯¯x ¯˜x minx maxx s¯x
Bandwidth Data 0.9070 0.9122 0.9289 0.8585 0.8981
Data Voronoi 0.9994 0.9991 0.9917 0.9976 0.9994
Voronoi Maintenance 0.9995 0.9997 0.9856 0.9934 0.9982
Data Maintenance 0.9980 0.9979 0.9969 0.9880 0.9961
Update Result Set 0.9820 0.9838 0.2743 0.9645 0.9778
Bandwidth Result Set 0.9460 0.9443 0.1926 0.9350 0.9531
The correlation coefficients indicated a significant correlation between the amount of
stored data and the bandwidth consumption. The only exception is the correlation
coefficient of the maximum maxx. This is most likely due to the fact that there might
be nodes storing a lot of inactive player character data that will not be requested
during the update process.
If objects are evenly distributed, the amount of data stored should mainly depend
on the size of a node’s responsibility area. Therefore, once per update interval
when the node queries its update area, we recorded the size of its Voronoi cell and
of its maintenance area. Table 6.23 shows the characteristics of Voronoi cell sizes
distributions averaged over the ten test runs.
As expected, average ¯¯x and median ¯˜x Voronoi cell sizes show the same characteristics
as the distribution of stored data. They strongly depend on the replication factor and
the number of nodes, increasing with higher replication factors and decreasing with
higher node numbers. The large difference between minimum minx and maximum
maxx sizes and the large standard deviation s¯x shows the same uneven distribution.
The correlation between Voronoi cell size and the amount of stored data is shown
in table 6.22, again indicating a significant correlation.
Since nodes store all dynamic objects inside their circular maintenance area and
not only inside their Voronoi cell, we also recorded the sizes of maintenance ar-
eas yielding the distribution characteristics shown in table 6.24. The distribution
characteristics are very similar to the characteristics of the Voronoi cell sizes, also
showing a very strong correlation to Voronoi cell sizes as can be seen in table 6.22.
However, the absolute difference shows maintenance areas to be more than twice as
big as Voronoi cells on average. This is consistent with the additional numbers of
replicas created due to overlapping areas as shown in table 6.13. Apparently, the
shapes of Voronoi cells are not as compact as supposed resulting in this comparably
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Table 6.23: Average values for Voronoi cell size distribution characteristics
n r ¯¯x ¯˜x minx maxx s¯x
200 4 893,382 796,776 107,613 2,925,142 486,386
400 4 448,825 406,616 63,643 1,506,821 238,767
600 4 299,595 266,798 49,244 1,137,822 159,662
800 4 224,679 201,638 44,617 858,612 115,858
1000 4 179,732 163,138 34,783 628,639 89,450
200 9 2,009,908 1,764,654 288,718 7,351,443 1,160,537
400 9 1,009,793 893,986 146,927 3,717,551 560,727
600 9 674,079 595,196 106,831 2,689,205 370,605
800 9 505,535 450,221 96,032 2,117,257 268,426
1000 9 404,397 360,888 83,422 1,651,821 209,560
200 16 3,542,585 3,085,236 450,883 13,884,378 2,114,902
400 16 1,795,159 1,558,933 224,575 6,597,142 1,034,184
600 16 1,198,367 1,060,174 179,571 5,388,986 680,129
800 16 898,629 796,718 159,476 3,447,660 488,084
1000 16 718,733 637,102 139,885 2,945,922 382,182
Table 6.24: Average values for maintenance area size distribution characteristics
n r ¯¯x ¯˜x minx maxx s¯x
200 4 1,958,678 1,762,719 274,100 6,771,109 1,054,042
400 4 964,931 860,826 154,547 3,490,365 511,146
600 4 633,954 565,456 89,815 2,515,736 335,348
800 4 470,399 422,121 75,402 2,450,055 245,418
1000 4 372,008 336,373 56,341 1,424,132 185,494
200 9 4,484,391 3,990,657 755,857 14,805,793 2,528,267
400 9 2,208,375 1,939,256 306,902 7,948,126 1,222,903
600 9 1,438,197 1,262,802 219,338 5,482,398 782,298
800 9 1,067,474 951,108 170,490 4,490,816 569,668
1000 9 847,111 753,480 139,950 3,676,084 444,652
200 16 8,351,765 7,140,488 1,135,380 34,686,912 5,204,762
400 16 4,009,264 3,455,413 437,957 14,816,166 2,330,788
600 16 2,652,790 2,326,981 358,452 11,599,003 1,536,663
800 16 1,944,689 1,697,430 277,241 8,853,076 1,094,088
1000 16 1,527,495 1,336,350 231,665 6,743,377 832,388
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large increase in area size. On the other hand, the increased overlap created by the
larger maintenance areas also has positive effects when it comes to the resilience
against attackers.
The correlation between maintenance area sizes and the amount of stored data is
also shown in table 6.22, suggesting the correlation to be as strong as the correlation
of Voronoi cell sizes to the amount of stored data. The most likely reason for the
correlation not becoming even stronger is the fact that the 4000 inactive out of 5000
player characters make up a significant share of the stored data. Inactive player
characters are static data only stored once per zone based on the non-overlapping
Voronoi cells. Therefore, the amount of stored data equally depends on the size of
the maintenance area and the size of the Voronoi cell.
The bandwidth consumption does not directly depend on the amount of stored
data or the sizes of maintenance areas. It depends on the amount of requested
and transferred data. There is only an indirect connection as the requested data
depends on the update areas determined by the maintenance areas. Therefore, we
will analyse the correlation between bandwidth consumption and processed queries
in the next section.
Query Result Sizes
The vast majority of transferred data can be accounted to the data retrieved during
the update process. Messages to query or store data possibly routed over multi-
ple hops are much smaller than the set of replicas returned in response to such a
query. Therefore, we recorded the size of the returned result sets of the update area
retrievals as well as the size of the retrieved areas to evaluate their correlation. Ta-
ble 6.25 shows the distribution characteristics of the amount of data returned after
retrieving the update area of a node. The amount of data transferred is consid-
erably higher than the shown amount, as possibly redundant replicas are returned
from each of the r replication zones.
Table 6.26 contains the same characteristics for the distribution of retrieved update
area sizes. Since the update area is derived from the maintenance area by adding
the maximum influence range to the radius, its sizes are generally bigger but the
distribution characteristics show the same trend of increasing with replication factor
and decreasing with node numbers. Furthermore, the distribution is just as uneven
causing some nodes to retrieve much more data than others. The only notable
difference is the larger relative increase in the minimum area size minx which is due
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Table 6.25: Average values for update area retrieval data size distribution characteristics
n r ¯¯x ¯˜x minx maxx s¯x
200 4 457,507 422,019 66,593 1,335,537 217,050
400 4 285,373 262,272 40,262 920,329 137,999
600 4 224,183 203,553 27,272 752,130 113,375
800 4 194,860 174,856 23,271 714,515 102,647
1000 4 177,523 158,044 19,452 660,167 97,158
200 9 920,314 855,110 160,874 2,817,404 451,693
400 9 565,061 518,292 77,669 1,848,154 282,716
600 9 436,215 397,339 48,781 1,537,861 217,639
800 9 374,612 341,634 44,145 1,387,661 190,400
1000 9 336,991 305,741 36,154 1,216,179 172,041
200 16 1,474,925 1,358,009 0 4,907,005 763,911
400 16 935,665 849,367 111,770 3,164,804 476,111
600 16 728,036 662,009 86,953 2,763,084 370,125
800 16 614,299 559,467 67,917 2,287,304 310,333
1000 16 545,767 498,393 57,577 1,991,206 275,960
to the larger relative effect of adding the same constant maximum influence range
to small areas.
The correlation of update area and result set size distribution characteristics is shown
in table 6.22, suggesting very strong correlations between sizes of the retrieved areas
and the contained data. The weak correlation of the minimum area and result set
size are just a result of some queries in the scenario with r = 16 and 200 nodes
not being able to complete successfully returning an empty result despite the large
retrieved area. Looking at the correlation between result set sizes and bandwidth
consumption in table 6.22, there is a strong correlation between the two. Only the
minimum value appears to be uncorrelated but this is due to the same issue as
before. We conclude the main reason for the uneven distribution lies in the uneven
distribution of retrieved update areas. Since the latter depends on the maintenance
areas which in turn depend on the Voronoi cells, the uneven distribution of Voronoi
cell size is the major cause for the uneven bandwidth distribution. Other factors
like uneven distribution of objects in the world at hotspots do not seem to have a
major influence.
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Table 6.26: Average values for update area size distribution characteristics
n r ¯¯x ¯˜x minx maxx s¯x
200 4 2,469,591 2,264,611 489,818 7,723,169 1,178,801
400 4 1,333,347 1,221,104 324,273 4,183,228 597,517
600 4 938,731 863,422 226,378 3,108,294 404,616
800 4 737,667 683,847 203,783 3,029,458 303,561
1000 4 613,523 573,378 171,610 1,877,254 235,924
200 9 5,239,094 4,730,160 1,092,301 16,195,553 2,725,470
400 9 2,747,941 2,464,274 534,053 8,976,225 1,359,649
600 9 1,880,583 1,692,529 415,368 6,343,249 889,351
800 9 1,453,524 1,328,233 347,374 5,269,075 659,845
1000 9 1,194,943 1,092,602 303,296 4,385,024 523,094
200 16 9,364,230 8,119,082 1,541,429 36,799,040 5,493,017
400 16 4,723,306 4,145,699 702,666 16,208,901 2,521,836
600 16 3,240,294 2,899,126 599,444 12,834,991 1,689,194
800 16 2,453,193 2,190,656 494,157 9,934,584 1,221,452
1000 16 1,982,691 1,777,544 432,879 7,693,245 941,907
The sizes of result sets and the bandwidth consumption decrease as node numbers
increase because the world state is the same for all tested node numbers. To find out
whether the number of messages a node has to receive to complete a query also scales
with the network size, we recorded the number of messages necessary to complete a
query and calculated the averages for the different query types. Since the number
of messages will always increase with the replication factor, we also normalized it
yielding the average number of messages from each replication zone. The results are
shown in table 6.27.
In one zone, only one node stores the replicas of all actions of one player. From
each zone, only one node will answer a request for player actions. After r/2 answers
from all zones came in, the request can be completed. This means the number of
messages is independent from the total number of nodes. It depends only on the
number of zones.
The area of interest has constant size. The average number of nodes overlapping
that area in a zone depends on the sizes of maintenance areas with bigger areas
leading to fewer nodes overlapping the requested area. The maintenance areas are
biggest with low node numbers and high replication factor and smallest with a high
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Table 6.27: Number of messages per query result
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200 4 2.00 0.50 10.04 2.51 5.67 2.83 21.29 5.32 3.03 0.76
400 4 2.00 0.50 11.53 2.88 5.00 2.50 23.98 6.00 3.68 0.92
600 4 2.00 0.50 11.05 2.76 4.99 2.49 25.58 6.40 4.21 1.05
800 4 2.00 0.50 10.78 2.70 5.40 2.70 26.96 6.74 4.71 1.18
1000 4 2.00 0.50 11.55 2.89 5.44 2.72 28.04 7.01 5.18 1.30
200 9 5.00 0.56 19.65 2.18 10.01 2.00 42.12 4.68 6.56 0.73
400 9 5.00 0.56 28.76 3.20 11.10 2.22 47.78 5.31 7.40 0.82
600 9 5.00 0.56 27.36 3.04 11.33 2.27 51.05 5.67 8.19 0.91
800 9 5.00 0.56 27.94 3.10 11.64 2.33 53.64 5.96 8.94 0.99
1000 9 5.00 0.56 27.21 3.02 12.52 2.50 55.64 6.18 9.59 1.07
200 16 8.01 0.50 37.91 2.37 23.06 2.88 63.67 3.98 10.30 0.64
400 16 8.01 0.50 44.89 2.81 25.29 3.16 76.74 4.80 11.34 0.71
600 16 8.00 0.50 48.60 3.04 22.26 2.78 82.62 5.16 12.05 0.75
800 16 8.00 0.50 54.12 3.38 23.35 2.92 85.14 5.32 12.48 0.78
1000 16 8.00 0.50 48.71 3.04 23.28 2.91 88.07 5.50 13.16 0.82
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number of nodes and a low replication factor. Thus, the scenario with 200 nodes
and r = 16 features the smallest average number of messages per zone while 1000
nodes and r = 4 features the highest for retrieving the area of interest.
The same trend of increasing message numbers can be seen in the columns for
join area and neighbour fail retrievals, despite the higher variation due to the low
number of node joins and departures. The sizes of the requested areas are dynamic
and depend on the area sizes of the involved nodes. Although the area sizes are
bigger with higher replication factors, the number of messages per zone is about
the same for the same number of nodes but different replication factors. As the
requested area sizes vary, so do the areas of the nodes they overlap and the number
of overlapped areas stays the same.
However, for the retrieval of the update areas, we see the message numbers per
zone increase as replication factors and maintenance area sizes decrease. This is
again an effect of the requested update area being the maintenance area increased
by the maximum influence range. With smaller maintenance areas, the requested
update areas become larger in relation and will overlap more maintenance areas at
the destination.
This actually suggests that there is a second limit to the scalability in addition to
the world and its content being too small for increasing player numbers. As player
numbers go towards infinity, the maintenance area sizes will converge towards zero.
However, the requested update area sizes will always have a constant minimum size
with the maximum influence range as radius. Therefore, the number of maintenance
areas overlapped by the requested update area and thus the number of messages per
query will also converge towards infinity. At the same time, most nodes will probably
just send back empty answers as the area they are responsible for does not contain
any data and the total amount of transferred data still only depends on the size of
the requested area. However, we expect this effect to become a limit only for much
higher node numbers. In our scenarios, the average number of messages from each
zone lies between four and seven which is still reasonable value. If the number of
nodes really becomes too high in relation to the replication factor, the replication
factor can always be increased.
Path Lengths
Returning results to area queries makes up most of the data transferred by the stor-
age. As query response messages are always transferred directly, they will generally
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Table 6.28: Average hop counts per query type
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200 4 0.7502 1.1858 1.8248 1.7633 1.7636 1.4817
400 4 0.7501 1.2697 1.8616 1.8320 1.8178 1.6639
600 4 0.7501 1.3233 1.8831 1.8022 1.8474 1.7729
800 4 0.7501 1.3631 1.8919 1.7851 1.8722 1.8560
1000 4 0.7501 1.3971 1.8995 1.7726 1.8936 1.9270
200 9 0.8890 1.1097 1.7561 1.7073 1.8653 1.3190
400 9 0.8890 1.1768 1.8156 1.7640 1.9185 1.4576
600 9 0.8890 1.2167 1.8416 1.7625 1.9401 1.5440
800 9 0.8891 1.2456 1.8570 1.7714 1.9598 1.6099
1000 9 0.8890 1.2694 1.8655 1.7867 1.9748 1.6597
200 16 0.9380 1.0703 1.7106 1.7559 1.8943 1.2432
400 16 0.9376 1.1298 1.7865 1.7683 1.9446 1.3595
600 16 0.9376 1.1670 1.8170 1.7949 1.9733 1.4403
800 16 0.9377 1.1954 1.8368 1.7639 1.9849 1.5029
1000 16 0.9376 1.2163 1.8472 1.7670 1.9947 1.5499
need only one hop. Queries might still be routed over multiple hops. Therefore we
evaluated the average path lengths of the different query types in table 6.28.
For all types of messages, the average hop count is smaller than two. For messages
to store player actions the average path length is actually smaller than one, because
the replica in the storing node’s zone is stored at the node itself. Furthermore, every
player always sends his actions to the same positions so there is not much change
in the paths.
The set of retrieved player actions changes depending on the players in a node’s
update area so the path length should be logarithmic with the number of nodes.
The path length actually increases with the number of nodes, but only slightly.
Apparently, the set of players in the update area does not change fast so shortcuts
will be used to send the following queries to retrieve the actions from the same player
so the average path length gets closer to one.
210 Chapter 6 Evaluation
All area retrieve messages have a longer path length than action retrieval messages
as they first have to reach a point in the requested area and create a multicast
tree covering that area afterwards. For neighbour fail, join area, and update area
retrievals, the retrieved area is related to the node’s own area and the routing table
will cause the retrieve message to reach the target area in one hop only. The number
of hops in the multicast tree depends on the size of the requested area, so it slightly
increases with the increasing area sizes of neighbour fail, join area, and update area
retrievals.
The fact that the average path length for update area retrievals is still below two
might surprise. Requesting an area larger than the average Voronoi cell size should
on average create a multicast tree with minimum height one as at least two nodes
should be covered by the requested area. However, the request message to the node’s
own replication zone does not need the one hop to get into other zones. The node
will start the multicast directly itself so saving this one hop brings the average down
below two. The effect of this one zone also diminishes with increasing replication
factor.
Finally, the average path lengths for retrieving the area of interest is mostly still
below the values for update area retrievals. Although the retrieved AOI changes with
the current player position and retrieve messages should be routed to the destination
zones over multiple hops, it does not change fast enough so shortcuts will keep the
length of the first part of the path down to one hop most of the time. The height of
the multicast tree is lower than the height for update area retrievals since the AOI
is smaller, creating the smaller average values. One exception is the scenario with
1000 nodes and r = 4. There, Voronoi cells got so small that the constant AOI size
together with the longer paths to the multicast start cause a slightly higher path
length in that case.
In general, the average path lengths stays very short as node numbers increase.
Even if the maximum values are bigger, upon the second retrieval of the same data,
shortcuts will keep the path lengths small. Therefore, increased message latency
due to multi-hop routing should not have a negative impact on the ability of the
storage to process queries and update its data as the network size increases.
6.4.4 Resilience
To determine the resilience of the storage, we had to find out how many malicious
nodes the storage can tolerate before they were able to successfully tamper with
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data. The test scenarios and the behaviour of malicious nodes will be described
in the following two sections. Afterwards, we first analyse the data at the end of
each test run looking for data that was successfully tampered with. Second, we also
evaluate the influence of malicious nodes on the different types of queries to find out
which types are most vulnerable.
Scenario Setup
From our storage test scenarios described in section 6.4.1, we picked the largest
scenario with 1000 nodes and an inter-arrival distribution mean value of 7 seconds.
Again, we used r = 4, 9, 16 and performed ten test runs each varying the number of
malicious nodes trying to find a scenario where data starts to get tampered. From
the thousand nodes, we first started the honest nodes and the malicious nodes last.
As we have shown, starting the malicious nodes earlier would not make a difference
as they will always only have a proportional influence. In the different scenarios,
we only varied the number of malicious nodes – the remaining setting deciding on
node IDs, times of join and departure, and on message latencies where identical.
Therefore, if there are two runs, one of a scenario with 20 malicious nodes and
another one with 21 malicious nodes, they will run identical except for the fact
that node number 980 will additionally act maliciously on the second run. More
precisely, the times of node join, node departure, and node IDs are the same. Upon
the first node sending a different message, latencies for messages will be different.
However, it is still easier to compare runs of different scenarios to find the cause for
data tampering this way.
Malicious Node Behaviour
The goal of a malicious node is to modify the stored data so it does not represent the
correct state of the virtual world. We decided to give the attacker as much power
as theoretically possible so we can determine how resilient the storage really is.
A malicious node will act very aggressively, tampering with every type of query if
it gets a chance to. There is no procedure in place to detect and punish tampering
nodes so trying to tamper with everything will give malicious nodes the biggest in-
fluence. Furthermore, where coordination of malicious nodes is necessary to tamper
successfully, we assume the attacker can coordinate tampering perfectly in zero time
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using all the information available to his malicious nodes. Malicious nodes also con-
tinue to try to get an increased share in honest nodes’ routing tables as described
in section 6.3.4.
When a malicious node receives an area query and the multicast has already started,
it can only tamper with data in its responsibility area. If the query is requesting
dynamic data, the malicious node will not tamper with data overlapping the main-
tenance areas of honest neighbours that will also receive the query as shown in
figure 5.6. Doing this would create conflicting versions of the same object and the
receiver will discard the result from this replication zone. Therefore, the malicious
node first calculates the non-overlapping area where it can actually tamper with
data. If static data is requested, data in its whole Voronoi cell can be modified.
A malicious node can only tamper successfully if it obtains at least a relative majority
for its tampered replicas. When the first malicious node receives a query, it can
already predict which malicious nodes in other replication zones will receive the
same query and it also knows which areas they can tamper with without creating
conflicting versions. Then it calculates the sub-area of the requested area where
most of its tampering areas overlap. It will tamper with all data in this area and
return the result. When the malicious nodes in the other areas receive the query,
they will tamper with the same data and return it. Finally, the attacker will have
a number of votes for the tampered state equalling the number of replication zones
where he had overlapping areas of tampering.
If a malicious node receives a query but its tampering area does not overlap the
tampering areas of other malicious nodes, it will still tamper with data to prevent
a correct result from being sent back. It is still better for a malicious node to have
another incorrect answer in the voting set at the receiver because it increases its
chances to get a majority for a tampered result.
Figure 6.13 shows how the responsibility areas of malicious nodes mapped to the
world area overlap the requested area A. Node a joins and requests its own area A.
Nodes m1, ...,m4 are malicious nodes in different replication zones. Their responsi-
bility areas M1, ...,M4 overlap the requested area A in their respective zone. M1,
M2, and M3 all overlap A in a small common area T . By tampering only with data
in this area m1, m2, and m3 can obtain three votes for a tampered state. Node m4
does not overlap T , but also tampers with data in its area to reduce the number of
correct votes.
If a malicious node receives an area query where the multicast has not started yet, it
can claim responsibility for the requested area by reporting a wrong neighbourhood.
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Figure 6.13: Malicious nodes overlapping a requested area tamper with data in area T to
obtain three votes
Therefore, it will reply with a tampered result matching the objects the attacker
could tamper with in other zones. If there are no other zones where the attacker
controls malicious nodes also receiving the query, the node will make up tampered
data in the requested area anyway.
In addition to tampering with area queries, malicious nodes will also tamper with
retrievals of stored player actions and with the storing of player actions themselves.
They will try to prevent honest nodes from calculating correct updates of the world
state by dropping actions of honest players. Whenever a malicious node receives a
request for player actions, it claims being responsible for storing these actions and
replies with an empty result, pretending the player did not perform any actions in
the latest interval. When a malicious node receives actions of players to be stored,
it neither stores nor forwards these actions to the responsible nodes. This way the
actions of players will not be stored and even honest might not be able to answer
queries for player actions correctly. Although this kind of tampering does not allow
to modify the state in any way like tampering with area queries does, we do not
differentiate between the two types as still malicious nodes were able cause incorrect
state to be created.
When an honest node retrieved a result containing tampered data and updates the
objects according to the retrieved result, the tampering will spread out to all objects
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within the maximum influence range of any retrieved tampered object. Since the last
state of the object was tampered, any other object this object could have influenced
up to the current update time must be considered as being tampered. The same
is true for any missing actions of a player character. All objects close enough to
this player character will be considered tampered. Spreading tampering this way
is a very conservative worst-case assumption as in practice, most objects will not
be affected this way. However, as this case can theoretically arise and we want to
estimate the worst-case resilience, we modelled tampering of state spreading out this
way.
Stored Data Evaluation
Table 6.29 shows the influence a varying number of malicious nodes had on the
stored data in the ten test runs with r = 9. The first line of each scenario with
m malicious nodes shows the number of honest nodes storing replicas that have
been tampered with. The second line shows the number of objects that have been
tampered successfully because the majority of replicas is tampered.
While 15 malicious nodes cannot cause any honest node to store tampered replicas in
any run, in run R3 with 18 and 19 nodes there is one honest node storing tampered
replicas. The same run is also the first where some objects were tampered with
successfully, while the other runs still do not contain tampered data. Apparently,
this run has some properties, probably the positions of nodes, giving the malicious
node the opportunity to tamper. As expected, data continues to be tampered in
this run as the number of malicious nodes is increased. With 25 malicious nodes,
the run R10 is the second run where honest nodes store tampered replicas and some
objects are tampered. With 30 malicious nodes, half of the runs contain tampered
data. With increasing number of malicious nodes, even more runs have tampered
data.
It is interesting to note that in the same run, increasing the number of honest nodes
containing tampered replicas does not necessarily mean more objects are tampered
successfully. Although more nodes store a tampered replica, tampered replicas might
still be in the minority. A possible reason is that the replicas got tampered just
recently and the majority being tampered will only happen at the next update.
However, it is also possible some honest nodes will continue to retrieve tampered
data because they have multiple malicious nodes in their top routing table layer.
If tampered replicas are still in the minority, nodes responsible for the same data
in other replication zones might still be able to obtain the majority for the correct
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Table 6.29: Honest nodes with tampered data and data with tampered majority for r = 9
m R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 242 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 99
0 0 235 0 0 0 0 0 0 663
30 37 0 39 0 0 0 87 0 0 98
36 0 241 0 0 0 510 0 0 703
35 46 0 75 0 136 0 85 0 0 100
106 0 152 0 928 0 118 0 0 427
40 157 99 175 77 141 2 248 92 0 216
1354 642 1695 266 1039 0 1248 459 0 1112
50 198 366 196 243 244 166 310 287 158 369
1375 2065 2055 1319 1482 802 1977 2560 847 2094
75 711 820 686 761 623 595 712 755 694 821
5694 7232 4617 5568 4570 4567 6539 7654 5513 7114
state. In the presence of malicious nodes, the storage cannot guarantee eventual
consistency even among the honest nodes only. However, in the end the decisive
factor is that the majority of replicas are not tampered with and this majority can
be retrieved by requesting nodes.
With regards to the level of resilience, with r = 9, the storage can only tolerate
up to 19 out of 1000 nodes being malicious equalling a 1.9% share of malicious
nodes before data gets tampered. First signs of tampering already appear at 1.8%.
Considering we tested only ten runs over a short period of time, the actual share of
malicious nodes the storage can withstand in all scenarios might still be lower.
Comparing this to the results with r = 4 shown in table 6.30, only two out of 1000
nodes being malicious could be tolerated in all ten runs, equalling a share of 0.2%.
Although most runs could tolerate up to six malicious nodes, run R6 already created
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tampered data with only three malicious nodes. Trying to find the cause for this
low resilience, we found reaching a constellation to tamper data is quite easy with
r = 4. It was not necessary to really have overlapping areas with malicious nodes in
multiple zones. One node just had a malicious node in its top routing table layer.
Requesting its update area, the node got one reply from a zone where a malicious
node had a maintenance area with parts not overlapping its neighbours’ maintenance
areas. The malicious node in the top layer also created a matching tampered vote.
The results from the other two zones were correct but since both votes were equal,
the tampered one was picked randomly. Considering that churn might also lead to
zones not being able to reply with correct results, it is clear that a replication factor
of r = 4 is not sufficient to provide a useful level of resilience. It is also interesting
to see that the timing of messages also has a big influence on tampering. In run R1,
tampering was possible with eight malicious nodes but not with nine or ten nodes.
Apparently, the different behaviour of the additional malicious nodes changed the
timing of messages in a way that tampering was no longer possible, although there
were more malicious nodes.
With r = 16, up to 38 malicious nodes could be tolerated in all ten runs as shown
in table 6.31. With 39 malicious nodes, the first run contained tampered data. This
means a share of 3.8% malicious nodes could be tolerated. With 60 malicious nodes,
four out of ten runs still did not contain tampered data while with 75 malicious
nodes, data was tampered in all runs. Compared to r = 9, twice the number
of malicious nodes could be tolerated with a little less than twice the replication
factors. However, this increase in resilience comes at a high bandwidth cost and the
level of resilience is still quite low. Furthermore, with more and longer test scenarios,
the final level might still be lower.
Query Evaluation
Table 6.32 contains the share of queries malicious nodes tried to tamper with. For
area retrievals, they were able to tamper the replica set from at least one replication
zone. For player action retrievals, malicious nodes either dropped action replicas
returned from at least one zone, they intercepted the storing of the actions, or
storing of a replica was delayed and so it could not be retrieved.
Since player actions make up the vast majority of retrievals as shown in table 6.17,
the share of queries malicious nodes try to tamper with of all queries mainly depends
on the share of player action retrievals. As shown in table 6.32 for r = 9, the total
share grows from 13% with 15 malicious nodes to 45% with 75 malicious nodes. At
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Table 6.30: Honest nodes with tampered data and data with tampered majority for r = 4
m R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 598 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 3 0 77 0 55 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 708 0 775 0 0
8 14 1 0 0 0 76 0 69 0 106
110 0 0 0 0 651 0 1274 0 1677
9 0 24 63 0 0 75 47 72 0 105
0 326 1225 0 0 676 626 1346 0 1434
10 0 0 68 49 51 78 105 134 48 105
0 0 1200 380 684 670 1437 2334 848 1426
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Table 6.31: Honest nodes with tampered data and data with tampered majority for r = 16
m R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
39 0 0 92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 189 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
40 0 0 92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 233 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
45 0 0 89 0 0 0 0 56 0 0
0 0 164 0 0 0 0 94 0 0
49 0 0 80 2 0 89 0 86 0 0
0 0 60 0 0 213 0 415 0 0
60 1 0 103 151 51 140 3 165 87 2
0 0 545 438 47 891 0 795 283 0
75 61 236 213 282 94 252 249 348 334 256
187 834 512 1164 425 975 418 2085 1791 1112
100 565 585 697 675 491 674 637 717 644 543
3480 2844 3979 3401 2879 2417 3999 3785 3393 2314
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Table 6.32: Share of queries malicious nodes tried to tamper with for r = 9
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15 0.1302 0.1080 0.2857 0.1344 0.5697 0.1753
18 0.1497 0.1252 0.2794 0.1734 0.6296 0.2064
19 0.1564 0.1311 0.3595 0.1837 0.6491 0.2171
20 0.1622 0.1361 0.3235 0.1548 0.6707 0.2251
25 0.1992 0.1708 0.4203 0.1893 0.7471 0.2787
30 0.2319 0.2020 0.4853 0.2809 0.8033 0.3239
35 0.2622 0.2303 0.4853 0.3105 0.8589 0.3751
40 0.2910 0.2585 0.6176 0.3247 0.8945 0.4160
50 0.3416 0.3084 0.6912 0.4271 0.9388 0.4942
75 0.4494 0.4162 0.8000 0.5889 0.9868 0.6801
the same time, the share of update area retrievals malicious nodes tried to tamper
with increases from 57% to 99%. This much bigger share with 15 malicious nodes
shows that a lot more nodes are involved in retrieving an update area causing even a
small share of malicious nodes to be involved in nearly all update area retrievals. The
shares of the other area retrievals are smaller, depending on the sizes of the requested
areas. With 75 malicious nodes, data got tampered successfully so even honest nodes
return tampered data and nearly all update area queries are tampered. Since player
actions must be tampered with directly instead of tampering just spreading out,
only malicious nodes involved in the query can actually try to tamper and the share
of player action queries is lower at 42%
With r = 4 and less malicious nodes, the shares are much lower as shown in ta-
ble 6.33, only increasing above 10% for update area retrievals as data got tampered
successfully. On the other hand, with r = 16 shown in table 6.34 the share was much
higher with 96% of update area queries being influenced by only 35 malicious nodes.
However, due to the higher replication factor the storage is able to tolerate these high
shares without data getting tampered. Apparently, the share of queries malicious
nodes try to tamper with mainly depends on the share of malicious nodes.
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Table 6.33: Share of queries malicious nodes tried to tamper with for r = 4
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1 0.0082 0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0301 0.0084
2 0.0166 0.0126 0.1449 0.0938 0.0616 0.0174
3 0.0253 0.0194 0.1449 0.0935 0.0923 0.0278
4 0.0328 0.0246 0.1932 0.0935 0.1218 0.0393
5 0.0407 0.0308 0.1449 0.0719 0.1509 0.0454
6 0.0470 0.0357 0.1449 0.0762 0.1739 0.0515
7 0.0553 0.0423 0.1449 0.0752 0.2017 0.0608
8 0.0619 0.0471 0.1449 0.0752 0.2258 0.0708
9 0.0705 0.0546 0.1449 0.0815 0.2477 0.0797
10 0.0790 0.0609 0.1812 0.1333 0.2768 0.0934
Table 6.34: Share of queries malicious nodes tried to tamper with for r = 16
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35 0.3309 0.3089 0.8551 0.5412 0.9574 0.5027
37 0.3466 0.3247 0.7887 0.5000 0.9638 0.5267
38 0.3521 0.3304 0.8696 0.5292 0.9638 0.5321
39 0.3857 0.3651 0.8571 0.5018 0.9660 0.5640
40 0.3925 0.3722 0.8451 0.5075 0.9676 0.5699
45 0.4234 0.4035 0.8986 0.5568 0.9795 0.6102
49 0.4465 0.4271 0.9130 0.5625 0.9842 0.6389
60 0.5024 0.4842 0.9565 0.6176 0.9944 0.7083
75 0.5664 0.5504 0.9855 0.7000 0.9983 0.7720
100 0.6482 0.6345 0.9718 0.8115 0.9997 0.8673
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The queries malicious nodes could actually tamper with are shown in table 6.35
for r = 9. The first line for each scenario contains the number of tampered player
action retrievals while the second line contains the number of tampered update area
retrievals. As expected, for both types the number of tampered queries increases as
the number of malicious nodes grows. In runs where data was successfully tampered
as shown in table 6.29, there are both tampered player action queries and update area
queries. Conversely, there are runs with tampered player action queries and update
area queries that did not lead to data being tampered, e.g. the run R3 with 18 and
19 malicious nodes. In these runs, there is probably one node retrieving a tampered
update area five times without causing the majority of replicas being tampered.
There are also runs where player action retrievals where tampered causing nodes to
calculate incorrect updates, while not leading to tampered update area retrievals.
Apparently, the majority voting suppressed these incorrect replicas.
Probably most interesting is the fact that tampered update areas never appear
without tampered player action retrievals in contrast to the opposite direction. The
most likely explanation is that tampered player actions are actually the cause for
state getting tampered. Only the combination of some actions not being retrieved
successfully and some update area retrievals being tampered allows final successful
tampering. In these cases, cheaters can only tamper the state by dropping actions
of players. They cannot modify the state in any way they desire.
Only one run is an exception: the run R10 with 15 malicious nodes actually had one
tampered update area retrieval but no tampered player action retrieval. However,
as this is only one retrieval, it probably suffered from late messages returning the
results of honest nodes while only malicious nodes answered before the timeout. On
the next queries, the node was able to retrieve its update area correctly.
Looking at the same data obtained with r = 4 in table 6.36, there are actually runs
like R6 with tampered update area queries without tampered player action queries.
The reason for this is scenario we sketched before with one malicious node in the
top routing table layer and another zone containing a tampered object is sufficient
to tamper successfully, reinforcing our thesis that r = 4 is not sufficient to provide
a useful level of resilience.
On the other hand, the results obtained with r = 16 in table 6.37 are again very
similar to the results with r = 9. There was no tampered update area query without
a tampered player action query. Runs like R7 and R10 show that tampered player
action queries can be tolerated without necessarily causing tampered update area
queries. Furthermore, even if they lead to some tampered update area queries, data
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Table 6.35: Tampered player action and update area retrievals for r = 9
m R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
15 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
18 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
19 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
20 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 2 2 1
0 0 103 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
25 1 0 8 0 3 0 0 4 0 13
0 0 105 0 0 0 0 0 0 432
30 12 7 11 3 3 1 2 2 1 18
85 0 109 0 0 0 251 1 0 435
35 18 9 17 2 13 6 6 6 3 49
165 0 224 0 459 0 300 1 0 482
40 37 14 46 9 25 8 29 14 6 66
579 309 652 227 492 7 861 281 0 854
50 60 113 66 37 61 36 78 82 28 87
710 1320 920 965 1005 626 1321 1212 603 1472
75 450 496 250 473 421 204 622 465 298 942
3269 3833 2983 3655 2932 2601 3522 3508 3161 3742
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Table 6.36: Tampered player action and update area retrievals for r = 4
m R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 57 0 0 0 0
5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 264 0 0 0 0
7 0 1 0 3 0 2 0 2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 269 0 198 0 0
8 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 38
24 2 0 0 0 266 0 274 0 386
9 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 37
0 51 278 0 0 263 168 282 0 399
10 2 0 2 3 1 1 2 10 0 37
0 0 292 171 192 268 341 430 166 393
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Table 6.37: Tampered player action and update area retrievals for r = 16
m R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
39 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 2 0 1
0 0 333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
40 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
0 0 334 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
45 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 3 1 0
0 0 335 0 0 0 0 135 0 1
49 0 0 5 4 3 1 3 13 0 0
0 0 340 11 0 258 2 355 0 1
60 4 1 10 8 4 8 8 39 8 4
5 0 459 658 160 616 17 808 349 11
75 17 29 46 64 47 29 33 113 75 31
330 871 873 1262 513 1006 794 1514 1445 926
100 143 113 490 362 208 280 271 476 505 162
2592 2578 3427 3326 2507 3320 3083 3517 3599 2607
is not necessarily tampered successfully as can be seen in run R3 with 37 and 38
malicious nodes, not creating tampered data as shown in table 6.31.
Finally, we also counted the number of AOI retrievals returning tampered results as
shown in table 6.38 for r = 9. If data was tampered as shown in table 6.29, there
will definitely by AOI queries returning tampered results if player characters are in
the area of tampered data. There are some runs returning tampered AOIs without
data in the storage being tampered e.g. run R2 with 40 malicious nodes , meaning
malicious nodes where able to intercept the query and answer it instead. However,
compared to the around 6000 total AOI retrievals (see table 6.17, the vast majority
of AOI retrievals returned correct results if data was not tampered.
This situation was very similar with r = 4 as shown in table 6.39. There, run R6
with four and five malicious nodes even had no tampered AOI retrieves although
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Table 6.38: Tampered AOI retrievals for r = 9
m R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 53
30 4 0 14 0 0 0 13 1 0 59
35 2 0 16 2 58 0 15 1 0 44
40 59 40 106 11 63 1 104 32 0 109
50 74 178 146 92 117 75 117 121 62 204
75 482 753 407 630 530 387 620 610 496 778
data was tampered. Apparently, no player characters were in the tampered area.
Only very few AOI retrieves got tampered when there was no tampered data like in
run R1 with nine and ten malicious nodes.
With r = 16 shown in table 6.40, there was no single run where tampered AOI
results were returned without any honest node containing tampered data as shown
in table 6.31. Furthermore, only run R7 with 60 malicious nodes returned tampered
AOI results without data being tampered successfully. Thus, with higher replication
factors, AOI retrieves are very resilient although their path length is larger than the
path length of update area retrievals.
6.4.5 Discussion
Drawing final conclusions about the long-term reliability of our storage is a little
problematic since our test runs have been very short since performing tests was so
time-consuming. We opted to evaluate the storage in a larger variety of different
scenarios instead of just performing a few long runs with churn being the only source
of variation.
Considering our test scenarios with r = 4 and r = 9, even r = 4 was sufficient to
not lose data and to update the state of the world correctly over the course of the
test runs. As no more than two replication zones had nodes joining or failing in
the same are in the same update interval, the majority voting caused all replicas to
regain a consistent and correct state at the end of the run. Over longer durations,
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Table 6.39: Tampered AOI retrievals for r = 4
m R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 1 0 34 0 51 0 0
8 10 0 0 1 0 38 0 103 0 71
9 1 18 81 1 0 35 46 81 0 70
10 2 0 76 22 45 34 102 177 19 69
Table 6.40: Tampered AOI retrievals for r = 16
m R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
39 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
40 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
45 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
49 0 0 11 0 0 5 0 6 0 0
60 0 0 27 35 8 29 4 57 15 0
75 15 63 32 62 24 43 37 157 120 79
100 232 202 455 338 274 261 351 481 390 215
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more than two zones experiencing join or leave will probably happen so using higher
replication factors like r = 9 would probably be advisable.
With r = 16, and smaller node numbers, the storage is not reliable in all scenarios
any more and a weakness becomes apparent: high bandwidth consumption. Band-
width requirements become so high that some nodes are not able to serve queries
and complete their queries, leading to incorrect and inconsistent updates in different
zones and even to complete loss of objects.
Considering the average bandwidth consumptions, the storage scales pretty well
with increasing node numbers as the bandwidth consumption actually decreases
if the world stays the same. However, this also means bandwidth consumption
increases with decreasing node numbers and it also increases with higher replication
factors as both lead to larger Voronoi cells per node. Each node, has to retrieve
larger update areas receiving more data in return and it also receives more queries
from other nodes it has to serve.
Unfortunately, the distribution of Voronoi cells governing the distribution of traffic
is not guaranteed to be even. There are some nodes with much larger areas than
the average Voronoi cell size, causing these nodes to have a much higher bandwidth
consumption than the rest. Apparently, performing a Voronoi tessellation on ran-
domly picked position does not create an even distribution, even if a rasterization
guarantees a minimum distance between positions. The inability to balance load
at runtime is a serious drawback of our approach, causing overload on nodes with
large Voronoi cells. However, using fixed CA-assigned IDs to distribute data is the
fundamental idea to prevent tampering, otherwise an attacker could just direct the
entire load to him by supplying abundant resources.
Since load balancing is not possible, every node needs sufficiently high bandwidth
to shoulder a much higher than average load, depending on the distances to the
nearest nodes currently present. In the smaller scenarios with r = 16, even our
assumed 100 MBit/s symmetric bandwidth exclusively available for our storage was
not adequate in all cases. In practice, with other applications running concurrently
generating traffic, it will probably take decades until all nodes of a network can be
guaranteed to have available bandwidth in this range. Otherwise, just a few slower
nodes with larger areas can make the storage unreliable.
Although decreasing bandwidth consumptions with increasing number of node seems
to be perfectly scalable, there are two kinds of limits for scalability. First, the
bandwidth only decreases because the world stayed the same. We designed it for
5000 players but had a maximum of 1000 players in the world, because in reality, only
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a fraction of players will be online at the same time, too. As player numbers increase,
at some point the world has to become larger and more objects have to be added
to the world, increasing bandwidth consumption again. In the end, each player
expects a certain amount of objects to be available for him to interact with them.
The world should not feel empty with players having to compete for interacting with
the objects in the world.
Second, as Voronoi cell sizes shrink with increasing node numbers, the requested
update area sizes increases in relation leading to update area queries overlapping
more nodes. As more nodes are involved in answering the query for one zone, chances
a malicious node is part of it and spoils the result increase, making the storage less
resilient.
Despite the storage being resilient to a certain number of malicious nodes depending
on the replication factor, the level of resilience is actually way below our expecta-
tions. We had hoped that the storage is guaranteed to withstand 10% to 20% of
nodes being malicious attackers with reasonable replication factors like r = 9 or
r = 16. However, to reach these numbers even higher replication factors would be
necessary at the cost of another considerable increase in bandwidth consumption.
Assuming sizes of Voronoi cells remain the same, the bandwidth consumption will in-
crease linearly with the replication factor. However, with the same number of nodes
increasing r also increases the Voronoi cell of a node by a linear amount. Although
the storage scales well with node numbers, this O(r2) dependency of the bandwidth
consumption causes improving resilience to be very expensive bandwidth-wise.
The cause of this low level of resilience is the sensitivity of the state update process
and the many ways an attacker has to tamper with it. Correct updating is only
possible if a majority of zones answered with a correct result without even one of
the nodes being malicious. If a malicious node is in the top-layer of the requesting
node’s routing table, it can reply with any forged state. If it is just one of multiple
answering nodes, it can either tamper with state if it controls areas overlapping in
multiple zones or it can choose to let the query in that zone fail to lower votes for
correct results.
Afterwards, all queries to retrieve the action of players in the update area have
to return a correct result, despite the queries possibly being routed over multiple
hops giving an attacker more chances to prevent successful return of data from a
zone. Furthermore, malicious nodes can also drop actions to be stored instead of
forwarding them. Since the storage also has to compensate occasional node join and
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leave in different zones, a one-time bad combination of different factors for malicious
nodes to exert influence can lead to an all-time tampering of state.
From all the different factors, the need to retrieve all player actions correctly for
a correct state update proved to be the main cause for the sensitivity. However,
this also means that malicious nodes could mainly indirectly tamper by dropping
actions of honest player. It was not possible for them to modify the world state
directly. This also opens up a possible future improvement. If retrieving actions of
players is much more sensitive, the replication factor could be increased even more
for player actions only – either by mapping actions to more position or by using
another second overlay or standard DHT with a much higher replication factor. As
actions are much smaller than world state, increasing the replication factor would
be possible without a drastic increase in bandwidth consumption.
One issue of practical relevance not appearing in our tests is variation of node
numbers over time. We used stable churn rates keeping the numbers about constant.
However, in practice the number of players in an MMORPG varies greatly. It is
usually highest in the evening and lowest in the night. An attacker not controlling
enough nodes to tamper in the evening could just wait for the night to come to
increase its relative share to allow tampering. Thus, additional means have to be
employed to prevent this. One could design the virtual world in a way so it appeals
to players all over the world and the number of player does not vary much. Since a
lot of players prefer a world where all people use the same language, it could also
be possible to simulate multiple virtual worlds on the same overlay also aiming at
keeping the numbers of nodes constant.

Chapter 7
Conclusions
To conclude this thesis, we will first summarize the results we achieved and the
lessons learned. Afterwards, we will give an outlook on future directions that could
be followed on the path towards real peer-to-peer-based MMVEs.
7.1 Summary
Realizing virtual worlds based on peer-to-peer technology has spawned a lot of inter-
est as it could improve scalability compared to current client/server-based MMVEs
and more importantly, it could reduce costs of operating the MMVE. For all virtual
worlds, cheating is a serious threat. Most MMVEs being games involving compe-
tition among players will lead to some players trying to cheat and break the rules
of the virtual world to get an unfair advantage. Players want a fair competition. If
cheating is possible, they will not play the game and look for a better one.
There are two types of rules defined by the operator, we called them codified rules
and uncodified rules. Codified rules are in-world rules implemented in executable
code specifying how the world looks like, what actions can be performed by players,
and how the world evolves according to player actions. Through uncodified rules,
the operator imposes additional restrictions on player behaviour, e.g. by forbidding
game automation or collusion. As uncodified rules are concerned with the real world
in contrast to codified rules, there is no way to prevent breaking them. Cheaters
breaking these rules can only be detected and punished and procedures to do this
must be in place in client/server-based as well as peer-to-peer-based MMVEs.
However, peer-to-peer-based MMVEs open up additional ways of breaking codified
rules compared to a client/server solution. A central server is the only authority
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on the world state, updating it according to actions sent by the players. For every
action, it can always decide whether this action is possible according to the rules and
apply the correct effects of that action. Furthermore, the server is the only source
of information about the world for the clients. For a peer-to-peer-based MMVE to
be scalable, the state of the world must be distributed among the nodes. Therefore,
malicious node can modify the state they are storing. Furthermore, messages are
exchanged in a decentralized fashion and malicious nodes can always try to tamper
with messages coming their way. Since the nodes are under physical control of the
player, a cheater could modify code and data on the node without other nodes
knowing whether he is honest or acts maliciously.
So far, approaches to realize peer-to-peer-based MMVEs have either not considered
cheating or they relied on the existence of trusted nodes known to be honest to deal
with cheating. We were interested to find out whether dealing with cheating is also
possible without trusted honest nodes, just assuming only a certain percentage of
node belongs to cheaters. We have developed a hybrid architecture consisting of an
overlay allowing local event and state exchange to perform the distributed simulation
of the virtual world around the current position of a player and a persistent storage
performing a distributed simulation of the whole world while protecting the world
state from being tampered with. This way, there is always a reliable distributed
authority nodes can use to retrieve the correct state.
Our storage is based on two main ideas. First, to make sure game state only evolves
according to codified rules, a correct state should only be calculated based on an old
state known to be correct and the actions performed by players. Thus, every node
can check whether executing an action is allowed based on the old state and calculate
the new state based on the rules. Analysing this update process, we observed the
state in an area at a certain time depends on the state in a larger area around this
area at an older time. The added radius depends on two factors: the maximum
speed at which effects can propagate in the virtual world and the age of the old
state, yielding a maximum influence range of objects that can have an influence
on the state in the area to update. However, this dependency is the main reason
why the local event exchange overlay alone cannot ensure world state to update
correctly.
Therefore, our second idea is to replicate the world in different zones, to allow suc-
cessful retrieving of the old correct state in the presence of malicious nodes. In every
zone, an event-based simulation of the world is performed leading to consistent state
evolution among all zones in areas not suffering from late messages or tampering
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by malicious nodes. Nodes can retrieve the replicas from the zones independently
from one another and perform a majority voting to retrieve the correct state. Since
malicious nodes cannot influence the areas they are responsible for, there is a high
probability for the state to be correct depending on the number of malicious nodes
and the chosen replication factor.
In addition to preventing state tampering, timing cheats, inconsistency cheats, and
information exposure can be prevented to a certain degree. Since nodes must store
their generated actions before a certain time in all replication zones, there is no use
for cheaters to delay these messages. However, they can still delay or drop these
actions on the local event exchange overlay, effectively causing honest players to see a
wrong state until the next lookup of the state using the storage. Since it is impossible
to prove a cheater has not sent a message if he claims he did, a detection and
punishment procedure could be used. Furthermore, a tit-for-tat strategy blinding
or delaying actions to players blinding an honest player could be used in the local
event exchange. At the same time, a malicious node sending different actions to
different players to cause inconsistencies can be detected and punished quite easily
as it sent out the proof itself. Within the storage, a malicious node can always
cause inconsistencies by tampering with its replicas and the majority voting will
compensate for that with a certain probability. Finally, information exposure is
limited as the storage will only give out area information to nodes that are currently
in that area or that are responsible for updating that area. This way, a single
malicious node can only obtain information beyond its in-world perception range in
the area it is actually responsible for.
We have shown the storage to store and update data reliably without the presence
of malicious nodes. We have also shown it to scale well with the number of nodes.
However, the absolute numbers for bandwidth consumption are very high with high
replication factors, way beyond the capacity of current DSL connections. Further-
more, some nodes face a much higher load than others. We cannot allow dynamic
load balancing based on available resources, since this could be exploited by an at-
tacker by providing more resources than others. Therefore, every node can face a
high load load depending on which other nodes are currently present and all nodes’
bandwidth capacities must be able to accommodate these high loads. The level of
resilience we could achieve with replication factors up to 16 was still quite low. The
share of coordinated malicious nodes the storage could tolerate with r = 16 was
only 4% during short tests. With more diverse scenarios and longer tests runs this
number might still be too optimistic. On the other hand, bringing 40 coordinated
malicious nodes to attack an overlay of 1000 nodes still requires some effort by an
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attacker. This number can be increased by further increasing the replication factor.
However, bandwidth consumption grows with the square of the replication factor if
the number of nodes stays the same so it does not scale well with the replication
factor. In the next section, we will discuss some ideas to reduce the bandwidth
consumption to allow the storage to tolerate even more malicious nodes.
The storage is based on a peer-to-peer overlay allowing communication among nodes
and also realizing a mapping function to partition the data space into Voronoi cells
and assign responsibilities for storing data. Similar to other structured peer-to-
peer overlays realizing a distributed hash table, it allows to use the data key as
an address to send messages to the responsible node to store and retrieve data.
In our overlay, keys are the two-dimensional positions of objects. By connecting
nodes of neighbouring Voronoi cells, the overlay creates a Delaunay graph structure
allowing executing range queries efficiently. This structure is maintained using a
self-stabilizing algorithm.
We map the area of the virtual world to the ID space of the overlay and pick node IDs
from that space in a special way to partition the ID space into different zones where
nodes in each zone can perform their own simulation of the virtual world. Using
three-dimensional routing tables, we realize short routing paths while allowing the
retrieval of data from different replication zones on disjoint paths as required by the
storage. We have shown the overlay maintenance to work reliably and to scale well
with the number of nodes with bandwidth requirements far below the requirements
of the storage.
Furthermore, the overlay maintenance is resilient against malicious nodes trying to
increase their influence in the overlay beyond their proportional share. This resilient
maintenance is necessary for redundant message exchange and voting to contain the
influence of cheaters to work. However, malicious nodes still have ways to cause
temporary disorder in the overlay. This behaviour can only be detected and nodes
should be punished by exclusion to prevent it in the future.
To conclude, we have shown that using redundancy to prevent state tampering in
a peer-to-peer-based MMVE of untrusted nodes works in principle. The bandwidth
required to realize a high level of resilience is very high. There are still open issues
and opportunities for improvements, we will discuss in the next section.
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7.2 Outlook
While we have shown that state tampering and related cheats can be prevented with
a certain probability, there are other types of cheats and misbehaviour that can only
be detected and punished. Some of these can be detected quite easily if the cheater
sends out the proof of cheating like he does when he sends out conflicting actions.
This proof can be presented to the CA and he can be punished by revoking his
certificate. Other misbehaviour like blinding players or causing temporary disorder
cannot be proven. If a single node detecting misbehaviour can punish another node
by just accusing it, then a cheater could easily accuse and punish honest nodes. If
accusations are raised it is only assured that one of the involved parties is a cheater.
To deal with these kinds of misbehaviour, detection and punishment strategies still
need to be developed.
To improve the excessive bandwidth requirements with high replication factors, sev-
eral techniques could be employed to reduce the amount of data transferred. As a
basic improvement, compressing data with some general purpose compression should
help to reduce bandwidth. Furthermore, from one update to the next, only a small
fraction of the variables of each object actually change, the position being the most
likely one for mobile objects. Therefore, a requesting node could include hashes of
the old state of objects into its query. The receiving nodes can check whether this
hash actually matches their old version of the data and only return the variables
of each object that have changed, while additional objects the requesting node did
not store before or non-matching objects are returned completely. This should lead
to a drastic reduction in bandwidth consumption. Another way to further decrease
bandwidth consumption would be to remove NPCs from areas without player char-
acters and to spawn them in a deterministic way according to the rules if players
get closer to an area. However, this would only decrease bandwidth consumption
on nodes that are not facing a high load anyway.
To solve the problem of very uneven load distribution, the operator could assign
positions dynamically upon node join by giving out certificates with shorter dura-
tions that need to be renewed instead of just assigning one static position. He could
keep track of the nodes in the network and assign positions in a way that new nodes
are placed where nodes currently have large Voronoi cells. While bandwidth re-
quirements for managing joining and leaving nodes will be higher than just creating
certificates for new players, it will still be much lower than a server actively involved
in simulating the world. Furthermore, the operator needs to supply a bootstrapping
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service that malicious nodes cannot tamper with anyway and using a trusted server
might be the best solution for this purpose.
There are also options for improving the resilience of the storage without increasing
the replication factor. Detection and punishment could also be employed as part
of the storage to detect nodes providing false answers and remove them upon de-
tection. If a node intercepting a query replies with a suspiciously big responsibility
area, additional queries can be sent out to prove this node reported an incorrect
neighbourhood. Furthermore, multipath routing as used by the overlay to fill rout-
ing tables could be used to route user messages on alternating paths as well. Due
to the high sensitivity of missing player actions leading to incorrect state updates,
using higher replication factors for player actions only might also increase resilience
without consuming too much bandwidth.
Finally, simulating multiple virtual worlds on the same overlay might help to counter
the problem of varying player numbers over the course of the day which could be
exploited by cheaters to increase their influence. At the same time, this could also
help to balance load and further limit information exposure e.g. by preferring nodes
to update areas in worlds their players are not in.
We think it would be worthwhile to explore some of the ideas we mentioned so
peer-to-peer-based MMVEs using untrusted nodes only have a chance of becoming
reality.
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2D two-dimensional
3D three-dimensional
ADSL asymmetric digital subscriber line
AI artificial intelligence
AOI area of interest
CA certification authority
DHT distributed hash table
DSL digital subscriber line
DVE distributed virtual environment
FIFO first in first out
FPS first-person shooter
GUID Globally Unique Identifier
IAD inter-arrival distribution
ID identifier
IP Internet Protocol
MMVE massively multiuser virtual environment
MMOG massively multiplayer online game
MMOG massively multiplayer online role-playing game
MTU maximum transfer unit
MUD multi-user dungeon
NAT Network Address Translation
NVE networked virtual environment
NPC non-player character
NTP Network Time Protocol
PVP player-versus-player
RAM random-access memory
SLD session length distribution
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
XNA XNA’s Not Acronymed
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